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Summary / Zusammenfassung  
Die Anwendung empirischer Forschung auf rechtliche Fragen der Corporate 
Governance hat in den letzten Jahren an Akzeptanz gewonnen. Empirische Forschung wird 
immer öfter in der rechtswissenschaftlichen Literatur rezipiert. In meiner Dissertation 
beschreibe ich zwei eigene experimentelle Untersuchungen, die für die Beantwortung von 
Fragen der Corporate Governance von großer Bedeutung sein können. Im ersten Kapitel 
führe ich die experimentelle Methode ein. Ich beschreibe die wichtigste Bausteine als auch 
die Vor- und Nachteile der experimentellen Forschung.  
Im zweiten Kapitel der Dissertation beschäftige ich mich mit den rechtlichen Fragen 
der Amtszeit und Abberufung von Vorstandsmitgliedern. Ich werte die deutsche 
Rechtsprechung aus, die sich mit dem Zweck und der Entstehung dieser Normen befasst, 
stelle aber auch alternative rechtliche Lösungen dar, die in anderen Rechtsystemen gelten. 
Außerdem verweise ich auf empirische Daten, die eine Diskrepanz zwischen den 
gesetzlichen Regeln und der tatsächlichen Dauer der Amtszeit zeigen. Weiterhin setze ich 
mich mit der ökonomische Theorie und empirischer Forschung auseinander, die die 
Auswirkung der Amtszeit als auch der Abberufungsregeln auf das menschliche Verhalten in 
einer Prinzipal-Agent-Beziehung untersuchen.  
Nach der Finanz- und Wirtschaftskrise in den Jahren 2007-2009 gab die 
rechtswissenschaftliche Expertengruppe „Reflection Group on the Future of EU Company 
Law“ eine Reihe von Empfehlungen zur Änderungen der gesellschaftsrechtlichen 
Vorschriften bezüglich der Amtszeit und Abberufung von Vorstandsmitgliedern einer 
Aktiengesellschaft ab. Die Expertengruppe empfahl, dass die EU-Mitgliedstaaten 
Aktiengesellschaften die Wahl zwischen verschiedenen Amtslaufzeiten erlauben sollten (von 
einem bis zu mehreren Jahren). Des Weiteren sollten Aktiengesellschaften die Möglichkeit 
haben, die Abberufungsregelung für den Vorstand auf eine Abberufung aus wichtigem 
Grund zu beschränken. Wie sich eine solche gesetzliche Regelung auf das Verhalten der 
Vorstandsmitglieder auswirkt, ist eine empirische Frage. Insbesondere ist es wichtig zu 
  
 
untersuchen, welche Konsequenzen Amtszeit und Abberufungsregel für die Entscheidungen 
eines Vorstandsmitglieds hätte, wenn Aktiengesellschaften zwischen verschiedenen 
Optionen wählen könnten, zum Beispiel zwischen einer langen Amtszeit mit Abberufung 
ohne Grund und einer Berufung für eine sehr kurze Amtsdauer mit 
Verlängerungsmöglichkeit.  
Das dritte Kapitel der Dissertation befasst sich mit der experimentellen Forschung, 
die ich durchgeführt habe, um die Verhaltenseffekte von zwei ähnlichen Regelungen der 
Amtszeit zu vergleichen. Ich habe die Auswirkung von einer sehr kurzen Amtsdauer, die 
verlängert werden konnte, im Vergleich zu einer sehr langen Amtsdauer, die jederzeit 
gekündigt werden konnte, in einem Laborexperiment untersucht. Aus Sicht der 
ökonomischen Standardtheorie erscheinen die beiden Regeln gleichwertig. Sie können aber 
unterschiedliche Verhaltenseffekte verursachen. Insbesondere könnte eine Option von den 
Experimentalteilnehmern in der Rolle des Agenten als eine freundlichere Option 
wahrgenommen werden. Dies könnte dazu führen, dass sich die Agenten mehr für den 
Prinzipal engagieren. Die Ergebnisse meiner Studie zeigen, dass beide Alternativen sehr 
ähnliche Auswirkungen auf das Verhalten haben, wenn nur eine Option als einzige 
Wahlmöglichkeit vorhanden ist. Sobald der Prinzipal zwischen beiden Varianten wählen 
kann, verhalten sich die Agenten aber unterschiedlich. Die lange Amtszeit ohne 
Kündigungsschutz führt zu langfristigen erfolgreichen Prinzipal-Agent-Beziehungen, 
während die kurze verlängerbare Amtsdauer mit kurzfristigen und weniger profitablen 
Beziehungen verbunden ist. Das Experiment dient als ein Beispiel dafür, wie normative 
Fragen der Rechtspolitik mithilfe von empirischer Forschung beantwortet werden könnten. 
Der Gesetzgeber, der eine Rechtsreform plant, muss oft entscheiden, welche rechtliche 
Lösung geeignet wäre, den rechtspolitischen Zweck zu verwirklichen. Dabei sollte der 
Gesetzgeber verschiedene mögliche Folgen, die durch die beabsichtigte Reform verursacht 
werden könnten, berücksichtigen.  
Das zweite Experiment gibt ein Beispiel dafür, wie empirische Forschung für die 
Verhältnismäßigkeitsprüfung einer Vorschrift aus dem Bereich der Corporate Governance 
informativ sein könnte. Ergebnisse empirischer Studien können nämlich eine Rolle bei der 
Abwägung zwischen dem gesetzlich verfolgten Ziel und dem beeinträchtigten Grundrecht 
spielen. Die empirische Forschung kann dabei helfen, das Ausmaß der Beeinträchtigung 
festzustellen. In 2015 hat der deutsche Gesetzgeber die starre Frauenquote für Aufsichtsräte 
  
 
von börsennotierten und mitbestimmungspflichtigen Aktiengesellschaften eingeführt. Die 
EU-Kommission hat schon 2012 in einer Richtlinie die starre Frauenquote vorgeschlagen. 
Sowohl der deutsche Gesetzgeber als auch die EU-Kommission haben argumentiert, dass die 
Frauenquote nicht nur zur gleichen Vertretung von Frauen und Männer in der 
Führungspositionen führen würde, sondern sich auch positiv auf die Leistung der 
Gesellschaften auswirken würde. In dem vierten Kapitel der Dissertation stelle ich die 
deutsche gesetzliche Regelung und die europarechtlichen Vorschläge dar. Anschließend 
bespreche ich die rechtlichen Fragen bezüglich der potenziellen Beeinträchtigung der 
Grundrechte. Ich zeige, dass es für die Abwägung wichtig ist, die genauen Folgen der neuen 
Regelung festzustellen. Der Gesetzgeber sollte nicht nur die Wirkung von 
Geschlechtervielfalt in den Aufsichtsräten auf die Leistung der Aktiengesellschaften 
untersuchen, sondern auch die Effekte der Regulierung in Form einer Frauenquote 
berücksichtigen. Ich bespreche die empirische Forschung zu den Konsequenzen der 
norwegischen Frauenquoten als auch die experimentellen Studien, die sich mit der Quote 
und Gruppenzusammenarbeit beschäftigt haben.  
In dem fünften Kapitel stelle ich dann meine eigene experimentelle Untersuchung zur 
Frauenquote und Gruppenkooperation dar. In einem Laborexperiment habe ich getestet, wie 
sich die leistungsabhängige Beförderung im Vergleich zur quotenbasierten Beförderung 
aufgrund des Geschlechts (oder einer in dem Experiment geschaffenen Kategorie) auf die 
Kooperation in der Zielgruppe auswirkt. Die Ergebnisse haben gezeigt, dass die 
quotenbasierte Beförderung einen negativen Effekt auf die Kooperation hat. Das 
quotenbasierte Verfahren wird auch als ungerecht wahrgenommen. Der negative Effekt auf 
Kooperation wird aber nicht dadurch getrieben. Die Studie zeigt, dass die Frauenquote die 
Gruppenzusammenarbeit nachteilig beeinflussen kann. Das Resultat kann auch für das 
Funktionieren von Aufsichtsräten von Bedeutung sein, da es sich dabei um ein kollegiales 
Gremium handelt, dessen Entscheidungen oft von der Zusammenarbeit innerhalb des 
Gremiums abhängen.  
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Note on Citations 
 
In the dissertation I refer to the English- and German-language literature from 
various areas of research. Since the citation styles differ considerably between disciplines 
and countries, I decided to adopt the following rules of citation in my thesis: 
1. When I refer to a particular article in the main text, I use only the names of the authors. 
The exact reference is always indicated in a footnote. To distinguish between two articles 
of the same author, I add the year of publication when referring to the article in the main 
text.  
2. When referring to articles published in German legal journals, I indicate the abbreviation 
of the journal title as well as the year of publication and the number of the first page of 
the article. For instance: 
Bosse/Hinderer, NZG 2011, 605. 
This is an article by Christian Bosse & Florian Hinderer. Vorzeitige Wiederbestellung 
des Vorstands auf dem Prüfstand, Neue Zeitschrift für Gesellschaftsrecht 2011, p. 605-
609.  
The citation style of German legal articles should facilitate the literature search in 
German literature databases. Below I indicate all abbreviations I used for German legal 
journals in the dissertation. 
3. Other sources (i.e. articles, book sections, books) are cited by indicating the name of the 
authors (or of two of the authors in case of 4 or more authors), title and year of 
publication. Book sections and books are cited in a similar way. In case of book sections 
I additionally indicate the title of the section as well as the title of the book. 
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4. German court rulings are cited by indicating the name of the court, the abbreviation of 
the journal in which the ruling was published as well as the publication year and the first 
page. For instance: 
BGH, NZG 2012, 1027 stands for the ruling of the Bundesgerichtshof (German Federal 
Court of Justice) that can be found in the journal Neue Zeitschrift für Gesellschaftsrecht 
from 2012 on page 1027. 
5. The decisions of the German Constitutional Court are cited by indicating the respective 
publication in the collection of court rulings “Entscheidungen des 
Bundesverfassungsgerichts”. For instance: 
BVerfGE 50, 290 stands for the decision of the Constitutional Court from March 1, 1979 
that can be found in the volume 50 on page 290 of the collection of court rulings 
“Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts”. 
6. The decisions of the European Court of Justice are cited in the following way: 
Case C-491/01 British American Tobacco [2002] ECR I-11550. This indicates the case 
number, the name of at least one of the parties, the publication year as well as the 
number of the ruling in the European Court Reports.  
7. The German statutory commentaries are cited in the following way: 
Koch in: Hüffer, AktG 2014 §84 sec. 20 
This indicates the author’s name, names of editors, title of the commented statue, 
publication year as well as the commented paragraph of the statue.  
List of abbreviations of the German-language journals: 
ZIP Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftsrecht 
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Chapter 1 
Experimental methods in corporate 
governance legal research 
A. Introduction 
Legislative initiatives in the area of corporate governance trigger many normative 
questions. Empirical method has been increasingly recognized as a tool providing valid 
insights into these issues.1 First, the empirical research might be particularly useful for 
policy decisions.2 For instance, empirical evidence can inform the legislator whether the 
policymaker’s goal can be achieved with a particular policy measure.3 It helps to identify 
which of the possible regulations could fulfill the normatively specified criteria of the best 
legislative solution, given its impact on individual behavior.4 My experiment described in 
chapter 3 might serve as an example of empirical research informing policy choices. In this 
study I investigated the influence of appointment lengths and dismissal rules on agents’ 
behavior and observed that even seemingly equivalent rules might have a different impact on 
agents’ performance. Second, a new regulation might be suitable to achieve one goal, but at 
the same time interfere with individual rights. In such case, the constitutional courts apply a 
proportionality test to evaluate whether a given legal provision impose a justified restriction 
on a fundamental right. The empirical research might provide evidence crucial for this 
                                                 
1 Hamann, Evidenzbasierte Jurisprudenz: Methoden empirischer Forschung und ihr Erkenntniswert für 
das Recht am Beispiel des Fesellschaftsrechts 2014, pp.38-52; Fleischer Gesellschafts- und Kapitalmarktrecht 
als wissenschaftliche Fisziplin - das Proprium der Rechtswissenschaft in: Engel, Das Proprium der 
Rechtswissenschaft 2007; Merkt, AG 2003, 126; Eidenmüller, ZGR 2007, 484; Bhagat/Romano Empirical 
studies of corporate law in: Polinsky/Shavell, Handbook of law and economics 2007; Strine Jr, The 
inescapably empirical foundation of the common law of corporations 2002; Pacces The law and economics of 
corporate governance: Changing perspectives 2010. 
2 Engel Verhaltenswissenschaftliche Analyse: Eine Gebrauchsanweisung für Juristen in: Engel et al., 
Recht und Verhalten 2007, p. 383. 
3 Eidenmüller, JZ 1999, 53, p.54. 
4 Engel in: Engel et al., Recht und Verhalten 2007, p.384. 
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assessment.5 For instance, one of the elements of the proportionality test requires balancing 
positive and interfering effects of a measure. Empirical studies can explore potential adverse 
side effects of a given legal solution on the interests protected by the fundamental rights.6 
One example of such a study is my experimental investigation regarding the impact of quota 
rules on group cooperation which is described in chapter 5. 
My experimental research was motivated by two recent legislative initiatives. The 
first one is a reform proposal made in a reaction to the economic and financial crisis 2007-
2009 to counteract the observed market failures. In 2011, the Reflection Group on the Future 
of EU Company Law recommended, among others, the introduction of a Directive which 
would allow all public companies to define executive directors’ appointment terms (one-year 
or multiple-year terms not exceeding 4-6 years) and to restrict dismissal at-will.7 The Group 
claimed that dismissal and appointment rules might influence the decision-making of 
directors in various ways.8 Thus, the role of the Directive should be to enable public 
companies making a choice between different options rather than limit it to one particular 
solution.9 This proposal inspired my first research question on the impact of seemingly 
equivalent appointment and dismissal rules on individual behavior in a principal-agent 
relation. More specifically, I investigated whether short-term renewable appointment term 
differently influences individual behavior as compared to indefinite appointment at-will. 
Additionally, I examined whether these reactions differ depending on the menu of available 
options (only short-term appointment, only indefinite appointment or both options 
available). These results could help to evaluate the consequences of the solution proposed by 
the Reflection Group. 
Another legislative initiative that motivated my second experimental research is a 
reform introducing mandatory gender quota for corporate boards. In Germany, mandatory 
quotas were implemented in 2015 with a statue on equal participation of men and women in 
executive positions in the private and public sector.10 The EU (European Union) 
Commission also proposed mandatory quotas in a Directive on improving the gender balance 
                                                 
5 Petersen, Braucht die Rechtswissenschaft eine empirische Wende? 2010, p.11. 
6 Petersen, Braucht die Rechtswissenschaft eine empirische Wende? 2010, pp.7-9. 
7 Antunes/Baums et al., Report of the reflection group on the future of EU company law 2011, p.52. 
8 Antunes/Baums et al., Report of the reflection group on the future of EU company law 2011, p.51 
9 Antunes/Baums et al., Report of the reflection group on the future of EU company law 2011, p.51. 
10 Gesetz für die gleichberechtigte Teilhabe von Frauen und Männern an Führungspositionen in der 
Privatwirtschaft und im öffentlichen Dienst from April 24, 2015, BGBl. I S. 642 [hereinafter: the Equal 
Participation Act]. 
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among non-executive directors of companies listed on stock exchanges.11 Both – the German 
legislator and the EU Commission – claimed that mandatory quotas will not only increase 
the share of women on corporate boards but also improve corporate and board functioning.12 
In my experimental research, I investigated whether mandatory quotas indeed might improve 
corporate performance. In particular, I studied whether a quota rule might influence one 
particular aspect of group behavior (i.e. group cooperation). I compared behavioral reactions 
towards a promotion procedure based on performance versus a procedure based on quota 
rules. I measured cooperation between an incumbent member of a group and a new coming 
member promoted according to one of the rules. This experimental study allowed me to 
identify potential negative side effects of a mandatory quota on group cooperation. The 
evidence provided by my experiment would be helpful in evaluating proportionality of 
mandatory quotas for corporate boards.  
The experimental method is one of several empirical methods used in social sciences 
(other examples might be field research or surveys). All these methods might potentially be 
applied to the legal context.13 They come however with advantages and limitations. 
Therefore, the method should be selected carefully depending on the research question and 
the conclusions one would like to draw from the results of an investigation. Before I present 
the details of my experimental studies, I would like to introduce the experimental method 
shortly. 
                                                 
11 European Commission, Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on 
improving the gender balance among non-executive directors of companies listed on stock exchanges and 
related measures, COM (2012) 614 final, available at: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:52012PC0614 [hereinafter: the Directive]. 
12 European Commission, Impact assessment on costs and benefits of improving the gender balance in 
the boards of companies listed on stock exchanges, SWD(2012) 348, available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/gender-equality/files/womenonboards/impact_assesment_quotas_en.pdf. 
[hereinafter: Impact Assessment or IA], p.13; Drucksache 18/3784 “Gesetzentwurf der Bundesregierung. 
Entwurf eines Gesetzes für die gleichberechtigte Teilhabe von Frauen und Männer an Führungspositionen in 
der Privatwirtschaft und im öffentlichen Dienst” from January 20, 2015, available at: 
http://dipbt.bundestag.de/dip21/btd/18/037/1803784.pdf [hereinafter, Regierungsentwurf], p.50 and 62. 
13 For an overview of the key empirical methods used in law see: Engel, Behavioral law and 
economics: Empirical methods 2013. For a more detailed discussion of empirical methods applied to legal 
issues: Hamann, Evidenzbasierte Jurisprudenz 2014. 
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B. Empirical methods 
I. Field research 
Field research allows studying behavior in a real world setting.14 Because the field 
data reflects the natural environment, this approach is characterized by a high external 
validity – “the extent of generalizability or certainty that results can be applied to other 
respondent groups, different settings, and different ways of operationalizing the conceptual 
variables.”15 For instance, a researcher can analyze the existing data, which comprises a 
large number of observations collected in the real world.16 However, the analysis of existing 
data usually provides evidence only for a correlational relationship between variables of 
interest.17 Additionally, field research does not allow a full control of the measured variables 
which might be subject to unmeasured noise (i.e., confounding factors or reverse causality). 
Another form of field research that might be especially informative for a legal 
scholar is a natural experiment.18 It occurs when only a particular group of individuals is 
subject to a treatment (i.e. a legal intervention) whereas another group of comparable 
individuals constitutes a control group (i.e. does not need to comply with a regulation of 
interest).19 Such comparison is very useful because it allows studying reactions to the 
particular legal change in a natural environment. A crucial limitation is that legal 
interventions are not assigned randomly to the individuals or corporate actors. It is, therefore, 
possible that a difference observed between addressees of a new regulation and a group 
which does not need to comply with it is a consequence of different features of these two 
groups and does not result from a legal reform itself. Furthermore, it is often impossible to 
collect observations on all variables of interest that might be crucial for the observed effects 
and identification of  underlying mechanisms of reactions towards the examined legal rule.20   
                                                 
14 Lawless/Robbennolt/Ulen, Empirical methods in law 2010, p.126. 
15 Crano/Brewer/Lac, Principles and methods of social research 2015, p.27. 
16 Lawless/Robbennolt/Ulen, Empirical methods in law 2010, p.125ff. 
17 Crano/Brewer/Lac, Principles and methods of social research 2014, pp.159-161. 
18 DiNardo Natural experiments and quasi-natural experiments in: Durlauf/Blume, The new palgrave 
dictionary of economics 2008; Lawless/Robbennolt/Ulen, Empirical methods in law 2010, pp.118-121. 
19 As an example see the regulation on mandatory quota rules in Norway examined in Ahern/Dittmar, 
The changing of the boards: The impact on firm valuation of mandated female board representation 2012; 
Matsa/Miller, A female style in corporate leadership? Evidence from quotas 2013. 
20 As an example see an article on the impact of female directors on board functioning and company 
performance: Adams/Ferreira, Women in the boardroom and their impact on governance and performance 
2009. 
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II. Survey studies 
A survey is a set of questions used to gather information on people’s self-reported 
attitudes, preferences or opinions.21 It is a useful tool to examine the characteristics of a 
given population.22 However, it does not allow studying individuals’ real but only declared 
reactions towards different legal interventions.23 A similar method is a vignette study.24 In a 
vignette study participants are presented with various scenarios describing a specific 
situation in the real world.25 They are asked questions aimed at evaluating their perception 
and attitudes towards the situation outlined in the scenario. Importantly, two scenarios which 
differ in only one small feature are distributed among the people. The vignette method 
allows identifying the impact of this difference on the answers provided by participants.26 
III. Laboratory experiments 
A laboratory experiment is an empirical method increasingly popular in social 
sciences.27 I will describe it in more detail because it is a method which I decided to 
implement in my studies. I will focus on economics experiments, but I will also explain the 
differences between economics and psychology experiments, each of which might be useful 
in providing insights for a legal scholar. The typical elements of an experimental study are 
(1) formulation of a research question, (2) specification of the hypothesis, (3) experimental 
design, (4) statistical analysis as well as (5) interpretation of the results and conclusions. 
Each of these elements will be described below in separate sections. As an illustration for 
discussing the experimental method, I will employ an experiment reported by Cain, 
Lowenstein and Moor in the paper “The Dirt on Coming Clean: Perverse Effects of 
Disclosing Conflicts of Interest” published in The Journal of Legal Studies in 2005.28 The 
authors investigated the influence of disclosure on the individual behavior when there exists 
a conflict of interests between interacting persons (in the paper called an advisor and an 
                                                 
21 Crano/Brewer/Lac, Principles and methods of social research 2014, p.219. 
22 Rea/Parker, Designing and conducting survey research : A comprehensive guide 2014, p.3ff. 
23 As an example of a survey study see: Storvik, Women on boards : Experience from the norwegian 
quota reform 2011. 
24 Vignette study can be also seen as a mixture of a survey and a laboratory experiment.  
25 Atzmüller/Steiner, Experimental vignette studies in survey research 2010 
26 As an example of a vignette study see: Heilman/Block/Lucas, Presumed incompetent? 
Stigmatization and affirmative action efforts 1992. 
27 For a review see: Falk/Heckman, Lab experiments are a major source of knowledge in the social 
sciences 2009. 
28 Cain/Loewenstein/Moore, The dirt on coming clean: Perverse effects of disclosing conflicts of 
interest 2005. 
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estimator). They found that advisors give more biased advice to estimators when these are 
informed about the existing conflict of interests compared to a situation when no such 
information is provided. This experimental study might be of high relevance for corporate 
governance regulations imposing disclosure obligations on the management board of a 
public company (i.e. § 325 German Commercial Code29 – Handelsgesetzbuch [HGB]). It is 
of a particular importance since it shows that a relatively nonintrusive legal regulation on 
disclosure might also have some adverse effects on both – these who disclose information 
and these who are supposed to benefit from disclosure.  
Many people when hearing a word “laboratory experiment” imagine some chemical 
or animal experiments. Others picture brain research experiments involving, for instance, an 
fMRI (Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging) scan. An economic laboratory experiment 
is, in fact, much simpler. It usually takes place in a computer room in which each 
workstation is situated in a separate cubicle. This should guarantee privacy for experimental 
participants when performing experimental tasks. Participants are typically students 
registered in a special database from which they are recruited for single experimental 
sessions. Maintaining the database allows specifying special requirements regarding 
characteristics of participants recruited for a particular experiment. For instance, it is 
possible to restrict the pool to the participants who have no experience with a given type of a 
decision-making problem. Upon arriving at the laboratory, participants are randomly 
assigned to separate cubicles. They are instructed that they cannot communicate with each 
other. Next, an experimenter typically reads aloud the instructions describing in details all 
features of the experimental task to make sure that all participants have the same information 
about the task and that they know all the details of the task beforehand. Usually, an 
experiment starts with a short quiz to make sure that all participants understand the 
instructions. Afterward, participants perform an experimental task by entering their answers 
using computers. The task might be either individual or interactive.  
An example for an individual decision-making experimental task is a lottery 
implemented to elicit risk attitudes. In such a lottery participants are asked to make a series 
of choices between two options. For instance, there are two options: (1) “option A” gives 
either $2.00 or $1.60 payoff, (2) “option B” gives either $3.85 or $0.10 payoff. In each 
                                                 
29 Handelsgesetzbuch from Mai 10, 1897, RGBl. S. 219.  
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option, the probability of receiving the higher payoff is 1/10. The task is to choose either 
“Option A” or “Option B”.30 Afterward, the lottery is realized depending on the selected 
option.  
A simple illustration of an interactive task is a dictator game used to study social 
preferences. In the simplest version of a dictator game participants are randomly matched in 
pairs. One of them is randomly given the role of a dictator and the other – the role of a 
recipient. The dictator is endowed with 10 €. Dictator’s task is to decide whether  to make an 
even (5€, 5€) or an uneven (8€, 2€) split between him and the recipient.31  
At the end of an experiment, participants are informed about their total payoffs. The 
money earned in the experiment is paid out in private so that participants do not see how 
much money the other participants receive.  
These experimental procedures might seem at first very artificial. They are however 
introduced to keep control over other factors which might potentially influence individual 
behavior. For instance, the payment in private should control for potential effects of social 
pressure - participants might care about what other would think about them seeing their 
payoffs and accordingly change their behavior in the experiment. The main advantage of a 
lab experiment is precisely this controlled environment. All the details, such as payoffs, 
information or timing of decisions, are designed and controlled by an experimentalist. 
Ideally, there should be only one difference between two conditions implemented in an 
experimental study. This way an experimentalist can conclude that the observed differences 
between experimental conditions are a consequence of the change in the variable of interest 
instead of some third, not controlled, variable (confound). Additionally, participants taking 
part in a laboratory experiment are randomly selected from a large pool. Imagine that 
participants would not be randomly selected and only women would come to the experiment. 
In this case, an experimentalist would not be able to generalize from the behavior of women 
observed in a laboratory to the behavior of men (selection bias).  Importantly, in a laboratory 
experiment participants are also randomly assigned to the experimental conditions. Random 
assignment assures that the differences in behavior observed between two experimental 
conditions are not a result of particular characteristics of a group which took part in one of 
                                                 
30 Holt/Laury, Risk aversion and incentive effects 2002. 
31 Kahneman/Knetsch/Thaler, Fairness and the assumptions of economics 1986. 
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the conditions. These features – controlled environment, random selection and random 
assignment - are obviously not possible in case of natural experiments. Furthermore, in 
contrast to survey or vignette studies the decisions made in the lab experiments are not only 
hypothetical but have real consequences for participants affecting their payoffs. 
1. Research questions 
An experimental study starts with the formulation of a clear and testable research 
question which differs considerably from a typical legal issue.32 The context of a legal 
question is often very complex. Additionally, legal issues are frequently of a normative 
character. For instance, a legal question relevant to corporate governance regulations might 
ask “Should the policymaker impose disclosure obligations on public companies regarding 
the financial situation of a company?” or “Is it more important to introduce transparency of 
the corporate performance or to decrease the costs of disclosure obligations?”. In contrast, a 
research question is a question “which can be answered by making observations that identify 
the conditions under which certain events occur”.33 It is, therefore, crucial that both – the 
“conditions” and “events” – are observable and verifiable. Thus, a research question which 
might provide insights relevant to a legal issue will usually ask about the relationship 
between a legal rule and individual behavior. Also, the complex legal environment needs to 
be translated into a simple question which asks, for instance: “Does disclosure of conflict of 
interests induce agents to reveal their private information truthfully?” 
For what kind of legal issues does the experimental method provide valuable 
insights? First, these are the questions related to legal interventions, which are entirely novel, 
and there are no comparable policy measures which have been already introduced. Second, 
even if there is an existing similar regulation it is difficult to study its causal effects on 
individual behavior as it is typically introduced endogenously and in a non-random way. The 
benefit of an experiment is that it allows an exogenous and random implementation of legal 
regulations to different groups of participants. As such it allows testing the behavioral 
                                                 
32 Lawless/Robbennolt/Ulen, Empirical methods in law 2010, p.10: “Legal analysis places a premium 
on argumentation and appeals to authority, is frequently geared toward proving a particular view, is often 
focused on the particulars of an individual case, and is directed at reaching a definitive conclusion. In contrast, 
empirical analysis places a premium on observation, challenges assumptions, is oriented toward the testing of 
hypotheses, is usually focused on describing patterns that operate in the aggregate, and is a continuing 
enterprise in which new work builds on that which came before and generates even more questions for further 
investigations”.  
33 Singleton/Straits, Approaches to social research 2010, p.21. 
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consequences that might be caused by the introduction of a certain policy. Third, 
experimental research might be particularly beneficial for legal questions because it provides 
insights not only into the effect of a legal intervention on individual behavior but also into its 
underlying mechanisms. Understanding of the mechanisms might be valuable for designing 
alternative policy measures which would avoid potentially undesirable consequences.  
2. Hypotheses 
A hypothesis is a statement about a relationship between two or more variables. It is 
typically derived from a theory that is “a set of interconnected propositions” describing 
individual behavior “at a general or abstract level”.34 For instance, in the experiment by Cain 
et al. one of the hypotheses was formulated as follows: “Advisors with conflict of interest 
will give more biased advice under conditions with disclosure than without disclosure.”35 
The dependent variable measured is advice provided by the advisors to the estimators. The 
variable manipulated by the experimentalist is a disclosure of conflict of interests.  
What are then the theories from which the economic experimentalist derives the 
hypotheses? The very first economics experiments aimed at testing the hypothesis derived 
from the “rational choice theory” in both - individual and strategic decision-making 
settings.36 The “rational choice theory” 37 is usually described as consisting of the following 
elements: 
 people maximize their expected utility function,  
 people update probabilities according to the Bayes rule,  
 people are self-interested in a narrow sense (do not care about the utility of 
others),  
 people discount future outcomes exponentially.38  
                                                 
34 Singleton/Straits, Approaches to social research 2010, p.24. 
35 Cain/Loewenstein/Moore, Perverse effects of disclosing 2005, p.8. 
36 Camerer/Talley Chapter 21 experimental study of law in: Polinsky/Shavell, Handbook of law and 
economics 2007, p.1629; Roth Introduction to experimental economics in: Kagel, The handbook of 
experimental economics 1995. 
37 Korobkin and Ulen stressed that in the literature there is, in fact, no coherent understanding of what 
the “rational choice theory” exactly is: Korobkin/Ulen, Law and behavioral science: Removing the rationality 
assumption from law and economics 2000, p.1060. 
38 Rabin, A perspective on psychology and economics 2002, p. 660; Wilkinson/Klaes, An introduction 
to behavioral economics 2012, p. 10. 
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One other concept crucial for the “rational choice theory” in the context of strategic 
decision-making is the notion of equilibrium. It refers to a condition when “all players 
choose an optimal response given beliefs about the others’ choices which are accurate.”39 
A series of experiments testing these “standard” assumptions gave rise to behavioral 
economics research which has incorporated insights from psychology to understand and 
predict human behavior better. As a consequence, behavioral economics has relaxed the 
standard assumptions of “rational choice theory”. An example of such a departure is the 
“prospect theory” which states that people evaluate and make decisions not based on 
absolute utility levels but rather by comparing current and possible future states (and 
perceiving it as gains or losses).40 Another example of a departure from “standard” 
assumptions is the “theory of social preferences” which assumes that people care not only 
about own utility but also about the well-being of others.41   
In the illustrative experiment on the impact of disclosure of conflict of interests on 
individual behavior, the authors referred first to the theoretical model of Crawford and 
Sobel.42 This model is based on the assumption that individuals act in their self-interest. It 
predicts that if there is a conflict of interests between advisors and estimators, estimators 
should ignore messages sent by advisors since they are uninformative. The model, however, 
does assume that estimators are aware of a conflict of interests. It does not specify any 
predictions when a conflict is not revealed to estimators. Cain et al. refer to psychological 
mechanisms such as “moral licensing” and predict that advisors will give more biased advice 
if a conflict of interests is disclosed to estimators than when estimators are not informed 
about it.43 The authors reasoned that “disclosing conflicts of interest can potentially backfire 
by reducing advisors’ feelings of guilt about misleading estimators and thereby giving 
advisors moral license to bias advice even further than they would without disclosure.”44 
This argument illustrates the use of psychological insights in developing hypotheses about 
the behavior of individuals in economics experiments.   
                                                 
39 Camerer/Talley in: Polinsky/Shavell, Chapter 21 experimental study of law 2007, p. 1630. 
40 Kahneman/Tversky, Prospect theory: An analysis of decision under risk 1979. 
41 For instance, Fehr/Schmidt, A theory of fairness, competition, and cooperation 1999; 
Bolton/Ockenfels, Erc: A theory of equity, reciprocity, and competition 2000. 
42 Crawford/Sobel, Strategic information transmission 1982; Cain/Loewenstein/Moore, Perverse 
effects of disclosing 2005, p. 8. 
43 Cain/Loewenstein/Moore, Perverse effects of disclosing 2005, p. 7. 
44 Cain/Loewenstein/Moore, Perverse effects of disclosing 2005, p. 7. 
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3. Experimental design 
The experiment is designed to test a specific hypothesis. Thus, all abstract variables 
have to be “translated” – operationalized – into variables which can be measured and 
manipulated in an experimental setting. Recall that in the Cain et al. study the general 
research question asked how disclosure of a conflict of interests affects the content of 
information provided by advisors. In this study participants were assigned either a role of an 
advisor or estimator.45 The experimental task of estimators was to assess the value of coins 
in a jar which was presented to all participants. The task of advisors was to send a report to 
estimators about the value of coins in the jar. Advisors were informed that this value lies in 
the range between $10 and $30. Thus, they had additional information compared to 
estimators. This situation should reflect an abstract concept of the asymmetry of information 
which is typical for many real life relations such as between a financial advisor and an 
investor, an executive director and shareholders, a doctor and a patient. The authors 
implemented three treatments which represented three environments of an advisor-estimator 
interaction. In the first treatment, there was no conflict of interests between estimators and 
advisors. Both – an advisor and an estimator - were rewarded for the accuracy of estimators’ 
predictions (accuracy treatment). In the two other treatments (conflict treatments) a conflict 
of interests was introduced. Advisors’ reward increased the higher evaluations were  
made by estimators. Thus, in the accuracy treatment advisors were incentivized to give their 
best estimation of the value of the jar. In the conflict treatments, advisors had an incentive to 
overestimate this value. The second manipulation was introduced between the two conflict 
treatments. In one treatment (conflict/disclosure treatment) estimators were informed about 
the payoff function of advisors. In the other treatment (conflict/no disclosure treatment) 
estimators did not know how advisors are rewarded.  
There are four features of an economics experimental design which are particularly 
relevant to a legal scholar.  
1. Controlled experimental environment. It is an important aspect of an experimental 
method46 that allows making statements about the causal relationship between an 
independent variable manipulated (i.e. disclosure of conflict of interests) by the 
                                                 
45 For an experimental design in the study by Cain et al.: Cain/Loewenstein/Moore, Perverse effects of 
disclosing 2005, pp. 9-12. 
46 As Vernon Smith famously stated: “Control is the essence of experimental methodology”: Smith, 
Experimental economics: Induced value theory 1976, p. 275. 
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experimentalist and a dependent variable (value of coins in the jar reported by 
advisors to estimators) measured in the experiment. Controlled experimental 
environment means that the experimentalist changes ideally exactly one thing 
between the treatments.47 For instance, in the Coin et al. study both conflict 
treatments differed only regarding the information provided to estimators on the 
payoff function of advisors. All other features in the procedure of the experiment 
were the same. “The idea of control is to employ procedures that effectively rule out 
all explanations except the one in which the researcher is interested.”48  
2. Random assignment. This rule is closely related to the controlled environment 
feature. “True random assignment requires that any person in [the] sample is equally 
likely to participate in any of the experimental conditions.”49 With random 
assignment, the experimentalist makes sure that even if participants are different 
from each other regarding some aspects (such as intelligence, personality, social 
preferences), each of these features should be equally frequent in each of the 
treatments.50 Imagine, for instance, that instead of random assignment, all 
participants who come to the laboratory first would be assigned to one treatment and 
all latecomers to the other treatment. The early birds might differ considerably from 
the latecomers – they might be more hardworking or diligent. In this case, the 
experimentalist would not be able to tell apart whether the behavioral difference 
observed in the study is due to the treatment manipulation or different characteristics 
of participants.  
3. No deception policy. In contrast to psychology experiments, economics experiments 
do not use deception. The rule was introduced to limit participants’ “second-guessing 
about the purpose of the experiment”.51 Economists want to make sure that the 
observed reactions of participants are “motivated by the induced monetary rewards 
rather than by psychological reactions to suspected manipulation.”52 According to 
Ariely and Norton “… deception merely masks the true nature of the experiment, 
impeding participants’ ability to make informed decisions about their roles, payoffs, 
                                                 
47 Lawless/Robbennolt/Ulen, Empirical methods in law 2010, p. 93. 
48 Singleton/Straits, Approaches to social research 2010, p. 39. 
49 Crano/Brewer/Lac, Principles and methods of social research 2015, p. 110. 
50 Lawless/Robbennolt/Ulen, Empirical methods in law 2010, pp. 101-106. 
51 Hertwig/Ortmann, Experimental practices in economics: A methodological challenge for 
psychologists? 2001, p.384. 
52 Davis/Holt, Experimental economics 1993, p.24. 
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and rules.”53 Despite a unanimous view on “no deception” policy within 
experimental economists’ community, there is no agreement on what deception 
exactly means. Some researchers claim that deception is only an intentional provision 
of misinformation but not an omission of some information.54 This controversy is 
very nicely illustrated by the experimental design implemented by Cain et al. In the 
no disclosure/conflict treatment estimators are not informed about the payoff function 
of advisors. According to some experimental economists such an experimental 
feature would be perceived as deception – it is information which might considerably 
influence estimators’ payoffs. There is, however, a growing number of researchers 
who support the less restrictive definition of deception as suggested by Hey.55 They 
introduce, for instance, surprise restarts in the experiment (participants know that 
there are more parts of the experiment, but they are informed about the rules of the 
game separately for each part of the experiment).56 In general, the no deception rule 
implies that an experimentalist needs to design an experiment in a way so that 
participants are not misled about any details of the procedure that could affect their 
payoffs.57  
4. Monetary incentives. Differently from psychology experiments, in economics 
experiments participants’ payments are directly linked to their behavior and 
decisions. In the illustrative experiment the advisor received higher payoffs in the 
accuracy condition, the closer the estimator was to the actual value. For instance, if 
the estimator was within the range 0.00 - 0.50 dollars from the real value, the advisor 
received $5.00. If the estimation was within 0.51 – 1.00 dollars from the actual value, 
the advisor received $4.50.  
Hertwig and Ortman list four objectives of the monetary incentives. First, “… 
salient payoffs (rewards or punishments) reduce performance variability.” Second, in 
comparison to other rewards schemes financial incentives are easy to implement. 
                                                 
53 Ariely/Norton, Psychology and experimental economics: A gap in abstraction 2007, p.226. 
54 Hey, Experimental economics and deception: A comment 1998: “…there is a world of difference 
between not telling subjects things and telling them wrong things. The latter is deception, the former not. I am 
advocating the former, not the latter.”, p.397. 
55 For a discussion: Hertwig/Ortmann, Experimental practices in economics: A methodological 
challenge for psychologists? 2001; Hertwig/Ortmann, Deception in experiments: Revisiting the arguments in 
its defense 2008; Hersch, Experimental economics' inconsistent ban on deception 2015. 
56 Krawczyk, Delineating deception in experimental economics: Researchers’ and subjects’ views 
2013. 
57 Hertwig/Ortmann, Deception in experiments: Revisiting the arguments in its defense 2008. 
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Third, “most of us want more of it [money] (so it is fairly reliable across participants) 
and there is no satiation over the course of the experiments.” Fourth, “… most 
economic experiments test economic theory, which provides a comparatively unified 
framework built on maximization assumptions (of utility, profit, revenue, etc.) and 
defines standards of optimal behavior.” 58 
4. Data analysis 
A detailed explanation of statistical data analyses is beyond the scope of this 
dissertation. However, I would like to introduce one important principle that will help the 
reader to understand and interpret the experimental results. In the illustrative experiment on 
the impact of disclosure, the mean values of estimates suggested by advisors to the 
estimators were 16.48 in the accuracy treatment, 20.16 in the conflict/no disclosure treatment 
and 24.16 in the conflict/disclosure treatment. The authors reported that advisors’ estimates 
were significantly greater in the high/disclosure condition than in the other two conditions 
(p<.05). What does it mean that the estimates are “significantly” greater? How to interpret 
the indicated p-value?  
The average values reported in the article describe only the behavior of individuals 
who took part in this experiment (descriptive statistics). One can clearly see that the values 
in two conflict treatments are greater than the value in the accuracy treatment. An 
experimentalist, however, is interested not only in describing how the individuals who took 
part in a particular experiment behaved, but to make inferences about the behavior of the 
population (inferential statistics). To this end, an experimentalist tests the reliability of the 
hypothesis.  In Cain et al. one of the hypothesis stated that advisors with a conflict of 
interests will give more biased advice (higher mean estimations) under conditions with 
disclosure than without disclosure. In the group of people who participated in the experiment 
this is indeed the case (as evident by the means). Does this, however, generalize beyond the 
group to a larger population? In other words, is the effect reliable when measuring the 
behavior of another group? The inference statistics which is usually used to provide such 
information requires an experimentalist to specify two exclusive hypotheses: the null and the 
                                                 
58 Hertwig/Ortmann, Experimental practices in economics: A methodological challenge for 
psychologists? 2001, p.390. 
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alternative hypothesis.59 The former states there is no difference between compared means, 
the latter states there is a difference. In the considered example the null hypothesis states that 
there is no difference in the advisors’ estimations under both conditions. Subsequently, the 
data from the experiment is used to test if this hypothesis can be rejected in favor of the 
alternative hypothesis. To this end, a researcher calculates the probability that the observed 
data indeed come from two distributions with different means.60 The two means observed in 
the experiment are usually interpreted as indeed coming from two distributions when the 
probability of making a mistake here is below 5%. This probability is reflected by the p-
value.  The statistical convention is to reject the null hypothesis and to accept the alternative 
hypothesis when the p-value is lower than 0.05. What does it mean however if the p-value 
equals .06? Does it mean that the null hypothesis is true and the alternative hypothesis is 
false? This is a very common misconception. It is important to understand that the p-value 
greater than 0.05 only means that there is not enough evidence to reject the null hypothesis. 
This, however, by no means indicates that the alternative hypothesis can be accepted. In fact, 
the p-value of .06 means that if I repeat the same experiment 100 times, I will observe the 
same results about six times by chance. The lower the p-value, the lower is the probability 
that the difference observed in the experiment is spuriously observed only by chance. A low 
p-value and highly significant effect also do not mean that the effect is big but only that it is 
reliable. In the illustrative study a p-value <0.05 means that there is strong evidence that 
estimations given in conflict/disclosure are indeed higher than in conflict/no disclosure 
treatment.  
5. Conclusions from the experimental research 
The laboratory experiments, like all empirical methods, also do have some 
limitations. One criticism refers to the experimental subject pool composed mostly of 
students who usually participate in lab experiments. It has been raised that students might 
behave differently than professional agents. Therefore, it is not clear whether laboratory 
findings can be applied to the behavior of individuals in a corporate setting. One could 
imagine overcoming this limitation by conducting studies with corporate agents, whenever 
                                                 
59 For a short description of hypotheses testing see: Lawless/Robbennolt/Ulen, Empirical methods in 
law 2010, pp.227-242. 
60 For an accessible explanation of how to interpret p-value (although in a medical context) see: 
Goodman, A dirty dozen: Twelve p-value misconceptions 2008. 
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the behavior of students and agents is expected to diverge.61 A further limitation of 
laboratory experiments is a simplified experimental environment which only resembles the 
real world situations. This criticism of an experimental method often is a consequence of 
common misuses of experimental results when drawing implications for legal issues. It can 
be however countered by understanding the objectives of conducting economics 
experiments.  
In the article “Caution on the use of economics experiments in law”, Kathryn Zeiler 
mentioned two most common misapplications of the experimental results for answering legal 
questions.62 First, some commentators tend to apply directly the experimental results rather 
than theories developed on their basis. This might be problematic since a given experiment 
might be based on very specific assumptions which might not hold in the real world situation 
a commentator has in mind. Second, even if there are many experiments concerning the 
given matter, there is a tendency to cherry pick the results which are most convenient for the 
policymaker. This bears the risk of introducing policy measures which, for instance, might 
lead to some negative side effects not mentioned in the cherry-picked studies.63   
Camerer and Talley listed three objectives for using experiments in economics.64 
First, experiments are conducted to test theories of human behavior. They are particularly 
useful for testing theories which are based on the assumptions requiring careful control of 
the environment, e.g., the precise scope of information the individuals are given. Second, 
experiments are often conducted to provide data on a behavioral regularity which has not 
been yet explained by any existing theory. In this case, experimental findings constitute a 
basis for developing new theories. Finally, experiments might be implemented to test policy 
interventions. As Camerer and Talley vividly explain “[t]he inspiration here is very much 
akin to experimentation in the physical sciences, such as testing of airplane wing designs in 
wind tunnels, or testing ship designs in “tow tanks” with simulated oceanic waves. These 
experiments do not guarantee that a wing or ship which performs well in a wind tunnel or 
                                                 
61 For a review of studies with subjects different than students: Charness/Kuhn Chapter 3 - lab labor: 
What can labor economists learn from the lab? in: Orley/David, Handbook of labor economics 2011, p.54. 
62 Zeiler, Cautions on the use of economics experiments in law 2010. 
63 Zeiler, Cautions on the use of economics experiments in law 2010, pp.178-179. 
64 Camerer/Talley in: Polinsky/Shavell, Chapter 21 experimental study of law 2007, p.1624ff. 
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tow tank will be the best design in the air or at sea, but they can weed out bad designs at a 
low cost.”65  
In sum, Camerer and Talley suggest that experiments might be useful for testing 
human reactions to legal rules. However, one should stay aware of limitations and objectives 
of the experimental method. Consider the illustrative experiment on the disclosure of 
conflicts of interests and biased advice - the following aspects might be taken into account 
when applying its insights for answering legal questions: 
1. The results of Cain et al. showed that disclosure of a conflict of interest might also 
have some adverse effects leading to more biased advice. For making legal 
implications it would be however useful to consider also the later studies, which not 
only replicated the initial results but tested it under different conditions.   
2. The ‘moral licensing’ as specified in the Cain et al. is rather a behavioral regularity 
than a theory. Cain et al. did not clearly identify conditions under which the ‘moral 
licensing’ of disclosure would occur. However, the later study by Loewenstein et al. 
made the moral licensing predictions more precise.66 Several further experiments 
tested the moral licensing effect in different environments (reputation building67, 
punishment68). Additionally, in an article “A Meta-Analytic Review of Moral 
Licensing” Blanken et al. report results of a number of experimental studies testing 
moral licensing under different conditions.69 The exact predictions and assumptions 
of ‘moral licensing theory’ should be considered when making implications for legal 
questions.  
3. It would be ideal if the experimental results were accompanied by results obtained 
with other methods (i.e., field research testing the predictions of ‘moral licensing’ 
theory in the real world setting). 
                                                 
65 Camerer/Talley in: Polinsky/Shavell, Chapter 21 experimental study of law 2007, p.1625 
66 Loewenstein/Cain/Sah, The limits of transparency: Pitfalls and potential of disclosing conflicts of 
interest 2011. 
67 Koch/Schmidt, Disclosing conflicts of interest – do experience and reputation matter? 2010. 
68 Church/Kuang, Conflicts of interest, disclosure, and (costly) sanctions: Experimental evidence 
2009. 
69 Blanken/van de Ven/Zeelenberg, A meta-analytic review of moral licensing 2015. 
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C. Conclusions 
Applying economic analysis to legal questions has a long, though also controversial, 
tradition in both – the United States and European legal scholarship.70 However, the 
economic models implemented to predict human behavior in a legal context rely on very 
specific assumptions. For example, the “standard economic model” assumes that a goal of an 
individual is to maximize his or her expected utility and that a person considers only own 
utility and does not care for the utility of others. Experimental studies have tested this model 
and refined its assumptions. These refinements turned out to be particularly informative for a 
legal decision maker and developed into the behavioral law and economics approach.71  
The experimental method, despite some of its limitations discussed above, allows me 
to investigate and compare basic behavioral reactions to different legal settings in a 
controlled environment. In particular, unlike other empirical methods, it enables me to draw 
conclusions on the causal relationship between a specific legal intervention and the observed 
behavior.72 
The experimental studies I conducted extend the current discussion in the field of 
corporate governance. In particular, they show that some legal interventions might affect 
human behavior in a way unexpected by the legislator. In the first project, I observed that at-
will contracts in contrast to fixed-term contracts foster long-term successful principal-agent 
relation. The effect is particularly pronounced when both contract types are available. It 
suggests that it is important to consider the impact of different legal solutions not only in 
                                                 
70 For foundations of economic analysis of law: Posner, Economic analysis of law 1973. For economic 
analysis of law in Germany: Schäfer/Ott, Lehrbuch der ökonomischen Analyse des Zivilrechts 2012. For a 
critical discussion on the application of economic analysis of law in Germany see, for instance: 
Fleischer/Zimmer Effizienzorientierung im Handels- und Wirtschaftsrecht in: Fleischer/Zimmer, Effizienz als 
Regelungsziel im Handels- und Wirtschaftsrecht. 2008; Jörn Lüdemann in the introduction to Engel, Recht und 
Verhalten: Beiträge zu Behavioral Law and Economics 2007; Lüdemann Die Grenzen des Homo Oeconomicus 
und die Rechtswissenschaft in: Engel, Recht und Verhalten: Beiträge zu Behavioral Law and Economics 2007; 
Fleischer in: Engel, Das Proprium der Rechtswissenschaft 2007. 
71 Generally on the behavioral law and economics approach: Jolls/Sunstein/Thaler, A behavioral 
approach to law and economics 1998; Englerth Behavioral law and economics–eine kritische Einführung in: 
Engel, Recht und Verhalten: Beiträge zu Behavioral law and Economics 2007. On behavioral and economics 
approach in corporate law: Schmolke/Fleischer/Zimmer Verhaltensökonomik als Forschungsinstrument für das 
Wirtschaftsrecht in: Fleischer/Zimmer, Beitrag der Berhaltensökonomie (Behavioral Economics) zum Handels-
und Wirtschaftsrecht 2011; Greenfield The end of contractarianism? Behavioral economics and the law of 
corporations in: Zamir/Teichman, The Oxford handbook of behavioral economics and the law 2014; 
Camerer/Malmendier Behavioral organizational economics in: Diamond/Vartiainen, Behavioral economics and 
its applications 2007; Langevoort Behavioral approaches to corporate law in: Hill/McDonnell, Research 
handbook on the economics of corporate law 2012. 
72 Engel, Legal experiments: Mission impossible? 2013. 
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isolation but also as endogenously chosen from possible available options. In the second 
study, I showed that the quota-based promotion compared to the performance-based 
promotion negatively affects group cooperation. I concluded that for evaluating the 
consequences of legal intervention, it is crucial to examine the direct impact of the 
intervention itself rather than of the desired outcome of the intervention (gender diversity) on 
group behavior.   
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Chapter 2 
Appointment length and dismissal rules of 
executive directors  
A. Introduction 
Appointment and dismissal procedures of executive directors belong to corporate 
governance matters that cannot be freely arranged by shareholders but are subject to 
mandatory legal rules in many European legal systems. Depending on the structure of the 
board,73 executive directors are elected and removed either directly by the shareholders or 
supervisory board. The extent of control over executive directors’ position is also determined 
by a maximum appointment term and dismissal protection regulated by the company law. In 
some legal systems (e.g., Denmark or France) the company law sets a maximum 
appointment term but at the same time allows dismissal at-will. In other jurisdictions (e.g., in 
Germany or Austria) members of the management board are strongly protected (removal 
only for good cause), but there are limits on appointment terms (maximum five years). In 
contrast, no term limits and no dismissal restrictions are imposed in the UK or Finland, 
although the corporate governance codices recommend one-year appointments. The design 
of appointment and dismissal rules reflects the tendency either to shield directors from 
shareholders’ pressure (long appointment term, dismissal for good cause) or to grant 
shareholders or the supervisory board a constant and direct control over directors (short 
appointment term, dismissal at-will).74 
                                                 
73 The board of directors has either a one-tier or a two-tier structure. In one-tier boards supervisory and 
management power is concentrated in one body – executive and non-executive directors operate in one unified 
organ. In two-tier boards the supervisory board and the management board are separate organs. The 
supervisory board is composed of non-executive directors whose task is to control executive directors who 
form the management board and are responsible for day-to-day operational decisions.  
74 Gerner-Beuerle/Paech/Schuster, Study on directors' duties and liabilities 2013, pp.20-29; For a 
short overview of jurisdictional differences in the distribution of power between the board of directors and the 
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Appointment and dismissal rights of corporate directors have been viewed as one of 
the “key strategies for controlling the enterprise”.75 They have received, however, 
surprisingly little attention in the European corporate governance literature.76 The issue of 
directors’ appointment lengths has been brought up only recently in the corporate law debate 
at the European level. The Reflection Group on the Future of EU Company Law suggested 
that the EU should require “…the Member States to grant the option to allow either one year 
or multiple year terms (e.g. not exceeding 4-6 years) and not to make directors and/or 
management of companies dismissible at-will ("ad nutum") - e.g. by explicitly stating the 
causes for dismissal.”77 In contrast, in the United States, the issue of directors’ removal has 
been hotly debated in the context of staggered boards.78 Empirical studies also investigated 
the relation between the actual directors’ tenure and firm performance79 as well as company 
performance before and after directors’ removal.80 
In this chapter, I suggest that appointment term and dismissal procedures constitute 
both - a control tool and an incentive mechanism. Next to severance pay and contractual 
protection, appointment term and dismissal rules define the security of executive directors’ 
position as well as the expected length of tenure. As such they might ex ante influence 
decisions made by company directors.81  
In publicly held corporations a great share of the decision-making power is vested in 
the hands of the board of directors or a similar collective body.82 Shareholders are typically 
not involved in the day-to-day operations of a company as well as its long-term plans.83 In 
                                                                                                                                                      
shareholders: Kraakman/Armour et al., The anatomy of corporate law: A comparative and functional approach 
2009, pp.82-87. 
75Kraakman/Armour et al., The anatomy of corporate law 2009, p.42. 
76Fleischer, AG 2006, 429, p. 29. 
77 Antunes/Baums et al., Report of the reflection group on the future of EUcompany law 2011, p.51. 
78 Bebchuk/Cohen, The costs of entrenched boards 2005; Cohen/Wang, How do staggered boards 
affect shareholder value? Evidence from a natural experiment 2013; Cremers/Sepe, The shareholder value of 
empowered boards 2016. 
79 Miller, Stale in the saddle: CEO tenure and the match between organization and environment 1991; 
Henderson/Miller/Hambrick, How quickly do ceos become obsolete? Industry dynamism, CEO tenure, and 
company performance 2006; Kim, Long-term firm performance and chief executive turnover: An empirical 
study of the dynamics 1996. 
80 I.e. Kaplan/Minton, How has CEO turnover changed? 2012; Weisbach, Outside directors and CEO 
turnover 1988. 
81 For a discussion on ex post and ex ante corporate governance strategies see: Kraakman/Armour et 
al., The anatomy of corporate law 2009, pp.44-45. 
82 Kraakman/Armour et al., The anatomy of corporate law 2009, p.13. 
83 Bainbridge, Corporation law and economics 2002, p.192; Marks The separation of ownership and 
control in: Bouckaert, The regulation of contracts 2000. 
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economic terms, the relation between shareholders and directors can be viewed as an agency 
relationship. Such a relation is defined “as a contract under which one or more persons (the 
principal(s)) engage another person (the agent) to perform some service on their behalf 
which involves delegating some decision-making authority to the agent.”84 The objectives of 
individuals who own shares in a company might, however, differ from the objectives of 
people who manage it. Shareholders might strive to maximize shares’ value whereas 
directors might aim at maximizing own utility (for instance, by maximizing own income).85 
These objectives are often misaligned what leads to the conflict of interests between 
directors and shareholders – directors realizing their objectives might not always act in the 
best interests of the shareholders.86  
According to the agency theory, the relationship between shareholders (principal) 
and directors (agents) is perceived as a contract.87 This contractual relationship might be, 
however, governed not only by the company law and a formal contract but also by a 
relational contract. Relational contracts are “informal agreements sustained by the value of 
future relationship”.88 Furthermore, “(…) a relational contract can be based on outcomes that 
are observed by only the contracting parties ex post, and also on outcomes that are 
prohibitively costly to specify ex ante.”89 In this chapter, I will argue that appointment term 
and dismissal rules might indeed influence the performance of directors given that the 
relation between directors and a company has features of a relational contract. I will show 
that two aspects of this relation – length of interaction and termination threat – are crucial for 
achieving efficiency in relational contracts through self-enforcement mechanisms (i.e., 
reputation, the value of future relation). I will further suggest that any policy intervention 
(i.e., involving the length of appointment term or dismissal restrictions) should take into 
account its effect on self-enforcement mechanisms of relational contracts.  
I will start by presenting the German company law rules on appointment term limits 
and removal procedures since they constitute an interesting border case in comparison to 
other European legal systems. I will review the legislator’s rationale for introducing the five-
                                                 
84 Jensen/Meckling, Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure 
1976, p.308. 
85 Jensen/Meckling, Theory of the firm 1976. p.308. 
86 Kraakman/Armour et al., The anatomy of corporate law 2009, p.35. 
87 Jensen/Meckling, Theory of the firm 1976, p.308. 
88 Baker/Gibbons/Murphy, Relational contracts and the theory of the firm 2002, p.40.   
89 Baker/Gibbons/Murphy, Relational contracts and the theory of the firm 2002, p.40.   
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year appointment limits and dismissal for good cause. I will shortly compare the German 
provisions with the rules implemented in other European countries. In the second part of this 
chapter, I will introduce the literature on relational contracts – the theoretical and empirical 
findings on self-enforcement mechanisms. Finally, I will discuss empirical research 
investigating the impact of provisions regulating the length of interaction and dismissal 
procedure on principals’ and agents’ behavior in relational contracts. 
B. Appointment term and dismissal rules in the company law 
I. Legislative measures in Germany - §84 AktG 
Appointment term and dismissal procedures of executive directors in public 
companies are subject to §84 German Stock Corporation Act (Aktiengesetz - AktG).90 
According to §84 (1) AktG, an appointment term of executive directors should not exceed 
five years. Section 3 of §84 AktG specifies that an executive director might be removed from 
office only for good cause before the tenure expires. Appointment and removal rights are 
exercised by the supervisory board (§84 (1) and (3) AktG).  
The origins of this provision can be traced back to the German Stock Corporation Act 
from 1937 (AktG 1937). Previous rules allowed directors’ appointment for life and dismissal 
at-will.91 In contrast, the AktG 1937 restricted the appointment term to five years (§75 (1) 
sentence 1 AktG 1937). The legislator recognized that a long-term contract with an executive 
director would impose an excessive burden on a company.92 At the same time, removal of an 
executive director was allowed only for good cause to prevent the supervisory board from 
exerting undue influence on the decision-making of the management board.93 Gross breach 
of duties or inability to manage a company properly were named as examples of good cause 
for removal (§75 (3) sentence 2 AktG 1937). 
The AktG 1937 did not explicitly regulate whether it is allowed to renew the five-
year term of office automatically. The German Federal Court of Justice (Bundesgerichtshof - 
BGH) decided in 1951 that such an automatic renewal of the appointment is not permissible 
                                                 
90 Aktiengesetz from September 6, 1965, BGBl. I S. 1089 [hereinafter: AktG].  
91 § 231 German Commercial Code from 1897 (Handelsgesetzbuch), accessible https://www.gesetze-
im-internet.de/hgb/BJNR002190897.html.  
92 Klausing, Gesetz über Aktiengesellschaften und Kommanditgesellschaften auf Aktien Aktiengesetz: 
Nebst Einführungsgesetz u.'Amtlicher Begründung' 1937. 
93 Klausing, Gesetz über Aktiengesellschaften 1937. 
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even if the director’s contract included an automatic renewal clause.94 In contrast to the 
AktG 1937, the German Stock Corporation Act from 1965 included a provision on the 
renewal procedure. According to §84 (1) sentence 2 AktG, a renewal of the appointment is 
admissible no earlier than one year before the current tenure is over. The new rule ensured 
that the supervisory board evaluates the performance of each executive director at least every 
five years.95 A regular check of the performance should provide a basis for a separate and 
non-automatic decision on whether to renew the appointment.96 According to the legislator, a 
five-year period is long enough for a director to “earn” a re-appointment.97  
The German Stock Corporation Act 1965 also included an additional example of 
good cause for removal. A vote of no confidence by the shareholders’ meeting would 
constitute good cause for removal unless such a vote is made for manifestly arbitrary reasons 
(§84 (3) sentence 2 AktG).   
Besides specifying the maximum length of term and causes for dismissal §84 AktG 
addresses other closely related issues. According to §84 (1) sentence 4 an automatic renewal 
is permitted as long as the current term of office is shorter than five years and the total length 
of appointment (together with renewal) does not exceed five years. Director’s relation with a 
company is defined not only by an appointment act but also by a civil law contract between a 
company and a director. Under the German law, an appointment act grants an executive 
director the power to represent a company.98 Furthermore, an appointment act establishes 
directors’ rights and duties regarding the management of a company.99 An appointment act is 
a legal act which is distinct from a civil law contract between a director and a company 
(Trennungstheorie).100 A civil law contract governs obligations such as compensation or 
non-compete clauses.101 Under §84 (1) sentence 5 AktG, all provisions on the length and 
renewal of appointment also applies to the executive director’s contract concluded according 
                                                 
94 BGH NJW 1951, 881. 
95 Kropff, Aktiengesetz: Textausgabe des Aktiengesetzes vom 6. 0. 1965 (Bundesgesetzbl. I S. 1089) 
und des Einführungsgesetzes zum Aktiengesetz vom 6. 9. 1965 (Bundesgesetzbl. Is 1185) mit Begründung des 
Regierungsentwurfs, Bericht des Rechtsausschusses des Deutschen Bundestags, Verweisungen und 
Sachverzeichnis 1965. 
96 Fleischer, AG 2006, 429, p.430; Kropff, Aktiengesetz 1965; BGHZ 10, 187 = NJW 1953, 1465, 
p.1466. 
97 Kropff, Aktiengesetz 1965; Spindler in: Goette/Habersack, MK-AktG 2014, §84 sec. 3. 
98 Thüsing §4. Bestellung und Anstellung des Vorstands in: Fleischer, Handbuch des Vorstandsrechts 
2006, p102. 
99 Thüsing in: Fleischer, Handbuch des Vorstandsrechts 2006, p.102. 
100 Koch in: Hüffer, AktG 2014 §84 sec.2. 
101 Thüsing in: Fleischer, Handbuch des Vorstandsrechts 2006, p.119. 
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to the civil law. There is one exception – a contract might include an automatic extension 
clause. According to this paragraph, once a company decides to renew the director’s 
appointment, the contract is automatically extended.  
§84 (3) AktG also states that the dismissal is enforceable unless it is declared null 
and void in front of the court. Furthermore, any claims arising from the executive director’s 
contract in connection with the dismissal are governed by the general provisions of the civil 
law (§84 (3) sentence 5).  
 The German law-on-the-books does not provide the whole picture of directors’ 
position in a public company as regulated by appointment and dismissal rules defined by the 
company law. For instance, §84 AktG does not prescribe the minimum appointment 
duration. It is also not clear what is the exact relation between causes for dismissal specified 
in §84 (3) and termination of the civil law contract typically regulated by §626 German Civil 
Code (Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch – BGB). If a cause for dismissal does not constitute a cause 
for contract termination, it might happen that a contract continues but a director loses power 
to manage and represent a company.  To provide a comprehensive view on the legal aspects 
of directors’ term of office, I present the discussion in the literature and judicial decisions on 
the core issues of directors’ appointment and dismissal procedure which are not explicitly 
regulated by the company law. 
1. Appointment length 
§84 (1) AktG sets only a maximum but not a fixed duration of appointment. It is a 
prerogative of the supervisory board to decide about the exact length of the term in each 
case.102 Therefore, a fixed duration cannot be prescribed in the articles of association, even if 
it is within the maximum duration defined in §84 (1) AktG.103 A five-year period is treated 
however as a default rule. For instance, if the supervisory board fails to set the length of 
tenure, an appointment is valid, and it is interpreted as a five-year appointment.104 The same 
                                                 
102 Koch in: Hüffer, AktG 2014 §84 sec.20; Lutter/Krieger, Rechte und Pflichten des Aufsichtsrats 
2008, p.146; Fleischer in: Spindler/Stilz, AktG2014, §84 sec.14. 
103 Koch in: Hüffer, AktG 2014 §84 sec.20; Lutter/Krieger, Rechte und Pflichten des Aufsichtsrats 
2008, p.146; Fleischer in: Spindler/Stilz, AktG 2014, sec.14. Different regulations apply to SE (Societas 
Europaea - European company): see art. 46 Council Regulation (EC) No 2157/2001 on the Statue for a 
European Company.  
104 Koch in: Hüffer, AktG 2014 §84 sec.20; Lutter/Krieger, Rechte und Pflichten des aufsichtsrats 
2008,  p.146. 
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applies if an appointment is made for longer than five years.105 Some scholars claim that the 
five-year default should not apply if, given the circumstances, it is clear that the appointment 
term deviates from the period of five years, e.g., an executive director was previously elected 
for three years.106  
There is no explicit rule regarding a minimum term of office.107 It is not specified in 
§84 AktG, and it is disputed in the legal doctrine. A minimum term of office might be 
defined in the articles of association.108 A decision of the supervisory board would 
nevertheless be valid even if an executive director was appointed for a period shorter than 
the minimum duration specified in the articles of association.109 Still, an appointment for an 
extremely short period could be interpreted as a breach of the supervisory board’s duties. 
Legal scholars posit that an executive director appointed for a very short period will not be 
able to fulfill his or her duties, i.e., manage a company under own responsibility (a duty 
imposed by § 76 (1) AktG).110 In this case, an executive director would be overly dependent 
on the supervisory board that could decide not to renew the tenure once a short appointment 
term is over.111 This could constitute a circumvention of company law rules on dismissal for 
good cause since these rules were introduced to guarantee a certain level of independence to 
executive directors.112 Some scholars claim that the length of appointment should not be 
shorter than one113 or two years.114 Others point out that the supervisory board has to justify 
its decision each time an executive director is appointed for a period shorter than five 
years.115 The shorter this period, the better explanation should be provided.116 For instance, a 
short tenure would be admissible if it serves as a transition period before retiring.117 It has 
                                                 
105 Spindler in: Goette/Habersack, MK-AktG 2014, §84 sec.38. 
106  Fleischer in: Spindler/Stilz, AktG 2014, § 84 sec.13. 
107 Koch in: Hüffer, AktG 2014, §84 sec.20. 
108 Thüsing in: Fleischer, Handbuch des Vorstandsrechts 2006, §4 p.116. 
109 Fleischer in: Spindler/Stilz, AktG 2014, §84 sec.12. For a different view: Krieger, 
Personalentscheidungen des Aufsichtsrats 1981, p.120: Krieger claims that a too short appointment term should 
be void. 
110 Spindler in: Goette/Habersack, MK-AktG 2014, §84 sec.37. 
111 Willemer, AG 1977, 133, p.133. 
112 Krieger, Personalentscheidungen des Aufsichtsrats 1981, p.120. 
113 Fleischer in: Spindler/Stilz, AktG 2014, §84 sec.12, arguing that one year is in line with the 
international practice. It is however only a guideline and special cases should be considered separately.  
114 Krieger refers to the business literature showing that some business strategies require a longer 
period to develop and that the appointment of 15 years would be the optimal one in these cases. He thinks that 
this is a plausible explanation why the practice to appoint directors for the maximum possible five-year period 
is so common: Krieger, Personalentscheidungen des Aufsichtsrats 1981, p.119. 
115 Lutter/Krieger, Rechte und pflichten des Aufsichtsrats 2008, p.147. 
116 Lutter/Krieger, Rechte und pflichten des Aufsichtsrats 2008, p.147. 
117 Lutter/Krieger, Rechte und pflichten des Aufsichtsrats 2008, p.147. 
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also been raised that it is not possible to define a minimum one-size-fits-all appointment 
term and therefore each case should be evaluated individually.118 
The supervisory board should pay particular attention when deciding on the length of 
the first appointment.119 The German Corporate Governance Code (Deutscher Corporate 
Governance Kodex – DCGK) recommends in Section 5.1.2 para. 2 sentence 1 that the 
maximum five-year period should not be a rule in case of the first appointment. It is been 
suggested that a new executive director should be appointed for three years.120 Some 
scholars argue that long appointment terms pose a certain risk for a company since an early 
dismissal of a director involves high costs for a company in the form of severance pay.121 
The risk of a forced removal is particularly high in case of the first appointment.122 On the 
other hand, many talented executive directors would not accept an offer if the appointment is 
made for a short period.123 Such situation is even more likely if the candidate has previously 
served in other company with a five-year term of office.124 Also, internally promoted 
executive directors do not need to be selected for a shorter period as the supervisory board 
usually knows them already quite well. Thus, the risk of an early removal is lower than in 
the case of an outsider.125 Taking into account such scenarios the DCGK does not specify 
any limit for the first appointment term but only recommends avoiding the maximum five-
year term.126 
Although the term of five years is not a mandatory rule and the DCGK explicitly 
recommends shorter tenure in the case of the first appointment, almost 75% of the German 
companies set the appointment term at five years.127 Another 10% elect executive directors 
for a term of three years.128 
                                                 
118 Thüsing in: Fleischer, Handbuch des Vorstandsrechts 2006, §4 p.116, Spindler in: 
Goette/Habersack, MK-AktG 2014, § 84 sec.37. 
119  Koch in: Hüffer, AktG 2014, §84 sec.20. 
120  Koch in: Hüffer, AktG 2014, §84 sec.20; Fleischer in: Spindler/Stilz, AktG 2014, § 84 sec. 14 
121  Spindler in: Goette/Habersack, MK-AktG 2014, § 84 sec.34. 
122  Spindler in: Goette/Habersack, MK-AktG 2014, § 84 sec.34, Fleischer in: Spindler/Stilz, AktG 
2014, §84 sec.14 
123 Kremer in: Ringleb, Deutscher Corporate Governance Kodex 2014, 5.1.2 sec.902. 
124 Kremer in: Ringleb, Deutscher Corporate Governance Kodex 2014, 5.1.2 sec.902. 
125 Kremer in: Ringleb, Deutscher Corporate Governance Kodex 2014 , 5.1.2 sec.902. 
126 Kremer in: Ringleb, Deutscher Corporate Governance Kodex 2014, 5.1.2 sec.903. 
127 Mutter in: Marsch-Barner/Schäfer, Handbuch börsennotierte AG 2005, §19 p.762; Fleischer in: 
Spindler/Stilz, AktG 2014, § 84, sec.13: criticizing that the maximum appointment term has become a default 
norm for the appointment length.     
128 Mutter in: Marsch-Barner/Schäfer, Handbuch börsennotierte AG 2005, §19 p.762. 
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2. Appointment renewal 
A recent case on an early reappointment of executive directors129 has revived the 
debate on the objectives of the five-year limits.130 §84 (1) sentence 2 AktG permits the 
supervisory board to reappoint an executive director or to extend the current term of office. 
The supervisory board can decide about the renewal no earlier than one year before the 
current tenure is over (§84 (1) sentence 3 AktG). A practice has been developed to prolong 
the appointment for another five years even if there is still more than one year of the current 
tenure left -  the current executive director resigns from the position and the supervisory 
board immediately reelects him or her for the new five-year tenure.131  
There has been no unanimous view in the German literature concerning the 
compliance of the described practice with company law provisions. The prevalent view used 
to be that this practice is not in conflict with objectives of §84 (1) sentence 3 AktG.132 In the 
2000s, some legal scholars started to contest the early reaappointment practice.133 Some of 
them claimed that this procedure is prohibited.134 It has been raised that such an appointment 
act is not valid as it is made based on an agreement to terminate the previous appointment 
concluded in an expectation of a subsequent reappointment.135 Besides, the core objective of 
a five-year limit of tenure is to induce the supervisory board to make a choice between 
reappointing the incumbent director and electing a new one.136 The board’s decision should 
not be reduced to an automatic extension of the current term without considering hiring a 
new director – a situation which takes place in case of an early reappointment.137 
Furthermore, the supervisory board should decide about the reappointment after a period 
long enough to properly evaluate the performance of an executive director.138  
                                                 
129 LG Frankenthal BeckRS 2010, 15165; OLG Zweibrücken NZG 2011, 433; BGH, NZG 2012, 
1027. 
130Willemer, AG 1977, 133, p.130; Werner, AG 1990, 1 , p.19. 
131 Götz, AG 2002, 305, p.305. 
132 Willemer, AG 1977, 133, p.130; Werner, AG 1990, 1 , p.19. 
133 Götz, AG 2002, 305, p.305; Peltzer, NZG 2002, 593, p.596; Thüsing in: Fleischer, Handbuch des 
Vorstandsrechts 2006, §4  p.115. 
134 Götz, AG 2002, 305, p.305, Thüsing in: Fleischer, Handbuch des Vorstandsrechts 2006, §4  p.115.  
135 Götz, AG 2002, 305, p.306. 
136 Thüsing in: Fleischer, Handbuch des vorstandsrechts 2006, §4 p.114.  
137 Thüsing in: Fleischer, Handbuch des vorstandsrechts 2006, §4 p.114. 
138 Semler/Peltzer Arbeitshandbuch für Vorstandsmitglieder 2005.  
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Other scholars state that an early reappointment is admissible only if the supervisory 
board provides good reasons for its decision.139 This argument is in line with the 
recommendation of Section 5.1.2 German Corporate Governance Code. It prescribes that a 
reappointment earlier than one year before the end of the appointment period with a 
simultaneous termination of the current appointment shall only take place in exceptional 
circumstances. Hölters and Weber list a few examples.140 For instance, an early re-
appointment might be necessary if there is a high competition for a particularly talented 
executive director.141 
According to an alternative view in certain circumstances, an early reappointment 
might constitute an abuse of law.142 One example of an abusive reappointment is provided 
by Fastrich, who refers to the Karstadt Quelle AG case where an executive director was re-
appointed. Shortly afterward he resigned due to “health problems” and received a high 
severance pay.143 Thus, an early reappointment would be deemed an abuse of law if it is 
conducted only to secure high severance pay to the re-appointed director.144 
The discussed practice has been the subject of the German Federal Court of Justice 
(Bundesgerichtshof – BGH) ruling from July 17, 2012 (II ZR 55/11). In its decision, the 
BGH stated that a reappointment earlier than one year before the end of the appointment 
period does not constitute an inadmissible circumvention of §84 (1) sentence 3 AktG.145 The 
BGH reached this conclusion after examining whether the described practice is in conflict 
with the goals of the company law provisions on executive directors’ reappointment. The 
BGH identified three objectives of this rule. The first one refers to the legislator’s rationale 
provided when introducing the norm in 1965 – at least every five years the supervisory board 
should decide whether to keep or remove the current executive director.146 Also, it prevents 
situations in which a company is bound to an executive director for longer than five years.147 
                                                 
139 Hölters/Weber, AG 2005, 629; Lutter/Krieger, Rechte und Pflichten des Aufsichtsrats 2008; 
Bosse/Hinderer, NZG2011, 605; Priester, ZIP 2012, 1781: Wedemann, ZGR 2013, 316.  
140 Hölters/Weber, AG 2005, 629, p.634. 
141  Hölters/Weber, AG 2005, 629, p.634. 
142 Fastrich Zur vorzeitigen Neubestellung von Vorstandsmitgliedern vor dem Hintergrund der 5-
Jahres-Frist des § 84 Abs.1 Satz 3 in: Bauer, Festschrift für Herbert Buchner zum 70. Geburtstag 2009; 
Fleischer, DB 2011, 861. 
143 Fastrich in: Bauer, FS Buchner 2009, 209, p.209. 
144 Fleischer, DB 2011, 861, p.864. 
145 BGH NZG 2012, 1027. 
146 BGH NZG 2012, 1027, p.1029. 
147 BGH NZG 2012, 1027, p.1029. 
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According to the second objective defined by the BGH the supervisory board should have a 
possibility to remove the current executive director at least every five years without 
providing a good reason for removal.148 Finally, restrictions imposed on the reappointment 
procedure should also prevent situations in which a new coming supervisory board would 
need to tolerate the old executive director for a five-year period.149 This might happen if the 
previous supervisory board reappoints an executive director for a new term of five years just 
before the new supervisory board is elected.150 The conclusion of the BGH is that the 
supervisory board is allowed to terminate the existing appointment any time in agreement 
with the director and set a new five-year appointment term.151 The BGH stated that this 
practice does not restrict any of the described objectives of § 84 (1) sentence 3 AktG.152 In a 
given case the supervisory board also did not abuse the law as there were no abusive motives 
for an early re-appointment of the management board.153 
3. Removal for good cause 
Under §84 (3) sentence 1 AktG, an executive director might be removed only for 
good cause. The objective of the removal restriction is to protect the management board 
from the undue influence of the supervisory board.154 Dismissal at-will could lead to 
situations in which the management board would follow the guidelines of the supervisory 
board to avoid an immediate dismissal.155 A constant threat of dismissal would have an 
adverse impact on the initiative and decisiveness of executive directors.156 
 The removal right is exercised by the supervisory board and cannot be restricted or 
delegated to another corporate body.157 Removal rights specified in the company law cannot 
be altered through the articles of association or the director’s contract.158 There is no legal 
definition of ‘good cause’ in the company law, but §84 (3) sentence 2 AktG includes a non-
                                                 
148 BGH NZG 2012, 1027, p.1029. 
149 BGH NZG 2012, 1027, p.1030. 
150 BGH NZG 2012, 1027, p.1030. 
151 BGH NZG 2012, 1027, p.1029; The BGH decision did not bring more clarity in the literature. 
Although some scholars agree with the BGH and find the re-appointment practice in line with the provisions of 
company law (i.e., Bürgers/Theusinger, NZG 2012, 1218; Schult, GWR 2012, 411), others are more skeptical 
and criticized at least parts of the BGH argumentation (Priester, ZIP 2012, 1781; Wedemann, ZGR 2013, 316). 
152 BGH, NZG 2012, 1027, p.1029. 
153 BGH NZG 2012, 1027, p.1030 
154 Fleischer in: Spindler/Stilz, AktG 2014 sec.5.  
155 Spindler in: Goette/Habersack, MK-AktG 2014, §84 sec.5. 
156 Spindler in: Goette/Habersack, MK-AktG 2014, §84 sec.5. 
157 Fleischer in: Spindler/Stilz, AktG 2014, §84 sec.95. 
158 Spindler in: Goette/Habersack, MK-AktG 2014, §84 sec.125. 
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exhaustive list of examples. A definition, repeatedly occurring in the court rulings and 
literature, specifies that good cause for removal exists if it would be unreasonable for the 
company to keep the director until the end of the appointment term.159 It is not clear whether 
only the interests of a company or also the interests of a director should be taken into 
account when evaluating the existence of good cause.160 The literature gives numerous 
examples of circumstances which might be qualified as good cause, e.g., corruption, 
manipulation of the financial statement, long-term illness, irreconcilable differences between 
the supervisory board and management board on fundamental issues of corporate strategy.161  
4. Appointment, removal and executive director’s contract 
The director’s actual tenure in a company might also depend on the contract. Since 
this is not a main focus of the current research, I will only briefly discuss the role of a 
contract for determining director’s tenure. More specifically, restrictions imposed on 
termination of a contract together with severance pay might considerably raise the costs of 
director’s removal, effectively leading to a longer tenure. According to the legal doctrine, the 
appointment of a director should be treated separately from a contractual relation governed 
by civil law rules (Trennungstheorie).162 Despite a formal separation, an appointment and 
director’s contract are closely interrelated.163 §84 (1) sentence 5 AktG stipulates that the 
rules on the appointment term should also be implemented to the contract length. The 
contract can be, however, automatically extended in case of the appointment renewal. In 
contrast, § 84 (3) sentence 5 stipulates that the director’s claims in connection with dismissal 
should be governed by the civil law rules. Thus, the termination of the director’s contract is 
regulated by provisions of the German Civil Code (Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch – BGB), which 
distinguish between termination with and without notice (§620 and 626 BGB respectively). 
Termination without notice is allowed only for good cause. Although the legislator used the 
                                                 
159 Koch in: Hüffer, AktG 2014, §84 sec.70; Spindler in: Goette/Habersack, MK-AktG 2014, §84 
sec.127; Thüsing in: Fleischer, Handbuch des Vorstandsrechts 2006, §5 sec.8, OLG Stuttgart: Urteil vom 
13.03.2002 - 20 U 59/01 = AG 2003, 211, p.212. 
160 Thüsing in: Fleischer, Handbuch des Vorstandsrechts 2006 § 5, sec.8-9. 
161 Spindler in: Goette/Habersack, MK-AktG 2014, §84 sec.131-136. 
162 Thüsing in: Fleischer, Handbuch des Vorstandsrechts 2006, pp.100-101. 
163 Thüsing in: Fleischer, Handbuch des Vorstandsrechts 2006, p.101.  
 Chapter 2 Appointment length and dismissal rules of executive directors  
 
 
33 
 
same term, an interpretation of good cause for contract termination is more stringent than for 
directors’ removal.164  
II. Legislative solutions in other European jurisdictions 
The German appointment and dismissal rules are rather unusual comparing to other 
European legal systems.165 The limits imposed on the term of office and removal procedure 
in different jurisdictions can be classified from the most to the least protective for executive 
directors. The German provisions grant the highest protection to executive directors – 
relatively long appointment term, unlimited re-election, and removal for good cause. A 
majority of European countries implemented an intermediate solution – longer appointment 
term and removal without cause.  
In France, for instance, the term of office should be defined in the articles of 
association within two- to six-year period (Article L 225-61 French Commercial Code).166 If 
there is no provision, the default appointment term for the management board is four years 
(Article L 225-62 French Commercial Code). Also, the AFEP (French Association of Large 
Companies) Corporate Governance Code for Listed Corporations recommends that the 
maximum directors’ term of office should not exceed four years (Article 14 AFEP Corporate 
Governance Code).167 Although board members can be dismissed at-will, they might be 
awarded damages if the removal was unjustified.168According to the AMF (Autorité des 
Marchés Financiers) 2012 Annual Report on Corporate Governance and Executive 
Compensation only 16.7% of 60 companies which apply the AFEP Corporate Governance 
Code did not comply with the four-year recommendation. The actual average tenure of 
directors is above six years, ranging from two to more than twelve years.169 Italian and 
Spanish company law provision on appointment term and dismissal procedures are further 
examples of intermediate solutions. In Italy directors are appointed for maximum three years 
                                                 
164 Thüsing §5. Abberufung und Kündigung der Anstellung des Vorstands in: Fleischer, Handbuch des 
Vorstandsrechts 2006, p.161. 
165Fleischer, AG 2006, 429, p.442: “Das deutsche Vorstandsrecht nimmt mit seiner Kombination einer 
langen Bestellungshöchstdauer von fünf Jahren (§84 Abs. 1 Satz 1 AktG) und dem Widerruf der Bestellung nur 
aus wichtigem Grund (§84 Abs. 3 Satz 1 AktG) international eine Sonderstellung ein.“ 
166 Reporting the regulation in France I referred to the English translation of the Code de Commerce, 
available at: http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/text.jsp?file_id=180801. 
167 AFEP Corporate Governance Code of listed companies 2013, available at: 
http://www.ecgi.org/codes/documents/afep_medef_code_revision_jun2013_en.pdf 
168 Pietrancosta/Romain in: Davies et al., Corporate boards in law and practice 2013, p.209.  
169 Financiers, AMF2012 Annual report on corporate governance and executive compensation 2012, 
p.46 
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and might be re-elected.170 They might be removed by the shareholders’ meeting any time 
without particular cause in which case a director might, however, claim damages.171 In Spain 
the term of office should be specified in the articles of association.172 It has to be uniform for 
all directors and cannot exceed six years (Section 221.2 Corporate Enterprise Act). Section 
223.1 Corporate Enterprise Act stipulates that directors may be dismissed any time without 
stating a cause for dismissal. However, according to the Recommendation 21 of the Good 
Governance Code of Listed Companies, non-executive directors should be removed only for 
a justified cause to protect their freedom of judgment.173 
On the other end of the spectrum regarding regulations of appointment terms and 
dismissal procedures are, for instance, company law provisions in Finland and UK. In 
Finland the default appointment term of directors in a one-tier and two-tier board structure is 
one year.174 A company might stipulate a different appointment term (even indefinite) in its 
articles of association (Chapter 6 Section 11 FLLCA). However, the Finnish Corporate 
Governance Code also recommends the maximum appointment term of one year 
(Recommendation 10).175 According to the Nordic Corporate Governance Project 2012, only 
7 out of 120 evaluated companies deviated from the one-year recommendation for the 
director’s term of office.176 In the UK Companies Act 2006 does not regulate the limits of 
appointment term. The UK Corporate Governance Code in the provision B.7.1 
recommended the annual re-election of all directors of the FTSE (Financial Times Stock 
Exchange) 350 companies.177 This recommendation was criticized as promoting “short-term 
mentality amongst directors”.178 Nevertheless, in 2013, all but two of the FTSE 350 
                                                 
170 Ferrarini/Peruzzo/Roberti Corporate boards in Italy in: Davies et al., Corporate boards in law and 
practice: A comparative analysis in Europe 2013, pp.392-393. 
171 Ferrarini/Peruzzo/Roberti in: Davies et al., Corporate boards in law and practice 2013, p.393. 
172 Reporting the regulation in Spain I referred to the English translation of the Spanish Corporate 
Enterprise Act, available at:  
http://law.au.dk/fileadmin/www.asb.dk/omasb/institutter/erhvervsjuridiskinstitut/EMCA/Spanish_Act.pdf 
173 Good Governance Code of Listed Companies from February 2015, available at: 
 http://www.cnmv.es/DocPortal/Publicaciones/CodigoGov/Good_Governanceen.pdf 
174 Reporting the regulation in Finland I referred to the English translation of the Finnish Limited 
Liability Companies Act, available at: http://www.finlex.fi/en/laki/kaannokset/2006/en20060624.pdf. 
175 Finnish Corporate Governance Code from June 15, 2010, available at: 
http://cgfinland.fi/files/2012/01/finnish-cg-code-2010.pdf. 
176 The NASDAQ OMX Group, Nordic corproate governance project 2011, available at: 
http://www.nasdaqomx.com/digitalAssets/85/85404_cgnordicproject2011.pdf.  
177 The UK Corporate Governance Code from September 2014, available at:  
https://www.frc.org.uk/Our-Work/Publications/Corporate-Governance/UK-Corporate-Governance-Code-
2014.pdf 
178 Institute of Directors’ reaction to UK Corporate Governance Code Revision, May 28, 2010;  
available at:  
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companies implemented the annual re-election practice.179 Additionally, 43% of Small Cap 
and Fledgling companies did so, although the Code provision did not apply to them.180 The 
Companies Act 2006 in Section 168.1 allows dismissal at-will before the current term of 
office expires. Still, a dismissed director might claim compensation or damages resulting 
from the breach of a service contract.181 
Interestingly, longer appointment terms and dismissal protection do not seem to go in 
line with a longer tenure. An average tenure varies considerably across European countries, 
ranging from 2.8 years in Norway to 8.6 in Spain (Figure 1).182 For example, in Germany, a 
maximum appointment term of five years is permitted, and 75 % of companies follow this 
                                                                                                                                                      
http://www.iod.com/influencing/press-office/press-releases/iod-reaction-to-uk-corporate-governance-code-
revision 
179 Financial Reporting Council, Developments in corporate governance 2013. The impact and 
implementation of the UK corporate governance and stewardship codes 2013, p.12. 
180 Financial Reporting Council, Developments in corporate governance 2013, p.12. 
181 Davies in: Davies et al., Corporate boards in law and practice 2013, p.745. 
182 Struggles, Towards dynamic governance 2014. European corporate governance report. 2014, p.28. 
Figure 1: Average number of years on the board 
Adopted from European Corporate Governance Report by Heidrick&Struggles 2013 
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maximum duration,183 but executive directors serve on average 5.4 years on the board.184 In 
contrast, in the United Kingdom (maximum one-year appointment term recommended and 
dismissal at-will) the average tenure is 6.7 years.185 Also in Sweden, where directors are 
granted the least protection (dismissal at-will, no compensation for an early dismissal),186 
executive directors hold their position for 5.9 years on average.187  
A misalignment of removal protection, long appointment terms and the actual length 
of tenure might result from different factors. First, the rules of dismissal protection are likely 
not the only provisions of corporate law which effectively facilitates or hinders directors’ 
removal. Next to severance pay, Davies et al. mention also the rules of voting.188 For 
instance, it might be difficult to achieve a majority of votes in the shareholders’ meeting, 
particularly if the voting is not only for removal of a single director but of the entire board.189 
Second, an actual removal threat might also depend on the shareholders’ activity and 
engagement in the functioning of the company. For example, dismissal protection might be 
lower with a large active shareholder compared to disperse share ownership.  
III. Summary 
According to the prevailing view in Germany, the main objectives of appointment 
term limits and removal restrictions are to ensure both - sufficient monitoring and the 
necessary level of independence for the management board. On one hand, a limited 
appointment term should induce the supervisory board to evaluate the management board 
performance at least every five years. It should also rule out situations in which a company 
has to tolerate an executive director for an extended period without having a chance to 
remove a director for no reason and no severance pay. On the other hand, limitations 
imposed on removal should guarantee an adequate amount of independence to manage a 
company under own responsibility. The independence of an executive director would also be 
endangered in case of a very short appointment term. Furthermore, longer appointment 
                                                 
183Mutter in: Marsch-Barner/Schäfer, Handbuch börsennotierte AG 2005, §19 p.762; Fleischer in: 
Spindler/Stilz, AktG 2014, § 84, sec.13 criticizing that the maximum appointment term has become a norm for 
an appointment length.     
184 Struggles, Towards dynamic governance 2014 2014, p.28.  
185 Struggles, Towards dynamic governance 2014 2014, p.28. 
186 Davies/Hopt et al. Boards in law and practice: A cross-country analysis in Europe in: Davies et al., 
Corporate boards in law and practice: A comparative analysis in Europe 2013, p.43. 
187 Struggles, Towards dynamic governance 2014 2014, p.28. 
188 Davies/Hopt et al. in: Davies et al., Boards in law and practice 2013, p.43. 
189 Davies/Hopt et al. in: Davies et al., Boards in law and practice 2013, p.43. 
 Chapter 2 Appointment length and dismissal rules of executive directors  
 
 
37 
 
lengths facilitate a proper evaluation of director’s performance - it would be hard to assess 
the management board if its work has been observed only for a short period. 
The short overview of corporate law provisions in selected European jurisdictions 
demonstrates a variety of legal solutions available to regulate appointment term and 
dismissal protection of corporate directors. In all discussed systems non-executive directors 
are appointed by the shareholders. In contrast, the management board in the two-tier system 
and executive directors in one-tier system countries are selected either by non-executive 
directors or by the supervisory board. Differences in appointment term and dismissal 
protection seem to reflect various approaches to the allocation of power within a company. 
There are company law systems which are shareholder-friendly (e.g., Finland or the UK). 
They grant strong power to the shareholders’ meeting and provide for annual re-elections 
and dismissal at-will. The other group of systems is more board-centric (e.g., Germany). In 
these systems, the independence of the management board is at the core of legal regulations 
specifying long terms of office or permitting removal only for good cause.190  
Here I explore the impact of different regulations of appointment term and dismissal 
protection on directors’ performance and their actual length of tenure. I start with a short 
introduction to the role of the interaction length and termination threat in a principal-agent 
relation. Since the Reflection Group recommended that the Member States should enable the 
companies to choose between different regulations of appointment term and dismissal 
protection, I focus thereafter on research investigating the effects of these provisions when 
various options (e.g. one-year and multiple-year appointment terms)191 are made available by 
law. First, I present empirical research measuring the influence of staggered boards on a 
company value. Next, I introduce experimental research examining behavioral effects of 
dismissal protection and appointment terms in a principal-agent relation.  
 
 
                                                 
190 Gerner-Beuerle/Paech/Schuster, Study on directors' duties and liabilities 2013, pp.22-23. 
191 Please note that in many countries a large majority of companies adopt either the recommended 
appointment term (e.g., one year in Finland or UK, four years in France) or the maximum allowed appointment 
term becomes a default option (e.g., Germany). Thus, although other options are available, usually only one of 
them dominates in practice.   
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C. Economic perspective on the directors’ role in a company 
I. The principal-agent relation and the role of law 
In economic terms, the relationship between an executive director and a company (or 
its shareholders as the owners of a company) is referred to as a principal-agent relation.192 
The principal (i.e. the shareholders) delegates a task (i.e. managing the company) to the 
agent (an executive director) who performs it on behalf of the principal. The principal-agent 
relation between an executive director and shareholders is governed by a contract and 
provisions of company law defining director’s obligations resulting from the appointment. 
The main duty of a director is to act in the best interest of the company (or in the best interest 
of its shareholders).193 In exchange for the fulfillment of these duties the agent receives a 
payment (i.e. director’s compensation).  
The principal-agent relation is of a strategic nature. The principal decides to whom to 
delegate the managing task. Subsequently, the agent, who was selected to perform the task 
on behalf of the principal, decides whether to perform it in the best interests of the principal 
or to shirk. This type of situations is called a moral hazard situation. The agent needs to 
determine whether to carry out the task in a way which makes the agent better off but is not 
necessarily in line with the best interests of the principal. The moral hazard of an executive 
director can take different forms. For instance, an executive director might avoid engaging in 
particular tasks such as wage negotiations or reallocation of the workforce.194 Although the 
consequences of these tasks might be beneficial for a company, a director might find them 
“unpleasant or inconvenient.”195 Pet projects are another illustration of the moral hazard 
problem. The success of a project might be doubtful, but a director might want to pursue it 
                                                 
192 Jensen/Meckling, Theory of the firm 1976.  Becht et al. point out that “the corporate governance 
problem can also be described as a “common agency problem”, that is an agency problem involving one agent 
(the CEO) and multiple principals (shareholders, creditors, employees, clients…”, Becht/Bolton/Röell Chapter 
12 Corporate law and governance in: Polinsky/Shavell, Handbook of law and economics 2007, p.842. 
193 The duty of the director to act either in the best interest of the company or in the best interest of 
shareholders depends on the legal system. It relates also to the long-lasting debate on shareholder vs. 
stakeholder primacy. For a discussion from the legal and economic viewpoint see i.e. Fleischer Shareholders 
vs. Stakeholders: Aktienrechtliche Fragen in: Hommelhoff et al., Handbuch Corporate Governance: Leitung 
und Überwachung börsennotierter Unternehmen in der Rechts- und Wirtschaftspraxis 2009; Schmidt/Weiß 
Shareholder vs. Stakeholder: Ökonomische Fragen in: Hommelhoff et al., Handbuch Corporate Governance: 
Leitung und Überwachung börsennotierter Unternehmen in der Rechts- und Wirtschaftspraxis 2009; 
Hansmann/Kraakman, The end of history for corporate law 2001. 
194 Tirole, The theory of corporate finance 2006, pp.16-20. 
195 Tirole, The theory of corporate finance 2006, p.16. 
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nevertheless because it is a personal favorite.196 A director might also engage in accounting 
manipulation to make a company outcomes look better or overconsume personal benefits 
(i.e. personal jet or luxuriously furnished office).197  
The game theory conceptualizes strategic situations such as the principal-agent 
relation. Importantly, the game-theoretic representation of the principal-agent relation might 
be used to study the impact of legal rules on actions and decisions of persons involved in a 
strategic interaction (e.g., by facilitating an efficient outcome of an interaction - in terms of 
the total surplus). For example, in the ‘agency game’198 (Figure 2 A) two players – the agent 
and the principal – interact with each other. Players know exactly the possible actions and 
payoffs of the other player (i.e., there is no asymmetry of information). Players observe each 
other actions but act sequentially. Both can choose one out of two actions. The principal 
decides first whether to delegate the managerial power to the agent or not. Next, the agent 
decides whether to select an action which is in the best interest of the principal (i.e. perform 
the task) or to shirk. The players’ payoffs are displayed in Figure 2 A (the first number is the 
payoff of the principal, the second – of the agent). For instance, if the principal decides to 
invest and the agent performs the task in the best interests of the principal both players 
receive the payoff of 5. If the principal invests and the agent shirks – the principal obtains -
10 and the agent 10. In this game, an efficient outcome is achieved if the principal invests 
and the agent performs. However, if both players care only about their payoffs and are 
                                                 
196 Tirole, The theory of corporate finance 2006, p.16. 
197 Tirole, The theory of corporate finance 2006, p.17. 
198 I use as an example the agency game as described in Cooter/Ulen, Law & economics 2008, pp.203-
205. 
A. B. 
Figure 2: Agency game 
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rational, the Nash equilibrium199 of this game predicts that the principal does not invest, in 
which case both players receive 0. The principal does not invest anticipating that the agent’s 
best response for investing would be to shirk since shirking gives the agent higher payoff 
than performing the task. The Nash equilibrium outcome is, however, inefficient, since the 
potential surplus of 10 is achieved if the principal invests and the agent performs.  
One may imagine that the goal of law in such a case would be to “enable people to 
convert games with inefficient solutions into games with efficient solutions.”200 This might 
be achieved by introducing an enforceable contract in which the agent promises to perform 
the task in the best interest of the principal and to pay damages in case of failing to do so 
(Figure 1 B). With an enforceable contract, if the principal invests and the agent shirks the 
agent receives -5 and the principal 5. In this game, the best response to the agent if the 
principal invests is to perform, which gives payoff of 5 to both of them. Therefore, the 
introduction of an enforceable contract helps to achieve the efficient solution (the principal 
invests and the agent performs).  
In the real world, the relation between an executive director and a company is much 
more complex than the one assumed in the ‘agency game’ described above. The shareholders 
typically do not have full information about the agent’s performance. For instance, the 
shareholders do not know managerial skills of an appointed director (adverse selection), they 
cannot observe director’s performance (moral hazard with hidden action), or they do not 
have all information about investment decisions made by the director (moral hazard with 
hidden knowledge).201 The standard principal-agent theory suggests how different 
contractual provisions might provide incentives for the agent to perform in the best interests 
of the principal, although the exact skills, actions or decisions are not observed. For instance, 
the director’s compensation might include stock ownership or profit-sharing arrangements to 
align directors’ and shareholders’ interests.202 One of the crucial assumptions of the standard 
                                                 
199 Nash equilibrium is a concept from the game theory. It is “a profile of strategies for which each 
player is choosing the best response to the strategies of all other players.”(Tadelis, Game theory: An 
introduction 2013, p.80). An important requirement for Nash equilibrium is that players are choosing their 
actions according to their beliefs about best responses of others players and that these beliefs are correct. 
(Tadelis, Game theory: An introduction 2013, pp.80-81) .  
200 Cooter/Ulen, Law & economics 2008, p.205. 
201 For a short and informative comparison of different problems resulting from asymmetry of 
information and its game theoretic representation: Rasmusen, Games and information: An introduction to game 
theory 2007, Chapter 7-11. 
202 Jensen/Murphy, Performance pay and top-management incentives 1990, p.231. 
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principal-agent model states that the contract governing the principal-agent relation is 
‘comprehensive’203 (i.e. all future contingencies which might emerge in the principal-agent 
relation are foreseen in the contract). This assumption of the standard principal-agent model 
is violated if a contract is incomplete, i.e. includes “gaps and missing provisions”.204 Since it 
is hard to specify ex ante all features of directors’ performance that is in the best interests of 
shareholders, the relationship between shareholders and directors is governed by such an 
incomplete contract.205 As an illustration imagine a director whose responsibility is to 
establish a network of reliable suppliers.206 To fulfill this task a director might use personal 
contacts. What if a director does not rely on personal connections to develop this network 
and, as a result, a company does not get the best suppliers? Although shareholders might 
observe it, a third party would not be able to verify whether a director did act in the best 
interests of shareholders or not. It is also not possible to specify ex ante in a contract how 
exactly the network of suppliers should be developed by a director. I will refer again to the 
“agency game” example (Figure 2 B) to illustrate the consequences of non-verifiability of 
performance. With an enforceable contract, the agent pays damages to the principal in case 
of shirking. If it is not verifiable in front of the court that the agent shirked, this contract 
cannot be enforced, and the agent might refuse to pay damages. Given that legal enforcement 
of a contract is not available, are there other mechanisms which would make an executive 
director behave in line with shareholders’ interests? 
II. Relational contracts 
A lack of verifiability of certain aspects of executive director’s behavior has 
particular consequences – a contract between an executive director and a company is, in fact, 
a mixture of a formal (enforceable) and relational contract.207 Relational contracts are 
“informal agreements sustained by the value of future relationship”.208 They “create unique, 
interdependent relationships, wherein unknown contingencies or the intricacy of the required 
                                                 
203 Hart, Corporate governance: Some theory and implications 1995, pp.678-689  
204 Hart, Corporate governance: Some theory and implications 1995, p.680. 
205 Almazan/Suarez, Entrenchment and severance pay in optimal governance structures 2003, p.520; 
Cremers/Sepe, The shareholder value of empowered boards 2016, p.122: “As is well known, the shareholder-
manager contract is mostly implicit, as the shareholders’ corporate interests are so broad to be largely 
noncontractible.”  
206 Hart, Corporate governance: Some theory and implications 1995, p.680. 
207 Baker/Gibbons/Murphy, Relational contracts and the theory of the firm 2002, p.73; 
Cebon/Hermalin, When less is more: The benefits of limits on executive pay 2014. 
208 Baker/Gibbons/Murphy, Relational contracts and the theory of the firm 2002, p.39. 
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responses may prevent the specification of precise performance standard”.209 In contrast “a 
formal contract must be specified ex ante in terms that can be verified ex post by the third 
party (…)”.210 
Relational contracts were initially studied by legal scholars – Stewart Macaulay and 
Ian R. Macneil. Macaulay examined contractual relations by interviewing businessmen and 
their lawyers. He observed that a considerable share of business relations is not governed by 
a formal contract but rather by some non-legal norms (e.g. “commitments are to be honored 
in almost all situations”).211 Macneil, who coined the term “relational contract”, made a clear 
distinction between discrete specific transactions and contracts understood as an “exchange 
relation.”212 According to Macneil to understand and analyze any transaction, one needs to 
consider all aspects of a complex contractual relation and not only a formal contract.213 What 
are then the mechanisms which help to achieve and sustain an efficient outcome in a 
relational contract? What is the role of law in such a relation? In particular, how the 
provisions specifying the appointment term and dismissal protection affect the mechanisms 
of a relational contract? 
Williamson pointed out that relational contracts play a major role in governing inter- 
and intra-firm relations.214 Since this work, the economists have focused on explaining why 
the relational contracts exist and how they influence a decision on conducting some 
transactions within and others between the firms.215 Furthermore, the economic literature 
provided theoretical explanations of the self-enforcement mechanisms of incomplete 
contractual provisions.216 Due to these mechanisms the agent behaves in line with the 
principal’s interests in relational contracts. Empirical insights into individual behavior in 
relational contracts have been provided by experimental studies rather than field data 
                                                 
209 Goetz/Scott, Principles of relational contracts 1981, p.1092. 
210 Goetz/Scott, Principles of relational contracts 1981, p.1092. 
211 Macaulay, Non-contractual relations in business: A preliminary study 1963. 
212 Macneil, The many futures of contracts 1973. 
213 Macneil, Relational contract theory: Challenges and queries 2000, p.881. 
214 Williamson, Markets and hierarchies, analysis and antitrust implications: A study in the economics 
of internal organization 1975; Williamson, The economic institutions of capitalism: Firms, markets, relational 
contracting 1985. 
215  Williamson, The economic institutions of capitalism: Firms, markets, relational contracting 1985; 
Grossman/Hart, The costs and benefits of ownership: A theory of vertical and lateral integration 1986; 
Baker/Gibbons/Murphy, Relational contracts and the theory of the firm 2002. 
216 Bull, The existence of self-enforcing implicit contracts 1987; MacLeod/Malcomson, Implicit 
contracts, incentive compatibility, and involuntary unemployment 1989; Levin, Relational incentive contracts 
2003. For a review: Malcomson Relational incentive contracts in: The handbook of organizational economics 
2012. 
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analysis, which investigated mostly relational contracting between and not within firms.217 
Below I will present experiments which tested theoretical predictions regarding people 
behavior in relational contracts. I will review research on both - one-shot and repeated 
interactions. Finally, I will discuss how the insights on self-enforcement mechanisms might 
contribute to defining the role of law in relational contracts.  
III. One-shot interactions 
Agents’ behavior in incomplete contracts has been studied experimentally using the 
framework of a gift-exchange game.218 In contrast to the “agency game” presented above 
which is a binary choice game (delegate or not to delegate a task, perform or not to perform 
a task), in the gift-exchange game the choice set of players is larger. A larger choice set 
allows collecting more information on individual behavior. In a gift-exchange game, two 
players – a “principal” and an “agent” interact with each other in a sequential move game. 
First, the principal makes a wage offer 𝑤 to the agent. The agent observes the offer and 
decides whether to accept or reject it. If the offer is rejected, the game ends and both players 
earn nothing. If the offer is accepted, the agent decides how much effort 𝑒 (𝑒 > 0)  at the 
cost 𝑐(𝑒) to provide. The principal’s payoff depends on the wage offer and worker’s effort 
level and takes the following form: 
𝜋𝑃 = 𝑣𝑒 − 𝑤. 
The principal’s payoff function reflects two intuitions typical for incomplete 
contracts such as employment or CEOs’ contracts. On the one hand, a principal receives the 
extra surplus generated by the agent’s effort and represented by a positive multiplicator 𝑣. 
On the other hand, the principal bears the risk of hiring the agent, since the wage declared in 
the offer is always paid to the agent, irrespective of the effort level provided. For instance, if 
the agent provides no effort, the principal earns a payoff of  𝜋𝑃 = − 𝑤.
  
                                                 
217 For instance, Gil/Marion, Self-enforcing agreements and relational contracting: Evidence from 
california highway procurement 2012; Gil, The interplay of formal and relational contracts: Evidence from 
movies 2013. Recently also on CEO bonuses (relational contracts within the firm): DeVaro/Kim/Vikander, Pay-
for-(persistent)-luck: CEO bonuses under relational and formal contracting 2014. 
218 Akerlof, Labor contracts as partial gift exchange 1982; Fehr/Kirchsteiger/Riedl, Does fairness 
prevent market clearing? An experimental investigation 1993. The gift-exchange game is commonly used to 
study labor and principal-agent relations, for a review see: Charness/Kuhn in: Orley/David, Chapter 3 - Lab 
labor: What can labor economists learn from the lab? 2011; Dohmen, Behavioral labor economics: Advances 
and future directions 2014. 
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The agent’s payoff depends on the wage offered 𝑤, the chosen effort level 𝑒, and the 
cost of effort represented by the function 𝑐(𝑒). The agent’s profit is calculated in the 
following way: 
𝜋𝐴 = 𝑤 − 𝑐(𝑒) 
The predictions for players’ behavior in this game are based on the assumption that 
players are selfish and rational, and this is common knowledge. They are derived using 
backward induction. Irrespective of the wage level, agents choose an effort level which 
guarantees them minimum costs. Principals anticipating this behavior will never offer wages 
higher than the minimum wage an agent would accept.219 The equilibrium solution derived 
based on standard assumptions is, however, inefficient. The efficient outcome (i.e., the sum 
of both players’ material payoffs) is achieved if the agent provides the maximum effort, as 
long as marginal costs of agent’s effort do not exceed the gains from an additional unit of 
effort represented by the multiplicator 𝑣.  For instance, let’s assume that a wage is defined as 
𝑤 ∈ {1,2, … ,100}, effort as 𝑒 ∈ {1,2, … ,10}, 𝑣 = 10 and 𝑐(𝑒) is given as in Table 1. 
Table 1: Cost of effort 
Effort, 𝑒 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Cost, 𝑐(𝑒) 0 1 2 4 6 8 10 12 15 18 
 
 If the outside option (no transaction concluded) for the agent and the principal is 
zero, then in equilibrium the principal offers a minimum wage of  𝑤 = 1 and the agent 
provides a minimum effort of 𝑒 = 1. In this case the total profit from the exchange is 10 
(𝜋𝑃 = (10 ∗ 1) − 1 = 9 and 𝜋𝐴 = 1 − 0 = 1). However, the efficient outcome can be 
achieved if the agent chooses 𝑒 = 10. Then the total profit from the transaction is 82 (10*e – 
c(e) = 10*10 – 18). The division of profits between the agent and the principal depends on 
the wage level.  
Contrary to the standard predictions some experimental studies have shown that even 
in one-shot interactions players show cooperative behavior – principals tend to offer higher 
                                                 
219 If the outside option for an agent (that what he receives if no contract is concluded) is 0 then the 
minimum wage an agent would accept is 0. However, if an outside option is higher than zero, then the 
minimum wage must be also higher and at least equal to the outside option. Also, the principal offers a positive 
wage only if a minimum effort agent can provide is higher than zero.  
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than minimum wage levels and agents provide high effort levels in exchange. This way both 
– principals and agents – receive higher payoffs than predicted according to the equilibrium 
based on standard assumptions. Furthermore, wage and effort levels are positively related – 
the higher the offered wage, the more effort is provided.220 The behavior observed in one-
shot gift-exchange games has been explained by models incorporating other-regarding 
preferences according to which people do not care only about their payoffs but also about 
other people’s well-being. The exact motives might be twofold: they can either be related to 
distributional (i.e., inequality-aversion) or intention-based concerns (i.e., reciprocity). 
Models of inequality-aversion221 assume that people’s utility depends on both - own payoffs 
and the comparison of own payoffs to the payoffs of others.222 In contrast, reciprocity 
models posit that the utility function incorporates not only the outcome but also the 
perceived intentions of the other decision maker, which in turn may depend on his choice 
and his available options.223 Therefore, individuals will differently evaluate an unequal 
distribution when an equal allocation was available than when the same unequal allocation is 
the only available option. These models focus on one-shot interactions and do not consider 
repeated game effects when different incentives for reciprocating behavior are present (i.e. 
future benefits, reputation).   
IV. Repeated interactions 
Most of principal-agent relations do not happen in one-shot interactions but are rather 
repeated over time. In contrast to one-shot interactions in a repeated interaction incomplete 
provisions are enforced through mechanisms developed in the course of the relationship, 
such as reputation or termination threat. Theoretical predictions for behavior in a repeated 
gift-exchange game can be derived using a repeated game framework. Here I focus on 
                                                 
220 For a review: Charness/Kuhn in: Orley/David, Chapter 3 - Lab labor: What can labor economists 
learn from the lab? 2011; Dohmen, Behavioral labor economics: Advances and future directions 2014.  
221 The literature often uses also a term “inequity aversion” which is more normatively loaded. 
222 There are two main models of inequality aversion: Fehr-Schmidt (Fehr/Schmidt, A theory of 
fairness, competition, and cooperation 1999) and Bolton-Ockenfels (Bolton/Ockenfels, ERC: A theory of 
equity, reciprocity, and competition 2000) model.  
223 Several models of reciprocity have been proposed i.e. Rabin model (Rabin, Incorporating fairness 
into game theory and economics 1993), Falk-Fischbacher model (Falk/Fischbacher, A theory of reciprocity 
2006) or Dufwenberg-Kirchsteiger model (Dufwenberg/Kirchsteiger, A theory of sequential reciprocity 2004).  
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theoretical predictions for finitely repeated games224 which are of particular importance to 
understand interactions between an executive director and the shareholders. 
The assumption of rationality, selfishness, and common knowledge leads to the same 
predictions in a finitely played gift-exchange game as in one-shot interactions. By backward 
induction, it is presumed that the agent has no incentive to provide effort higher than the 
minimum effort level for any wage offered by the principal in the last period. The principal, 
in turn, anticipating the agent’s behavior offers the minimum wage in the last period. In the 
penultimate period the agent knowing that the principal will offer the lowest wage in the 
final period, chooses the minimum effort level irrespective of the wage offered. Going 
backward and repeating these steps from the last one to the first period leads to the 
conclusion that there is no room for cooperation in any period of the game. 
The predictions change if one removes the assumption that selfishness is common 
knowledge and introduces incomplete information on the type of players. A seminal article 
by Kreps et al. provides a theoretical framework for explaining the emergence of cooperation 
in finitely repeated prisoner’s dilemma game with incomplete information.225 Their model is 
based on the premise that, when interacting, individuals are not perfectly informed about the 
type of the other player. More specifically, both players attach some probability that the 
other player’s strategy might be, for instance, a tit-for-tat strategy226 rather than a strategy to 
free-ride in each period of the game. An intuition of the model by Kreps et al. is that even 
selfish players, who in fact do not prefer to cooperate, will cooperate to uphold the other 
players’ beliefs of interacting with a cooperative partner. They will build a reputation of a 
non-selfish individual. The key message of the model is that due to reputation concerns, 
people cooperate with each other even in finitely repeated games.227 In contrast to one-shot 
interactions, a repeated game with incomplete information about players’ types provides 
incentives to cooperate even for self-interested players. Therefore, one should expect more 
cooperation in repeated than in one-shot interactions.  
                                                 
224 Similarly to Brown/Falk/Fehr, Relational contracts and the nature of market interactions 2004, who 
experimentally investigated behavior in relational contracts. 
225 Kreps/Milgrom et al., Rational cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma 1982. 
226 The player following the tit-for-tat strategy will cooperate in the first period. In all subsequent 
periods this player will mimic behavior of his opponent in the previous period. If in the previous period, the 
opponent cooperated (defected) the tit-for-tat player will cooperate (defect) in the given period. 
227 According to the model the cooperation decreases in last periods. For simplicity, I will refrain from 
discussing what exactly happens in the last periods.  
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High levels of cooperation have indeed been observed in experiments implementing 
repeated games.228 Research has also shown that the longer the interaction time is, the more 
cooperation is observed.229 In all these studies participants were matched in pairs 
exogenously and it was not possible to change the interaction partner. Thus, there was no 
termination threat that might serve as an additional mechanism for sustaining cooperation. 
A threat of contract termination has been claimed to provide additional incentives for 
non-opportunistic behavior in relational contracts.230 This threat can be exerted if a principal 
can switch to another agent and stay away from the dismissed one. This is possible only if 
individuals interact on a market with several principals and agents as in a study by Brown et 
al.231 This study investigated the endogenous emergence of long-term relationships when 
contracts are incomplete and negotiated on a market. The authors implemented an 
experimental design based on a repeated gift-exchange game in which seven firms and ten 
workers interacted on a market for 15 periods. Firms made offers to the workers, in which 
they specified the wage and the desired effort level. There were two types of offers – public 
offers directed to all workers available on a market and private offers addressed to a 
particular worker. The authors conducted three treatments varying completeness of contracts 
and identifiability of participants. In the treatment with complete contracts the desired effort 
level specified in the offer was automatically implemented as the agent’s actual effort 
choice, once the offer was accepted. In the treatment with incomplete contracts, the agent 
was not bound by the desired effort specified in the accepted offer. He could freely choose 
his effort. This feature was implemented to reflect provisions of relational contracts which 
are non-enforceable in front of court – whether the agent provides effort equal to the desired 
effort specified in the offer depends only on the self-enforcement mechanisms. In both 
treatments firms and workers were assigned fixed ID numbers. This feature enabled firms 
and workers to build long-term contractual relationships and to stay away from undesirable 
workers. In the third treatment contracts were also incomplete but the ID numbers were 
                                                 
228 Camerer/Weigelt, Experimental tests of a sequential equilibrium reputation model 1988; 
Andreoni/Miller, Rational cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoner's dilemma: Experimental evidence 1993; 
Gächter/Falk, Reputation and reciprocity: Consequences for the labour relation 2002. 
229 Anderhub/Engelmann/Güth, An experimental study of the repeated trust game with incomplete 
information 2002; Cochard/Nguyen Van/Willinger, Trusting behavior in a repeated investment game 2004; 
Landeo/Spier, Incentive contracts for teams: Experimental evidence 2014. 
230 MacLeod/Malcomson, Implicit contracts, incentive compatibility, and involuntary unemployment 
1989; Shapiro/Stiglitz, Equilibrium unemployment as a worker discipline device 1984. 
231 Brown/Falk/Fehr, Relational contracts and the nature of market interactions 2004. 
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assigned randomly in every period, such that the creation of long-term relationships was not 
possible.  
The results revealed that in the incomplete contracts treatment with fixed ID numbers 
(ICF) firms formed more long-term relationships in contrast to the complete contract 
treatment (C). Both – ICF and C treatment – were more efficient regarding total earnings 
than the incomplete contract treatment with random ID numbers (ICR). Earnings were 
distributed far more equally between workers and firms in the ICF than in the C treatment. 
Due to the impossibility to form long-term relationships in the ICR treatment wages and 
effort levels were much lower than in the ICF and C treatment. The study shows that in the 
absence of third-party enforcement – when contracts are incomplete – forming long-term 
relationships is crucial for observing efficient trades. Furthermore, complete contracts lead to 
an unequal distribution of profits where a trading partner with a larger bargaining power 
reaps a greater share of benefits.  
Brown et al. (2012) studied how an excessive demand for labor influences creation of 
long-term relationships and efficiency of trades when contracts are incomplete.232 An 
implicit assumption for an effective termination threat is the existence of unemployment. If 
there are more principals than agents on the market, the disciplining effect of termination 
threat is much lower – if the agent misbehaves and the principal terminates the contract, the 
agent can still easily switch to the other principal. Thus, it is possible that even the agent 
who provides low effort levels will never be unemployed. The results of the study by Brown 
et al. (2012) indicate that long-term relations are still sustained with an excessive demand for 
labor, albeit at a lower frequency than in the case of an excessive supply of labor. This 
highlights that fear of dismissal is not the only motive that drives cooperation, but workers 
care about their reputation which upholds cooperation rates.  
The theoretical and experimental literature provides valuable insights regarding 
informal mechanisms of enforcement in relational contracts. The existence of cooperative 
behavior (principals offering high wages, agents performing the task in the best interest of 
the principal) in one-shot interactions is explained by other-regarding preferences (i.e. 
inequity aversion, reciprocity). In repeated interactions the expectation of future gains 
                                                 
232 Brown/Falk/Fehr, Competition and relational contracts: The role of unemployment as a 
disciplinary device 2012. To distinguish it from  Brown et al. (2004) study I will indicate this article in the text 
by Brown et al. (2012).  
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provides additional incentives for self-interested individuals to build a reputation as a 
cooperative person. Research has shown that relational contracts are the more efficient, the 
longer is the expected interaction, and that termination threat plays an important 
incentivizing role.  
V. Summary 
As argued in section C. II the relationship between an executive director and a 
company has features of a relational contract – some of executive director’s actions 
observable by shareholders are not in shareholder’s best interests, but it is hard to verify in 
front of the court. Many aspects of this relationship are regulated by provisions of company 
law such as the maximum appointment length and dismissal procedures discussed in this 
chapter. These provisions are likely to influence both – the expected duration of the 
interaction and termination threat – two elements of repeated interactions which have been 
shown to have an impact on efficiency in relational contracts. Law and economics scholars 
have suggested that the role of law in relational contracts is to “foster enduring relationships” 
and to provide a possibility for an exit from a contractual relation.233 Others claimed that 
restrictions of termination right should be imposed only “where the reduction in the social 
costs of improper termination is not overbalanced by concomitant increases in agency costs 
that result from the diminished efficacy of termination provisions as a form of contractual 
bonding.”234 Therefore, when evaluating different regulations of appointment term and 
dismissal procedures of executive directors it would be crucial to consider both - the goals 
mentioned by the legislator (e.g. independence of executive directors, regular control of 
executive director’s performance by the supervisory board), and also the impact of these 
regulations on the expected length of interaction and termination threat and - as a 
consequence – on behavior and decision-making of executive directors. Below, I discuss 
empirical research which implements field data analyses to investigate the impact of 
dismissal protection and appointment term on company performance. Next, I present 
experimental research to pin down the behavioral effects of appointment term and dismissal 
protection on behavior in relational contracts.  
                                                 
233 Cooter/Ulen, Law & economics 2008. 
234 Goetz/Scott, Principles of relational contracts 1981, p.1147-1148. 
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D. Research on appointment terms and dismissal protection 
I. Field data analyzes of the impact of staggered boards on company 
performance 
Comparing the impact of appointment term and dismissal provisions on directors’ 
behavior and the length of tenure across different legal systems is particularly challenging. 
This is due to difficulties in isolating the effect of a single statutory provision. For example, 
other differences in governance structure might also affect the decision-making of directors 
and their length of tenure. Alternatively, one may study different solutions adopted by 
companies within one jurisdiction, which comes, however, with own limitations. For 
example, the differences in appointment terms and dismissal protection implemented by the 
publicly listed companies within a single jurisdiction are rather small, 235 and therefore 
usually do not provide sufficiently rich data. The dismissal rules are often mandatory. 
Additionally, the maximum appointment term allowed by company law has become a 
default followed by most of the companies (e.g., in Germany or UK). Also, this kind of 
empirical research faces a selection problem – companies with particular characteristics 
might be more likely to select specific provisions. In this case, any difference in performance 
would not necessarily be the effect of a legal rule but possibly reflect these particular 
features. Second, reverse causality might also be an issue when studying the introduction of 
specific provisions. It is likely that low performance causes some companies to adopt 
particular provisions (e.g. dismissal protection and long appointment terms). In this case, it is 
not the given provision which causes the low performance but rather the opposite.  
Despite these difficulties, valuable insights on the effects of appointment term and 
removal protection are provided by the studies investigating the impact of staggered boards 
on the U.S. companies’ performance. The staggered board is one of two possible board 
structures available to the U.S. companies.  In the unitary board, the directors are appointed 
for one year and can be re-elected each year.236 In the staggered board, the appointment term 
is usually three years.237 Directors in staggered boards are divided into three classes – each 
year only one class of directors stands for re-election and might be replaced. The two 
structures of corporate boards allow measuring the impact of appointment term (one year vs. 
                                                 
235 See information provided in section B.  
236 Bebchuk/Cohen, The costs of entrenched boards 2005, p.411. 
237 Cohen/Wang, How do staggered boards affect shareholder value? Evidence from a natural 
experiment 2013, p.629; Cremers/Sepe, The shareholder value of empowered boards 2016, p.77. 
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three years) as well as dismissal protection (it is harder to remove directors with a staggered 
board structure238) on company performance and directors’ behavior. It is worth to note that 
staggered boards not only protect the directors from removal in general but also play an 
important role in the antitakeover defense. Since only one-third of directors can be removed 
during an annual shareholder meeting, it would take at least two years for a bidder to get a 
majority on the board of directors. The defense effect is even stronger given that incumbent 
board members can issue ‘poison pills’ – special measures which make the takeover very 
costly to a hostile bidder. Some of the empirical studies examine the overall effect of the 
staggered board on company performance239 and directors’ decision-making, whereas others 
investigate the staggered board in the context of an antitakeover defense.240 Here I discuss 
only the first one because it is of particular importance for exploring the impact of 
appointment terms and dismissal protection on directors’ performance in general and not 
only in a very special hostile takeover situation.  
The study by Bebchuk and Cohen focused on the influence of staggered board on a 
company value measured by Tobin’s Q241 in the period 1995-2002. The authors showed that 
staggered board structure is associated with a lower company value. The effect holds when 
controlling for various company characteristics such as other provisions protecting company 
directors, returns on assets or R&D (Research and Development) investments. Furthermore, 
the authors aimed at establishing the causal relationship between staggered boards and lower 
company Tobin’s Q. To this end, they looked at the companies that went public before 1990 
and had a staggered board in 1990. The authors argued that after 1990 very few companies 
adopted staggered board regulations and also very few dropped it since “the shareholders did 
not have the power to dismantle charter-based staggered boards.”242 Thus, a staggered board 
in companies which went public before 1990 and had it in 1990, is a result of the “initial 
                                                 
238 Assessment of the effective removal protection of directors in staggered boards needs a special 
consideration, see Bebchuk/Cohen, The costs of entrenched boards 2005, p.414. Additionally, a recent 
Delaware court ruling (In re Vaalco Energy Shareholder Litigation from December 21, 2015) stated that 
directors in unitary boards can be removed without cause (even if the bylaws or statue provides differently). If 
the board is staggered, the company’s statue or bylaws might also permit removal only for cause. Therefore, 
even in staggered boards directors might be removed with or without cause, see a post by Philip Richter and 
Fried Frank on the Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance and Financial Regulation from 
February 18, 2016 “Delaware Companies with non-classified boards”. 
239 For instance: Bebchuk/Cohen, The costs of entrenched boards 2005. 
240 For instance: Bebchuk/Coates/Subramanian, The powerful antitakeover force of staggered boards: 
Theory, evidence, and policy 2002. 
241 Tobin’s Q represents a ratio of a market value of a company to the replacement costs of its total 
assets. 
242 Bebchuk/Cohen, The costs of entrenched boards 2005, p.426. 
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condition” rather than a consequence of a firm with specific characteristics adopting a 
staggered board structure. The analysis revealed that companies with the staggered board in 
1990 show lower firm value than these which did not have this provision back then. The 
approach adopted by Bebchuk and Cohen to identify causal relationship seems rather 
unconvincing, since adopting a board before 1990 might be a result of some previous 
specific characteristics of a company which still held in the period 1995-2002.  In particular, 
bad performing companies might be more likely to adopt and to maintain a staggered board 
structure.243 
Similar to Bebchuk and Cohen, Faleye showed a negative relation of staggered 
boards and company value.244 He also explored whether this effect holds for all types of 
companies and what are the potential underlying mechanisms of this adverse impact. Faleye 
found that companies with staggered boards have lower value than companies with unitary 
boards irrespective of “operational complexity”, i.e. R&D-intensive firms. Additionally, 
staggered boards are associated with lower R&D investments and lower sensitivity of CEO 
turnover to firm performance. The latter means that even if, for instance, a company 
observes lower returns, a CEO is less likely to be removed if a company has a staggered 
board structure compared to a company with a unitary board. The author suggested that 
companies with staggered boards tend to shield top managers from the market disciplining 
pressure. As a consequence, this strong managerial protection leads to decrease in firm 
value.  
In a recent article Cremers and Sepe challenged the results of these empirical 
studies.245 Their procedure overcomes selection and ‘reverse causality’ problems which have 
been essential in most of the previous research investigating differences in firm value 
between companies with and without staggered boards.246 Unlike previous studies, Cremers 
                                                 
243 Cohen/Wang, How do staggered boards affect shareholder value? Evidence from a natural 
experiment 2013. Cohen and Wang used a particular event which allowed them to study the impact of the 
staggered board on shareholder value in a natural experiment setting. Within a short period of time two court 
rulings were issued – the first one weaken the importance of the staggered board as an antitakeover defense 
tool, the second one reversed this decision. This way the antitakeover power of the staggered board was 
recovered. The authors observed first an increase in the value of companies which were affected by the court 
ruling, i.e. the companies in which the power of staggered board as antitakeover defense was weaken as a result 
of the ruling. After the decision was reversed, the value of these companies decreased again.  
244 Faleye, Classified boards, firm value, and managerial entrenchment 2007. 
245 Cremers/Sepe, The shareholder value of empowered boards 2016. 
246 Bebchuk/Cohen, The costs of entrenched boards 2005; Faleye, Classified boards, firm value, and 
managerial entrenchment 2007; Zhao/Chen, Staggered boards and earnings management 2008. 
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and Sepe examined how the firm value changes after the decision to adopt a staggered board 
had been made. Importantly, they compared this with a change in a firm value after the board 
had been de-staggered. It was achieved by conducting time-series analysis and implementing 
company fixed effects. According to the authors, this approach allows for “determining what 
change in firm value within the same firms occurred before or after a change in board 
structure.”247 Furthermore, they are not only interested in the effects of the staggered board 
on the overall firm value, but also investigate features of companies for which adoption of a 
staggered board might accrue the greatest benefits (e.g., level of R&D and intangible 
investments). The analysis revealed that the positive effect of a staggered board on firm 
value is stronger in companies with more R&D investment. In particular, the more the 
company invests in R&D, the higher increase in firm value in companies which had 
introduced the staggered board is observed. A similar result was observed for investments in 
intangible assets (such as know-how, patents, and trade secrets). In details, the more the 
company invests in intangible assets, the greater positive effect the staggered board has on 
firm value. A shortcoming of this analysis is that decisions to invest in R&D and intangible 
assets are likely to be influenced by the adoption of a staggered board. In this case, the effect 
of the staggered board on a firm value would not be stronger for firms with high R&D and 
intangible assets investments, but rather staggered board will influence firm value through 
these investments decisions. 
The results of studies on the impact of staggered boards are mixed. There is some 
evidence that companies with staggered boards have a lower value than companies with 
unitary boards.248 Other research showed that adopting a staggered board might, in fact, lead 
to an increase in firm value.249 Although this research provides first empirical insights into 
the potential impact of directors’ removal protection and appointment lengths on company 
performance, it also has some shortcomings. First, although a staggered board provides 
strong removal protection since each director stands for reelection only every three years, 
some companies can adopt bylaws which permit removal at-will. Such a provision would 
effectively weaken the dismissal protection introduced with a staggered board. Importantly, 
this issue has not been taken into account in the discussed studies. Second, field data analysis 
                                                 
247 Cremers/Sepe, The shareholder value of empowered boards 2016, p.72. 
248 For instance: Bebchuk/Cohen, The costs of entrenched boards 2005; Faleye, Classified boards, firm 
value, and managerial entrenchment 2007. 
249 Cremers/Sepe, The shareholder value of empowered boards 2016. 
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do not allow studying more basic behavioral mechanisms of directors’ reactions towards 
appointment length and dismissal protection. Some of these shortcomings might be 
addressed by experimental research presented in the following section. 
II. Experimental research on the role of appointment term and dismissal rules 
in relational contracts 
The study by Falk et al. investigated how dismissal barriers affect individual 
behavior in relational contracts, i.e., when contracts are incomplete, and people have to rely 
on informal enforcement mechanisms.250 As a baseline treatment, the authors implemented a 
procedure similar to the ICF treatment in the study by Brown et al.251 Participants played a 
repeated gift-exchange game for 18 periods in groups with seven firms and ten workers. 
They were able to endogenously create long-term relationships by concluding a contract with 
the same partner as in the previous period. The baseline treatment was compared with a 
dismissal barrier treatment. In this condition, a one-sided dismissal barrier was implemented 
which means that the firm was not able to fire the worker, but the worker could leave any 
time. The barrier was effective once the same worker was hired for two consecutive periods 
by the same firm. The results of this experiment revealed that the efficiency of contractual 
relationships, as well as firm profits, were lower in the dismissal barrier treatment that in the 
baseline treatment. Workers’ payoff did not differ, however, which seems to result from low 
wages paid in the dismissal barrier treatment. In this treatment firms started with very low 
wages and increased them over the course of the relationship. Since a termination threat 
could not be implemented as an incentivizing device in the dismissal barrier treatment, most 
likely firms used the increasing wage schemes to motivate workers to provide high effort 
levels. This study shows that it is crucial to examine different contract types, and not only 
wage agreements, in the context of incomplete contracts and repeated interactions. It also 
demonstrates that a policy intervention in a form of dismissal restriction might decrease 
efficiency in relational contracts.  
The dismissal barriers implemented in the study by Falk et al. are absolute. After two 
periods the firm has no possibility to fire the worker irrespective of how the worker behaves. 
This setting is very different from real world situations in which dismissal can be restricted 
to good cause (or can be costly) but not completely excluded. This problem is partially 
                                                 
250 Falk/Huffman/Macleod, Institutions and contract enforcement 2015. 
251 See section D. IV. for a detailed description. 
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addressed in the study by Charness et al.252 in which the authors implemented the baseline 
treatment similar to ICF treatment in Brown et al.253 However, in contrast to Falk et al., the 
authors introduced a treatment in which a contract had to be renewed with the same worker 
conditional on the effort level provided (i.e., given that the worker provides effort equal or 
higher to the desired effort specified in the offer). Thus, in this treatment, the dismissal 
barrier is not absolute, but the termination threat is restricted to the situation in which the 
worker does not fulfill some pre-specified criteria. The authors found that when dismissal 
barriers are not absolute but depend on effort, firms’ and workers’ profits, as well as 
workers' effort, are higher than in the baseline treatment (with no dismissal barriers). This 
result suggests that dismissal barriers which allow exiting from the relationship under 
specific conditions might positively affect the efficiency in relational contracts. 
Besides specifying dismissal protection rules, company law provisions also restrict 
the maximum length of appointment. A company can appoint a director for a defined 
number of years within the limits permitted by a statute. Some of experimental studies have 
researched individual behavior in fixed partner matching (the same two persons interact with 
each other during the entire experiment) over a different number of periods.254 Additionally, 
in the study by Brown et al. firms and workers decide endogenously to interact with each 
other for a longer time but can do so only by renewing the one-period contract. There is no 
option of commitment to interacting with the same partner for more than one period. 
Similarly, in the study by Falk et al. the firm might have effectively entered into a long-term 
contract by concluding a contract twice with the same worker. In this case, the long-term 
contract was permanent - it lasted until the end of the experiment. Thus, there was no option 
to restrict the length of the interaction for a given period. In none of these studies, 
participants decided to commit endogenously to interacting with the same partner for a 
restricted period. This limits the conclusions on the impact of appointment terms’ 
regulations, which allow contractual partners to choose endogenously the duration of their 
commitment within restrictions specified by law.  
                                                 
252 Charness/Cobo-Reyes et al., Renewable dismissal barriers, job security, and long-term investment: 
An experimental analysis 2014. 
253 See section D IV for a detailed description. 
254 See for instance: Anderhub/Engelmann/Güth, An experimental study of the repeated trust game 
with incomplete information 2002; Brandts/Figueras, An exploration of reputation formation in experimental 
games 2003. 
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There is some experimental evidence on individual behavior when people can 
endogenously choose the length of interaction within certain limits. These studies, however, 
investigate behavior in contexts slightly different than relational contracts. Anderhub at al. 
measured firm-specific investment of agents depending on the contract length offered by the 
principal.255 Imagine a manager who has just been hired by a company. In the beginning, the 
manager needs to invest lots of time and effort to familiarize with company’s practices or 
develop good relationships with workers and clients. If the company decides to dismiss the 
manager, the time and effort invested would be lost.256 The question is how likely managers 
are to invest if they are offered short-term renewable contracts compared to the case when 
they are offered long-term contracts. This type of decision-making was studied by Anderhub 
et al. The results showed that firm-specific investments are much more frequent if the 
principal offers a long-term contract. Also, in long-term contracts agents receive more of the 
produced surplus than in short-term contracts. Furthermore, short-term contracts are chosen 
more often than long-term.  
Schneider and Weber studied the impact of endogenous choice of the interaction 
length on cooperative behavior in prisoner’s dilemma game.257 In this game, two persons 
interact with each other and simultaneously choose whether to cooperate or defect. The 
payoffs depend on actions chosen by both players and are displayed in Table 2.  For 
instance, if both players decide to cooperate, each of them receives 40 units. However, if 
Player 1 defects and Player 2 cooperates then Player 1 receives 65 and Player 2 only 5.  
Assuming self-interested players, and common knowledge of rationality and self-interest, in 
this game both players should defect according to Nash equilibrium. Cooperation would be, 
however, more efficient since it would yield the total payoff of 80 units. In Schneider and 
Weber experiment participants played this game over 150 periods. In three treatments 
participants were matched for exogenously defined number of periods: (1) 1 period (2) 10 
periods and (3) all 150 periods. In treatments 1 and 2 (i.e., one period, ten periods) 
participants were randomly rematched with another player after the matching time was over. 
In two additional treatments, participants could endogenously choose for how long they 
                                                 
255 Anderhub/Königstein/Kübler, Long-term work contracts versus sequential spot markets: 
Experimental evidence on firm-specific investment 2003. 
256 This kind of situations, in which one of the contractual partners does not want to invest in the 
contractual relationship, is called a hold-up problem. For a more detailed and non-technical description, for 
instance: Hart, Firms, contracts, and financial structure 1997, pp.29ff. 
257 Schneider/Weber, Long-term commitment and cooperation 2013. 
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would like to be matched with the same partner. In treatment 4 they could decide whether 
they would like to be re-matched every period with another partner or whether they would 
like to stay with the same partner in the next 10 periods. In treatment 5 participants could 
further decide to stay with the same partner for the duration of the whole experiment. An 
interesting feature of this design is that it allows testing the influence of endogenous choice 
of the interaction length on individual behavior. Additionally, it can be examined whether 
this impact depends on the available options (1 and 10 periods or 1, 10 and permanent option 
available). 
Table 2: Payoffs in the prisoner's dilemma game 
 
Player 2 
Cooperate Defect 
Player 1 
Cooperate 40, 40 5, 65 
Defect 65, 5 20, 20 
 
The results revealed that cooperation and earnings increase with the duration of the 
interaction. Cooperation rates are also higher when the choice is endogenous but only when 
the chosen length of interaction is the longest available (i.e., if participants are choosing 
between 1 period or 10 periods than cooperation is higher in 10 periods chosen than in 10 
periods exogenously imposed). When the permanent option is available, endogenous choice 
of 10 periods does not have such a positive effect anymore. The highest cooperation is 
observed only in endogenously chosen permanent option. These results suggest that 
commitment has a positive impact on cooperation, particularly when it is not imposed but 
chosen by participants. Importantly, intermediate commitment option loses its meaning if 
there is a permanent option available. This indicates that the impact of the selected length of 
interaction depends on the menu of choices provided.  
The results of experimental studies discussed in this section suggest that legal 
interventions (i.e. dismissal barriers, appointment length limits) might influence individual 
behavior in relational contracts. The impact of dismissal barriers seems to depend on their 
specific conditions. Whereas absolute dismissal barriers have a negative effect, the 
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conditional dismissal barriers positively affect agents’ performance. It is as yet unclear what 
would be the impact of dismissal protection if the rules of termination are not so clearly 
specified as in the experiment by Charness et al. This question is important since the rules 
permitting only removal for good cause in the real world do not define clearly what a good 
cause is. Also, research in repeated strategic interactions has shown that endogenously 
chosen length of the interaction influences individual behavior differently than exogenously 
imposed duration. This impact further depends on the available options. In the study by 
Schneider and Weber, participants were randomly matched for a specified number of 
periods. It would be yet crucial to investigate behavior when not only the length of 
interaction but also an interaction partner can be chosen endogenously since this is an 
important feature of real-world interactions.  
 The experimental research simplifies the complexity of real-world relationships 
between executive directors and companies (e.g., it is not possible to directly translate the 
experimental periods into years of appointment). This helps to create well-controlled 
conditions which allow studying the influence of certain legal provisions on the behavior of 
principals and agents. These studies provide valuable insights and tests for theoretical 
predictions about individual behavior in repeated interactions. They also reveal causal 
relations between legal interventions (i.e. dismissal barriers, a menu of options) and 
efficiency in relational contracts.  
To shed more light on individual reactions in relational contracts towards different 
regulations of the appointment length, together with my colleagues I have conducted an 
experimental study. In this experiment, I examined how the length of relation and agent’s 
behavior is influenced by two particular types of contracts (fixed-term and open-ended at-
will). The study is described in details in chapter 3. 
E. Conclusions 
In this chapter, I discussed the German rules on appointment term and dismissal 
protection of management board members in publicly listed companies. I introduced the 
legislator’s rationale for designing these provisions in the current form and compared them 
with solutions implemented in other European countries. This corporate governance tool has 
been traditionally viewed as a control and monitoring device of the management behavior. 
The differences between regulations on appointment and dismissal procedure in the 
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European countries seem to reflect the general tendency of some legal systems either to grant 
more rights to the shareholders’ meeting (short appointment term, dismissal at-will) or to 
protect the directors’ independence (long appointment term, dismissal for good cause). 
These rules might yet also constitute a powerful tool influencing the behavior of executive 
directors ex ante. Field data studies show mixed results regarding the impact of removal 
protection in the form of a staggered board on a company value.258 Experimental research 
revealed that absolute dismissal protection has detrimental effects on efficiency, whereas 
conditional dismissal positively affects agent’s behavior.259 Other studies have demonstrated 
that the impact of the length of interaction depends on whether it is endogenously chosen or 
exogenously imposed as well as on available options.260 Given these results, it is crucial for 
the legislator to take it into account when designing and implementing the corporate 
governance rules on appointment and removal of executive directors. For instance, it needs 
to be considered that making very long appointment terms (e.g. six years) available might 
diminish potential benefits of intermediate options (e.g. three years). 
 
                                                 
258 Bebchuk/Cohen, The costs of entrenched boards 2005; Cremers/Sepe, The shareholder value of 
empowered boards 2016. 
259 Falk/Huffman/Macleod, Institutions and contract enforcement 2015; Charness/Cobo-Reyes et al., 
Renewable dismissal barriers, job security, and long-term investment: An experimental analysis 2014. 
260 Anderhub/Königstein/Kübler, Long-term work contracts versus sequential spot markets: 
Experimental evidence on firm-specific investment 2003; Schneider/Weber, Long-term commitment and 
cooperation 2013. 
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Chapter 3 
Behavioral implications of contract 
duration for agents’ behavior 
A. Introduction 
In the previous chapter, I discussed company law provisions on appointment length 
and dismissal rules for executive directors of public companies. A summary report on 
European corporate governance comparing the average length of tenure in different 
European countries suggests that fixed-term appointments and dismissal protection are not 
necessarily related to longer tenures than appointments at-will.261 In fact, in some countries 
that allow dismissal at-will (e.g., Belgium, UK) executive directors on average serve more 
years on the board than in countries with dismissal protection (e.g., Germany, Austria).262 
In this chapter, I show that appointment terms and dismissal rules have an impact on 
agents’ behavior in relational contracts. More specifically, I present a study which compares 
two particular types of agreements defining the length of a principal-agent interaction. I 
investigate seemingly equivalent contract types – fixed-term renewable contracts and open-
ended contracts terminable at-will. Why are these contracts so similar? Even if the parties 
define the length of their interaction as fixed-term, they can always prolong it once the 
defined term is over. In contrast, with an open-ended length each of the parties can exit any 
time. Thus, a fixed-term contract may eventually result in a similar length of a relation as an 
open-ended contract.  
Despite the supposedly similar contract terms, I conjecture that both contract types 
will not induce the same rate of agents’ effort. In particular, if both contract types are 
available, by choosing an open-ended contract the principal might indicate a willingness to 
                                                 
261 Struggles, Towards dynamic governance 2014 2014, p.28. 
262 Struggles, Towards dynamic governance 2014 2014, p.28. 
 Chapter 3 Behavioral implications of contract duration for agents’ behavior  
 
 
 
62 
 
interact with a given agent for a longer period. In contrast, a principal who offers a fixed-
term contract implies a lack of trust which may trigger opportunistic behavior. Thus, an 
open-ended contract might be perceived as kinder than a fixed-term contract and as a result 
lead to more reciprocating behavior and higher effort. It is also likely that due to the  
status-quo bias an open-ended contract will lead to longer relationships than a fixed-term 
contract. As longer relations have been shown to be more efficient than one-shot 
interactions,263 it is likely that an open-ended contract will enhance efficiency in a relational 
contract. In the current study, I compare the behavior of agents under a fixed-term and an 
open-ended contract when only one contract type and when both contract types are available. 
The study was designed and the data analyzed together with Sebastian J. Goerg and 
Erich Cromwell.  
B. Materials and methods 
I. Design and participants 
A repeated gift-exchange game framework developed by Brown et al.264 to study the 
endogenous emergence of relational contracts served as a benchmark for the experimental 
design. The experiment was programmed using Z-Tree265 and was conducted in June, July 
2014 and in January, February 2015 at the University of Bonn. A total of 480 participants266 
were recruited from the BonnEconLab subject pool consisting of students with various fields 
of study.267 Twenty participants took part in each of the 24 experimental sessions and 
interacted with each other in groups of five, resulting in four independent observations per 
session. In total, we collected 24 independent observations per treatment. No subject 
participated in more than one session. Each session lasted about 100 minutes. Subjects were 
initially endowed with 150 points. Each point was worth 4 euro cents. At the end of a 
session, subjects were paid in private the total amount of points earned (including the initial 
                                                 
263 Gächter/Falk, Reputation and reciprocity: Consequences for the labour relation 2002. 
264 Brown/Falk/Fehr, Relational contracts and the nature of market interactions 2004. 
265 Fischbacher, Z-tree: Zurich toolbox for ready-made economic experiments 2007. 
266 These numbers include also participants from the FixedTermDefault treatment described in the 
Appendix 2. 
267 Participants were recruited via the online recruitment tool ORSEE (Greiner, The online recruitment 
system orsee 2.0-a guide for the organization of experiments in economics 2004) and hroot 
(Bock/Baetge/Nicklisch, Hroot: Hamburg registration and organization online tool 2014). Subjects who had 
already participated in any gift-exchange experiments were excluded. 
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endowment), converted into Euros. The average payment was 18.8 EUR in the main part of 
the experiment. 
In each experimental treatment subjects were randomly assigned to a group and a 
role with an identification number (ID). There were two principals and three agents in each 
group. Identification numbers were known to all members of the group. Group matching, 
roles, and ID numbers remained constant for the 15 periods of the experiment. Participants 
were informed that the experiment lasts 15 periods.  
Each period consisted of three stages: the offers’ stage, the effort stage, and the 
feedback stage. In the offers’ stage, principals made contract offers to agents by sending two 
types of offers: private or public. Both types of offers specified a desired effort (?̃? ∈
{1,2,3, … ,10}) and a wage 𝑤 ∈ {1,2,3, … ,100}. Private offers included the ID number of the 
agent to whom the offer was directed. Private offers were only visible to the principal who 
sent it and the specified agent. Private offers could be used by principals to renew a contract 
with a specified agent. Public offers were displayed to all available agents. Principals could 
make as many offers as desired and agents could accept any available offer. Each principal 
and each agent could enter into only one contract.  
As soon as an agent accepted an offer, a contract was concluded, and this agent could 
no longer accept any offers in this period. No private offers could be sent to this agent and 
the existing private offers directed to him were removed from the market. The principal who 
had concluded a contract could not send further offers and his existing offers were deleted. 
The offers’ stage ended when both principals in a group concluded a contract or 150 seconds 
elapsed. It was possible for both – agents and principals – to conclude no contract in a given 
period. In this case, the principal made no profit, whereas the agent received his outside 
option of 5.  
In the effort stage, agents who entered into a contract made an effort choice. Agents 
were not bound by the desired effort (𝑒) specified in the accepted offer. This feature of the 
design was implemented in order to reflect the incompleteness of a contract. Therefore, 
agents could freely choose their effort level (e) at a cost 𝑐(𝑒) displayed in Table 1. 
Principals, however, were bound by the accepted wage offer. Regardless of the agent's 
choice, the accepted wage was subtracted from the endowment of the principal and paid to 
the agent.  
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After the effort stage, all subjects were informed about their payoffs in the feedback 
stage. The payoffs of principals were calculated according to the rule:  
𝜋𝑃 = {
10𝑒 − 𝑤   if a contract offer was accepted
0          if no contract was accepted
 
and the payoffs of agents were calculated according to the following rule: 
𝜋𝐴 = {
𝑤 − 𝑐(𝑒)    if a contract offer was accepted
5           if no contract was accepted
 
Principals and agents were informed about their payoffs. As the payoff rule was 
common knowledge, each principal could calculate the payoff of his agent and each agent 
could calculate the payoff of his principal. In each period, the history of previous interactions 
was displayed on the screen (own payoffs and ID number of a contractual partner in a given 
period, total payoffs). 
II. Materials and procedures 
1. Treatments 
To investigate the influence of the contract type on the behavior of contractual 
partners, we implemented three treatments: FixedTerm, OpenEnd, and Mixed.268 In the 
FixedTerm treatment, each contract was concluded for one period and each period begins 
with the offers’ stage. Principals, who want to continue a relationship with a given agent, 
could do so by sending private offers to a specific agent. If the agent had accepted such an 
offer, the contractual relationship continued.269 
In the OpenEnd treatment, each contract was concluded for all remaining periods of 
the experiment. However, during the feedback stage at the end of each period, agents and 
principals with a contract could decide whether to terminate the contract or continue to the 
next period. If a contract was terminated by at least one of the partners, both the principal 
                                                 
268 A fourth treatment, FixedTermDefault contains elements of both FixedTerm and OpenEnd 
treatment. Results from this treatment largely overlap with the FixedTerm treatment and thus, the 
FixedTermDefault treatment has been excluded from the analyses. Details on a treatment manipulation as well 
as a summary of the results are included in Appendix 1. 
269 This treatment closely resembles the ICF condition (incomplete contracts with identification) from 
Brown et al. The only differences to Brown et al. are the size of groups (2 principals instead of 7 and 3 agents 
instead of 10) and the knowledge of offers – in the current design principals are not informed about the offers 
made by other principals. 
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and agent started the next period with the offers’ stage. If both agreed to continue, the next 
period begun with the effort stage. The wage, the desired effort level, and the contractual 
partner remained the same as in the previous period.  
In the Mixed treatment, principals could choose whether to offer a fixed-term or an 
open-ended contract. In this treatment offers also included the type of contract offered. If a 
fixed-term contract was formed, the contract was governed by the rules of the FixedTerm 
treatment. Thus, the subsequent period started with the offers’ stage for both partners. 
Principals could decide to continue a relationship with the same agent by making a private 
offer. If an open-ended contract was formed, the contract was governed by the rules of the 
OpenEnd treatment. It extended for all remaining periods and could be terminated by either 
of contractual partners at the end of each period during the feedback stage. Principals in the 
offers’ stage could freely choose the type of contract, irrespective of the types of contracts 
formed in the previous periods. This treatment was designed to explore whether the 
endogenous choice of different provisions on contractual duration change their meaning to 
the contractual partners. 
2. Procedures 
The experimental instructions were framed in a labor market language.270 Principals 
were called firms, agents – workers and contracts – employment contracts. Upon arrival, 
participants were randomly assigned to separate cubicles. Instructions for the experiment 
were read aloud by the experimenter, and a quiz was conducted to ensure that all subjects 
were familiar with the rules of the experiment. Before the start of the experiment, 
participants were allowed to ask questions which were answered privately by the 
experimenter. At the end of the experiment, participants completed a social value orientation 
test as well as a personality questionnaire. A 32-items test implemented by van Dijk, 
Sonnemans, and van Winden271, who adopted a ‘social value orientation’ test developed 
originally by Liebrand272, was used to elicit social preferences of participants. The 
personality questionnaire included the 10-item measure of the Big Five personality domains 
                                                 
270 The instructions were formulated in German. A translated copy of the instructions is included in the 
appendix. 
271 van Dijk/Sonnemans/van Winden, Social ties in a public good experiment 2002. 
272 Liebrand, The effect of social motives, communication and group size on behaviour in an n-person 
multi-stage mixed-motive game 1984. 
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as well as four questions on self-assessed trust and risk attitudes using questions from the 
German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP). The trust scale is generated from the following 
items: (1) In general, you can trust people. (2) Nowadays, you cannot rely on anybody. (3) It 
is better to be cautious before trusting strangers (Cronbach’s α = 0.69). Self-assessed risk 
preferences are measured with a question: How do you see yourself: are you a person who is 
fully prepared to take risks or do you try to avoid taking risks? 
C. Theoretical background and hypotheses 
In the following section, I will describe predictions for individual behavior in the 
current experimental setting. I will start with equilibrium predictions based on the 
assumption of self-interested and rational players as well as common knowledge of self-
interest and rationality. Next, I will present the predictions assuming the existence of some 
inequality-averse players and incomplete information on the type of players. Finally, based 
on two behavioral phenomena – the reciprocity and status-quo bias – I will derive 
predictions for agents’ effort choices and the length of principal-agent relations in the 
experimental treatments. 
Given the standard assumptions of common knowledge of self-interest and 
rationality as well as the parameters of the experimental design, in equilibrium a principal 
offers a wage 𝑤 = 5273 which renders an agent indifferent between accepting an offer or 
rejecting it and receiving an outside option, 𝜋𝐴 = 5 guaranteed if no contract is concluded. If 
an offer is accepted, an agent chooses the minimum effort of 1. As a result, a principal 
receives the payoff 𝜋𝑃 = (10 ∗ 1) − 5 = 5 and an agent receives the payoff 𝜋𝐴 = 5 − 0 =
5.  In this case the whole benefit of a transaction is reaped by a principal.274 According to 
standard predictions the equilibrium behavior should not differ depending on the type of 
contract. 
Based on the assumption that there exist a sufficient number of reciprocating agents 
one can predict cooperative behavior which is sustained almost until the last period of the 
                                                 
273 In the equilibrium also wage, 𝑤 = 6 is possible. With 𝑤 = 6 an agent is not anymore indifferent 
but prefers accepting an offer than having no contract at all.  
274 The benefit of a transaction is the surplus achieved through a transaction in comparison to a 
situation when no contract is concluded. If no contract is concluded agents receive profit of 𝜋𝐴 = 5 and 
principals 𝜋𝑃 = 0. Therefore, the surplus of a transaction in non-cooperative equilibrium is 5 - the profit earned 
by principals. 
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game.275 In equilibrium both – selfish and reciprocating - agents provide high effort levels. 
They differ however in their motivation. A selfish agent accepts any offer and chooses an 
effort level equal to the desired effort as long as the costs of this effort do not exceed 
expected profits from future interaction with the same principal. In contrast, non-selfish 
agents reciprocate high wages offered by the principal. The level of effort depends on the 
level of wage. The expectation of future rents from the interaction is a main motive for a 
selfish agent to provide high effort. If principals belief that there are some reciprocating 
agents on the market they will offer high wages even in the last period of the game. 
Additionally, selfish agents are also disciplined by a belief that there are reciprocating agents 
available on the market which could replace them if a principal decides not to renew a 
contract. A contract will not be renewed as soon as an agent provides effort lower than the 
desired effort specified in the offer.  
Given these predictions in the current study, one should observe effort levels and 
wages higher than in the equilibrium based on standard assumptions. According to this 
behavioral equilibrium, there should be no differences in cooperative behavior between the 
fixed-term and the open-ended contract type. Two behavioral phenomena – status quo bias 
and reciprocity – may yet lead to different behavior of agents and principals when interacting 
in a fixed-term compared to an open-ended contract.  
I. Agents’ effort choices 
A simple model is proposed to derive predictions regarding agents’ effort choices 
depending on the concluded contract type. The key assumption of the model is that the 
kindness of each contract type is evaluated differently by the agent in light of all contract 
types available to the principal. It is clear that the perception of principal's kindness by the 
agent depends not only on the contract type but also on a wage and desired effort level 
specified in the offer. However, in the model this is simplified to focus only on the impact of 
contract type on the perception of principal's kindness. The behavioral reactions of 
contractual partners to different contract types are modeled based on Falk and Fischbacher’s 
theory of reciprocity.276 The underlying assumption of the theory is that people evaluate the 
                                                 
275 These predictions are based on the behavioral equilibrium suggested by Brown et al. A more 
formalized presentation can be found in the Appendix to Brown et al. 
276 Falk/Fischbacher, A theory of reciprocity 2006. 
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final allocation not only by looking at the outcome itself but also by assessing intentions of a 
decision maker. How the intentions are evaluated depends on the options available to the 
decision maker. More specifically, to assess the intentions, the decision maker needs to have 
a possibility to choose between fair and unfair allocation.  
According to the model each offer consists of three elements: wage, desired effort 
level, and contract type. The contract type offered is one of the available contract types, 𝑐 ∈
𝐶. When sending an offer to an agent a principal has a set of possible strategies: 𝑆𝑃, whereas 
𝑠𝑃 ∈ 𝑆𝑃 is his given strategy. Thus, each contract offer is principal’s defined strategy 
(𝑠𝑃|𝑤, 𝑒 ̃, 𝑐). The payoff function of the agents is the following:  
𝜋𝐴 = 𝑤 − 𝑐(𝑒) 
Contract offers made by a principal are perceived by an agent regarding their 
kindness. In the model, it is assumed that there is a kindness term 𝜑𝐴 which represents how 
kind an agent perceives the principal’s offer given the contract type. The parameter 𝜑𝐴 
enters the utility function of the agent in the following way: 
𝑈(𝑤, 𝑒, 𝑐) = 𝑤 − 𝑐(𝑒) +  𝜑𝐴 
Depending on the treatment a principal may initially offer different types of contracts 
– fixed-term, 𝑐𝐹𝑇 and/or open-ended, 𝑐𝑂𝐸 . According to the model, there is also a third type 
of a contract – a renewal contract, 𝑐𝑅 ,  which is available only for the agent and principal 
who have interacted with each other in the directly preceding period. A renewal contract 
represents a contract between parties who decide to continue their contractual relationship 
either by renewing an initial fixed-term contract or by non-terminating an initial open-ended 
contract. In the first period of the experiment, the only possible contract types are the ones 
available by the experimental design. In all subsequent periods a renewal contract might be 
available.  
Whether a contract type offered is interpreted as 𝑐𝐹𝑇, 𝑐𝑂𝐸 or 𝑐𝑅 depends on the 
treatment, timing and type of offer. In the FixedTerm treatment the contract types offered are 
defined as follows:  
- Initial fixed-term contract type, 𝑐𝐹𝑇: 
– in period 1: 
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▪ any contract offered irrespective of the type of offer (private or public), 
– in period>1: 
▪ any contract offered publicly, 
▪ a contract offered privately to an agent not hired by the offering principal in a 
directly preceding period, 
- Renewal contract, 𝑐𝑅 (available only in periods>1): 
– a contract offered privately to an agent hired by the offering principal in the 
directly preceding period. 
In the OpenEnd treatment contract types are defined as in the FixedTerm treatment 
with an additional possibility for a renewal contract. A contract type offered is classified as a 
renewal contract if an agent and a principal mutually agree to extend the concluded contract 
without going to the offers stage. In the Mixed treatment an initial fixed-term contract 𝑐𝐹𝑇 
and an initial open-ended contract 𝑐𝑂𝐸 are available from the beginning. Subsequently, from 
period > 1, a renewal contract 𝑐𝑅 enters the contract set. Its definition depends on whether a 
contract concluded in the preceding period is a fixed-term or an open-ended one. If it is a 
fixed-term contract, a renewal contract is defined as in the FixedTerm treatment. In the case 
of an open-ended contract in the preceding period, a renewal contract is defined as in the 
OpenEnd treatment. 
Table 3: Contract sets by experimental treatment 
Treatment Period = 1 Period > 1 
FixedTerm 𝐶𝐹𝑇 𝐶𝐹𝑇,𝐶𝑅 
OpenEnd 𝐶𝑂𝐸 𝐶𝑂𝐸,𝐶𝑅 
Mixed 𝐶𝐹𝑇,𝐶𝑂𝐸 𝐶𝐹𝑇,𝐶𝑂𝐸,𝐶𝑅 
 
Available contract sets are summarized in Table 3. Each contract set 𝐶 depends on 
the treatment X = [FT, OE, MX] and period 𝑡. The model assumes that agents will perceive 
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the kindness of any concluded contract not only in light of its wage and desired effort, but 
also depending on the type of contract given the contract set 𝐶𝑋𝑡. The hypothesis on 
behavioral reactions towards different contract types are formulated given different contract 
sets made available in the experimental treatments.  
The model is used as a framework to propose two hypotheses regarding agents' effort 
responses to various contract types available in the experimental treatments. The hypotheses 
are derived based on the assumptions about 𝜑𝐴 (kindness term) and holding wage and 
desired effort constant. More specifically, it is assumed that an initial contract of any 
duration type (𝑐𝐹𝑇 or 𝑐𝑂𝐸 ) is always perceived as less kind than a renewal contract. The 
perception of an initial contract changes when both contract types  𝑐𝐹𝑇 and 𝑐𝑂𝐸  are available. 
An open-ended contract might be perceived as a sign of trust and willingness to stay in one 
relationship for a longer period of time. In contrast, offering a fixed-term contract might be 
seen as a distrustful behavior showing no willingness to stay in a long-term relation. 
Therefore, in the presence of both types of contracts, it is assumed that an open-ended 
contract is perceived as kinder than a fixed-term contract. It is predicted that agents will 
reciprocate the kindness of a contract type and provide different effort levels depending on 
the contract set and the contract type concluded. 
Behavioral prediction 1:  
For a given wage and desired effort, an agent provides less effort under a new 
contract of any duration type than under a renewal contract, whenever a renewal contract 
enters the contract set.  
Behavioral prediction 2:  
For a given wage and desired effort, an agent provides less effort under an initial 
fixed-term contract than under an initial open-ended contract, if both contract types are 
available.  
II. The length of principal-agent relations 
Predictions regarding the share of contracts concluded in long-term relations under 
fixed-term compared to the open-ended contract are derived based on the status quo bias. 
Given the definition of contract types introduced above, a long-term relation is any 
contractual relation under a renewal contract.  
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The status quo bias is a behavioral phenomenon referring to peoples’ tendency to 
uphold the current state of affairs which they perceive as a status quo rather than opt for an 
alternative state.277 Samuelson and Zeckhauser who coined the term “status quo bias” 
conducted a series of experiments in which they presented people with scenarios describing 
various decision problems.278 Subsequently, individuals were prompted to make decisions by 
choosing one of the alternative options introduced in the scenario. In some scenarios, one of 
the options was described as a status quo and the decision involved a choice between 
keeping the current option and switching to one of the alternatives. In other scenarios, 
participants chose between different options, but none of the options was described as a 
current one. The authors observed that people tend to choose an option more frequently 
when it is presented as a status quo than when it is presented as one of the alternatives, and 
no status quo option is given. This difference is larger when people are confronted with more 
alternative options.279  
In the current study, an open-ended contract creates a status quo of being in a 
contractual relation with a given person until the end of the experiment. To change the status 
quo one of contractual partners has to opt for terminating the existing contract. In contrast, in 
a fixed-term contract, a status quo is that a contract ends after one period. In each period, 
contractual parties need to make a decision to extend the current contract. Given the 
empirical results on the status-quo bias, one could predict that people will tend to stay in a 
current contractual relation more often in open-ended than in fixed term contracts.280 This 
difference should be observed irrespective of the available contract types.  
                                                 
277 Kahneman/Knetsch/Thaler, Anomalies: The endowment effect, loss aversion, and status quo bias 
1991. 
278 Samuelson/Zeckhauser, Status quo bias in decision making 1988. 
279 For a short review of the current findings and possible behavioral mechanisms underlying the 
status-quo bias see: Zamir, Law, psychology, and morality: The role of loss aversion 2014, pp. 17-21. 
280 Omission bias is a related behavioral phenomenon often mentioned together with a status quo bias. 
It refers to people tendency to favor inaction over action (for a difference between status-quo and omission bias 
see: Schweitzer, Disentangling status quo and omission effects: An experimental analysis 1994). In case of the 
current experimental design omission bias should not play any role. As in the fixed-term contract in the open-
end contracts participants has to be active in both cases – in order to terminate a contract as well as in order to 
continue to the next period with the same contractual partner.  
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Behavioral prediction 3: 
More renewal contracts will be observed in the OpenEnd treatment than in the 
FixedTerm treatment. Also, in the Mixed treatment, more renewal contracts will be observed 
in the open-ended than in the fixed-term contracts.  
D. Results 
I. Descriptive statistics 
Table 4 presents the key dependent variables by treatment (FixedTerm and OpenEnd) 
and contract type within the Mixed treatment. In the Mixed treatment, principals could 
choose between two types of contract. Therefore, the results are reported separately for each 
contract type. Mixed (FT) represents fixed-term contracts and Mixed (OE) represents open-
ended contracts in the Mixed treatment.  
The last line, starting from the bottom of Table 4, displays the number of concluded 
contracts in each treatment. For each treatment there existed a maximum of 720 possible 
contracts (2 principals * 15 periods * 24 groups in each treatment). “Unused Contracts” 
reports the number of times where a principal did not conclude any contract at all. For the 
Mixed(FT) and Mixed(OE), the Unused Contracts represents the number of times no contract 
was entered into by one of the principals in the complete Mixed treatment. The low number 
of “Unused Contracts” (the largest number in the FixedTerm treatment is 17 “Unused 
Contracts) indicates that principals almost always successfully used their opportunity to hire 
an agent.  
Table 4 reports the percentage of contracts concluded as a result of a private offer. 
The low number in the OpenEnd treatment (18.7%) and Mixed(OE) contracts (19.6%) is 
related to the experimental design which allowed for extending the existing contract without 
entering into the offers’ stage. More specifically, if both – the principal and the agent – 
agreed for continuing to the next period, their contract was upheld, and private offers were 
not needed to extend their contractual relationship.  
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Table 4: Descriptive statistics by treatment and contract type 
 FixedTerm OpenEnd Mixed (FT) Mixed (OE) 
Effort 6.04 6.31 4.31 6.64 
Wage 40.30 38.79 31.54 41.45 
Desired Effort 7.59 7.43 6.21 8.17 
Percent Private Offers 61.6% 18.7% 42.9% 19.6% 
Percent Renewal Contracts 41.3% 66.6% 20.7% 70.5% 
Unused Contracts 17 8 15 15 
𝑁 703 712 261 444 
 
Furthermore, Table 4 displays the share of renewal contracts in each of the 
treatments. Recall that renewal contracts are defined as all contracts between a principal and 
an agent who interacted with each other in the directly preceding period. An additional 
condition for a contract to be classified as a renewal contract is that both contractual partners 
expressed willingness to extend their current contract. In the case of fixed-term contracts, it 
means that a renewal contract could be concluded only through a private offer. In the case of 
an open-ended contract a renewal contract is concluded if neither a principal nor an agent 
terminated a contract in the preceding period or if one of them ended a contract but in the 
next period, a new contract between the same principal and agent was concluded through a 
private offer.  
Among all contracts, Mixed(OE) contracts have the largest renewal rate (70.5%) and 
Mixed(FT) contracts have the lowest renewal rate (20.7%). The treatments with exogenous 
contract type (FixedTerm and OpenEnd) show a similar pattern. The share of renewal 
contracts in the FixedTerm treatment (41.3%) is nearly 30% lower than in the OpenEnd 
treatment. However, it is still larger than in Mixed(FT) contracts. This is in line with the 
behavioral prediction 3 according to which due to the status quo bias more renewal contracts 
should be observed in the OpenEnd treatment than in the FixedTerm treatment. The same 
pattern should be observed comparing open-ended and fixed-term contracts in the Mixed 
treatment.   
 Results provided in Table 4 reveal that more contracts were concluded as open-ended 
than as fixed-term (444 vs. 261) in the Mixed treatment. Figure 3 shows a time trend in the 
percentage of contracts entered into either as open-ended or fixed-term. Whereas in the 
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initial periods Mixed(FT) contracts outnumbered the Mixed(OE) contracts by 54% to 44%, 
the proportion reversed in the later periods (33% Mixed(FT) contracts and 63% Mixed(OE) 
contracts).281 
The first three lines of Table 4 display means of wage, effort and desired effort level 
which look fairly similar in the FixedTerm, OpenEnd treatments and the Mixed(OE) contract 
type. Different values are observed only in Mixed(FT) contracts.  
Agents who concluded Mixed(FT) contracts provided the lowest effort levels 
compared to FixedTerm and OpenEnd treatment as well as to Mixed(OE) contracts (two-
sided Wilcoxon rank sum test: p<0.01 in each of the three comparisons).282 No other 
comparisons between the treatments and the Mixed(OE) contract type revealed significant 
differences in effort levels provided by agents. Figure 4 displays mean effort levels over the 
                                                 
281 The percentage is a share of contracts of a given type out of 48 contracts available in the Mixed 
treatment in each period (there were altogether 24 groups with 2 principals in each group). The percentages of 
contract types do not sum up to 100% in some periods in which one or two principals did not conclude any 
contract at all.   
282 In the experiment participants interacted in groups of five. Therefore, all statistical non-parametric 
tests were conducted using group means. There were 24 groups in each treatment and in Mixed(OE) contract 
type and 23 groups in Mixed(FT) contract type as one group in the Mixed treatment did not experience any 
Mixed(FT) contract type.   
Figure 3: Percentage of each contract type in the Mixed treatment 
Note: Percentage of Mixed (FT) and Mixed(OE) contract types out of 48 
contracts available in the Mixed treatment in each period.   
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course of the experiment. In all treatments the „end game” effect is observed – a typical 
sharp decline in effort provided in the last period of the experiment. Effort choices in the 
FixedTerm and OpenEnd treatment as well as under the Mixed(OE) contracts show similar 
positive time trend during periods 1-14. An interesting development over time can be noticed 
in the provision of effort under Mixed(FT) contracts. In the initial periods mean effort levels 
under Mixed(FT) contracts seem fairly similar to these observed in Mixed(OE) contracts. 
However, in contrast to Mixed(OE) contracts in which the effort levels slightly increase over 
time, in Mixed(FT) contracts, there is a downward trend in the later periods. The right-hand 
side of Figure 4 also displays mean effort levels in the Mixed treatment. 
Similar patterns are observed when looking at wages paid by principals in all 
treatments and contract types. Figure 5 displays mean wage levels over the course of the 
experiment. Agents who concluded Mixed(FT) contracts are paid significantly lower wages 
compared to FixedTerm and OpenEnd treatments as well as to Mixed(OE) contracts (two-
sided Wilcoxon rank sum test: p<0.01). There are no other significant differences in wages 
between treatments and contract types. Time trends in wages correspond to time trends 
observed in effort levels. In FixedTerm and OpenEnd treatments as well as in Mixed(OE) 
contracts wages tend to rise slightly in the later periods in comparison to the early periods of 
Figure 4: Mean effort over time 
(a) Treatments FixedTerm and OpenEnd (b) Mixed treatment, separated by contract type 
Note: The figure on the left-hand side displays group means of effort over all periods of the 
experiment in the FixedTerm and OpenEnd treatments. The figure on the right-hand side 
displays group means of effort over all periods of the experiment in the Mixed treatments and 
separately for Mixed(OE) and Mixed (FT) contract types 
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the experiment. This is, however, not the case in Mixed(FT) contracts. There is a striking 
decrease in wages paid under Mixed(FT) contracts starting with period five which coincides 
with a similar decline in effort provided by agents under Mixed(FT) contracts. 
II. Effort choices 
Regression analyzes were conducted to isolate further differences between treatments and 
contract types. As the dependent variable effort choice was restricted to the values from 1 to 
10,283 a Tobit model with upper and lower censoring was implemented to inspect the impact 
of treatments and contract types on effort choices.  Standard errors were clustered to correct 
for dependence at the group level. Table 5 reports the results.  
 
                                                 
283 Censoring was found in 27.5% of contracts with 258 left-censored at 𝑒 = 1 and 324 right-censored 
at 𝑒 = 10. Random effects model analyses conducted as a robustness check revealed the same significance 
levels of of all treatment variables. 
Figure 5: Mean wage over time 
(a) Treatments FixedTerm and OpenEnd (b) Mixed treatment, separated by contract type 
Note: The figure on the left-hand side displays group means of wages over all periods of the 
experiment in the FixedTerm and OpendEnd treatments. The figure on the right-hand side 
displays group means of wages over all periods of the experiment in the Mixed treatments and 
separately for Mixed(OE) and Mixed (FT) contract types 
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Table 5: Tobit regression on effort by treatment 
 
(1) 
Effort 
(2) 
Effort 
(3) 
Effort 
(4) 
Effort 
(5) 
Effort 
FixedTerm -0.35 
(0.54) 
-0.35 
(0.54) 
-0.61** 
(0.26) 
-0.20 
(0.23) 
 
Mixed(FT) -2.64*** 
(0.56) 
-2.55*** 
(0.56) 
-1.21*** 
(0.34) 
-0.75** 
(0.29) 
 
Mixed(OE) 0.37 
(0.60) 
0.32 
(0.60) 
-0.26 
(0.31) 
-0.14 
(0.24) 
 
Period 
 
0.15*** 
(0.03) 
0.09*** 
(0.02) 
0.06*** 
(0.02) 
0.06*** 
(0.02) 
Last Period 
 
-3.74*** 
(0.43) 
-2.99*** 
(0.40) 
-3.01*** 
(0.43) 
-3.01*** 
(0.43) 
Wage 
  
0.13*** 
(0.01) 
0.10*** 
(0.01) 
0.10*** 
(0.01) 
Desired Effort 
  
0.36*** 
(0.07) 
0.32*** 
(0.05) 
0.32*** 
(0.05) 
Renewal Contract 
   
0.80*** 
(0.14) 
0.62*** 
(0.21) 
First Effort 
   
0.29*** 
(0.04) 
0.29*** 
(0.04) 
Period First Hired 
   
0.03 
(0.02) 
0.03 
(0.02) 
FixedTerm*Renewal 
    
-0.04 
(0.28) 
Mixed (FT)*Renewal 
    
-0.21 
(0.32) 
Mixed (OE)*Renewal 
    
-0.16 
(0.27) 
FixedTerm*Initial 
    
-0.39 
(0.27) 
Mixed (FT)*Initial 
    
-1.02*** 
(0.31) 
Mixed (OE)*Initial 
    
-0.10 
(0.28) 
Constant 6.50*** 
(0.35) 
5.57*** 
(0.37) 
-1.63*** 
(0.37) 
-2.75*** 
(0.36) 
-2.63*** 
(0.38) 
N 2120 2120 2120 1907 1907 
Clusters 72 72 72 72 72 
Notes: Three (***), two (**), and one (*) stars indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 
10% levels respectively. Standard errors, reported in parentheses, have been corrected for clustering 
at the group level 
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In each model, the OpenEnd treatment is the comparison group. The first model 
confirms the results of non-parametric tests showing significantly lower effort levels 
provided by agents hired under the Mixed(FT) contract type. Model 2 introduces the 
variables Period and Last Period, which control for time trends in effort provided by agents. 
The coefficient of the Mixed(FT) contract type remains negative and statistically significant.   
In the repeated gift-exchange game implemented in this experiment, agents make 
effort choices in response to wage and desired effort level specified in the offer. Model 3 and 
4 introduce in the regression analyzes these two variables – wage and desired effort – to 
control for their impact on the effort choices.  Interestingly, when controlling for wage and 
desired effort level, a significant negative coefficient is observed for both – Mixed(FT) 
contract types and the FixedTerm treatment. This result seems to reflect the trend visible in 
the descriptive statistics presented in Table 4. Agents in the FixedTerm treatment provided a 
mean effort of 6.04 in response to mean wages of 40.30 whereas mean wages of 38.79 were 
reciprocated with a mean effort of 6.31 in the OpenEnd treatment. Independently comparing 
mean effort choices and wages does not reveal any significant differences between 
FixedTerm and OpenEnd treatment. However, when controlling for a wage, it is clear that 
wages paid in the FixedTerm treatment are not reciprocated with effort levels as high as in 
the OpenEnd treatment.284  
Given the lower effort choices in Mixed(FT) contracts as well as lower effort 
responses to wages in FixedTerm treatment, further analyzes were conducted to investigate 
reactions of agents to renewal and initial contracts depending on treatment and contract type. 
Figure 6 displays mean effort choices in both treatments and contract types in Mixed 
treatment separately for initial and renewal contracts. Regardless of the treatment and 
contract type in the Mixed treatment renewal contracts are always related to a higher mean of 
effort than initial contracts.  
                                                 
284 This result might be represented in terms of principals’ earnings. Per period principals receive 4.21 
points more in the OpenEnd than in the FixedTerm treatment. This amounts to average 2.52€ earned 
additionally by each principal in the OpenEnd treatment. Given the average payment of 18.64€ for a principal 
in the experiment, this represents 7% increase in earnings.  
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It would be ideal to examine responses to each contract type – fixed-term, open-
ended and renewal – in isolation since the agents, who are more reciprocal from the 
beginning, are also more likely to be offered a renewal contract. As a result, higher effort 
choices could potentially be not only the effect of a renewal contract type but also a 
consequence of a type of agents hired under renewal contracts. Two variables were included 
in the regression analyses to control for the type of agent: First Effort and Period First Hired. 
First Effort controls for effort choices made by agents in the first period of being hired. For 
agents who were unemployed in the first period, the variable First Effort takes the effort 
value of the first period they were employed. To avoid including effort variables on both 
sides of the regression equation, observations from the first period of the first contract for an 
agent were dropped in Model 4 and 5. To control for the potential impact of being 
unemployed in the first periods, a variable Period First Hired was included in the regression 
model. This variable takes the value of the period of the experiment in which an agent was 
hired for the first time. Model 4 in Table 5 reports results of a Tobit regression on effort 
including variables controlling for time trends (Period and Last Period), wage, desired effort 
and agent’s type (First Effort, Period First Hired). Furthermore, Model 4 includes a dummy 
Figure 6: Mean effort by contract type (Initial and Renewal contract) 
Note: Means of effort provided in all periods of the experiment 
separately for Renewal and Initial Contracts over all conditions. 
The results from Mixed treatment are presented separately for 
Mixed(FT) and Mixed(OE) contracts.  
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variable indicating whether a contract was a renewal contract (Renewal Contract). Being in a 
renewal contract seems to have a positive impact on agents’ effort choices. Interestingly, 
controlling for the impact of renewal contracts the coefficient indicating a negative impact of 
the FixedTerm treatment on agents’ effort responses to wages becomes insignificant. The 
negative influence of Mixed(FT) contracts on effort is still observed. Do the agents response 
differently to renewal contracts depending on the treatment and contract type? Model 6 
reported in Table 7 includes interaction terms for initial and renewal contracts: 
Mixed(FT)*Initial, Mixed(OE)*Initial, FixedTerm*Initial; Mixed(FT)*Renewal, 
Mixed(OE)*Renewal and FixedTerm*Renewal. The coefficients of interaction terms for 
renewal contracts reveal that agents do not distinguish between renewal contracts offered in 
different treatments. The results suggest that once contracts are renewed and both parties 
agree to continue their interaction, then the initial contract duration does not matter anymore. 
The ongoing relationship between the same agent and principal ensures higher effort 
responses of agents. 
While all renewal contracts are viewed equally by agents irrespective of the treatment 
or contract type, initial contracts show important differences. The results of the regression 
analysis reveal strong negative and statistically significant result for Mixed(FT) contracts – 
effort responses in initial Mixed(FT) contracts are lower than in initial contracts in OpenEnd 
treatment. Although effort choices in initial Mixed(OE) contracts are not significantly 
different from initial contracts in the OpenEnd treatment, there are significantly higher than 
in initial Mixed(FT) contracts.285 This difference between Mixed(OE) and Mixed(FT) 
contracts disappears when both contractual partners decide to continue their interaction.  
III. Wages 
Table 6 reports results of a regression analysis on wages with standard errors 
clustered at the group level.286 It reveals that agents receive significantly lower wages under 
Mixed(FT) contracts than in the OpenEnd treatment (Model 1).  
 
                                                 
285 Coefficients compared using a two-sided t-test.  
286 Although the experimental design restricts wage offers between 1 and 100, only 9 of the 2120 
observations were observed at the end point. Analyses using a Tobit regression conducted to address this minor 
censoring reveal comparable results.  
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Table 6: Regression on wage by treatment 
 (1) 
Wage 
(2) 
Wage 
(3) 
Wage 
FixedTerm 1.23 
(2.54) 
1.23 
(2.54) 
2.34 
(2.45) 
Mixed (FT) -5.33** 
(2.50) 
-5.20** 
(2.53) 
-3.24 
(2.49) 
Mixed(OE) 1.49 
(2.38) 
1.40 
(2.38) 
1.26 
(2.32) 
Period 
 
0.15 
(0.13) 
-0.00 
(0.13) 
Last Period -2.32** 
(1.03) 
-1.74* 
(0.99) 
Renewal 
 
4.36*** 
(0.71) 
Constant 38.62*** 
(1.75) 
37.57*** 
(2.01) 
35.85*** 
(1.96) 
N 
Clusters 
2120 
72 
2120 
72 
2120 
72 
Notes: Three (***), two (**), and one (*) stars indicate 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels 
respectively. Standard errors, reported in parentheses, have 
been corrected for clustering at the group level. 
 
There are no significant differences between the OpenEnd treatment, the FixedTerm 
treatment and Mixed(OE) contracts in the Mixed treatment (Model 1). It seems that the main 
reason for the observed variation in wages is the use of renewal contracts which are far less 
prevalent in Mixed(FT) contracts. As a result, wages under Mixed(FT) contracts tend to be 
much lower. Including a dummy for a renewal contract (Model 3) shows a significant 
positive relation of a renewal contract and wage paid by the principal. Furthermore, the 
coefficient for Mixed(FT) contracts in Model 3 becomes less negative and insignificant. 
IV. Behavior in the Mixed treatment 
In this section, I take a closer look at the behavior of agents and principals in the 
Mixed treatment. If offers for both contract types – Mixed(OE) and Mixed(FT) – are 
available on the market, it is possible that high-reciprocating types would self-select into 
Mixed(OE) contracts and low-reciprocating agents would choose Mixed(FT) contracts. In 
this case, low effort choices observed in Mixed(FT) contracts would not be an effect of a 
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contract type but would rather reflect a selection effect: certain types of agents self-select 
into a particular contract type. This explanation can be excluded by analyzing the behavior 
of agents who experienced each type of contract at least for one period. Given the 
endogenous selection of contracts in the Mixed treatment, 50 agents experienced both 
contract types, and 21 agents experienced only one of the contract types.287 The first two 
bars of Figure 7 display means of effort provided by the agents who concluded either only 
the Mixed(FT) contract (10 agents) or only the Mixed(OE) contract (11 agents) during the 
whole experiment. The last two columns represent average effort choices by the agents who 
experienced each contract type for at least one period of the experiment. Figure 7 reports the 
average effort (mean of individual averages) of agents in a given contract type.  
The results reveal that agents provide higher effort when hired under the Mixed(OE) 
contract than under the Mixed(FT) contract regardless of the agent’s experience with only 
                                                 
287 One agent did not conclude any contract in the Mixed treatment. 
Figure 7: Mean effort over agent's concluded contract 
Note: Means of effort provided by agents who experienced either 
only one or both contract types in the Mixed treatment over the 
type of contract - Mixed(FT) and Mixed(OE). The numbers above 
the columns indicate the number of contracts concluded in each 
type of contract.  
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one or two contract types. In particular, the comparison of effort levels provided by the 
agents who experienced both types of contracts reveals significantly higher effort choices 
under Mixed(OE) than under Mixed(FT) contracts (Wilcoxon signed-rank test: p<0.01). 
Thus, it can be concluded that the difference in effort choices between the two contract types 
is not only a result of self-selection of different types of agents to a particular contract type. 
More specifically, the same agents provided higher effort when hired under the Mixed(OE) 
than under the Mixed(FT) contract. 
 This effect is examined in greater details using a Tobit regression on effort and 
restricting the sample to the agents who experienced both contract types in the Mixed 
treatment. The results are presented in Table 7. Model 1 confirms the results of a non-
parametric test adding as a control Wage as well as Period and Last Period (variables 
catching time trends). Controlling for wages, agents provide lower effort when hired under 
the Mixed(FT) than under the Mixed(OE) contract. Model 2 adds a control variable for the 
desired effort level which appears to slightly mitigate the negative impact of the Mixed(FT) 
contract type as the coefficient for Mixed(FT) contract is still negative but not significant 
anymore. It seems that agents in the Mixed(FT) contract react positively to the desired effort 
specified in the offer although they are much less reciprocating. The size of the coefficient 
for Mixed(FT) contracts decreases when a control variable for a renewal contract is added in 
the regression model (Model 3). The coefficient of renewal contract is positive and 
significant. Model 3 and 4 includes variables First Effort and First Period Hired, which 
controls for the type of agent (similarly to Model 4 and 5 described in the Effort Choice 
section). To avoid the inclusion of effort variable on both sides of the regression equation, 
observations from periods which were the first period in the first contract for an agent were 
dropped in Model 3 and 4. Furthermore, Model 4 includes interaction terms representing 
initial and renewal contracts by contract types (Mixed(FT) or Mixed(OE)). The comparison 
group in Model 4 are Mixed(OE) renewal contracts. The regression analysis reveals that 
agents provide lower effort level in the initial Mixed(FT) contracts. The results imply that 
contract renewals are crucial for the contractual relationship in the experiment irrespective of 
the contract type. Continuing the relationship might overcome negative associations arising 
out of initially offering a fixed-term contract. 
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Table 7: Tobit regression on effort of agents who experienced both contract types 
 (1) 
Effort 
(2) 
Effort 
(3) 
Effort 
(4) 
Effort 
Mixed (FT) -0.56** 
(0.25) 
-0.35 
(0.23) 
-0.26 
(0.21) 
 
Wage 0.14*** 
(0.01) 
0.12*** 
(0.02) 
0.10*** 
(0.01) 
0.10*** 
(0.01) 
Period 0.08** 
(0.04) 
0.08** 
(0.03) 
0.05 
(0.03) 
0.04 
(0.03) 
Last Period -2.40*** 
(0.61) 
-2.34*** 
(0.62) 
-2.60*** 
(0.65) 
-2.61*** 
(0.65) 
Desired Effort 
 
0.22** 
(0.10) 
0.10 
(0.09) 
0.11 
(0.09) 
First Effort 
 
0.36*** 
(0.06) 
0.38*** 
(0.07) 
Period First Hired -0.07** 
(0.03) 
-0.07* 
(0.03) 
Renewal Contract 0.53** 
(0.26) 
 
Mixed (FT) * Initial 
 
-0.82*** 
(0.19) 
Mixed (OE) * Initial -0.16 
(0.29) 
Mixed (FT) * Renewal 0.48 
(0.38) 
Constant 0.02 
(0.70) 
-1.04* 
(0.58) 
-0.87** 
(0.40) 
-0.57 
(0.45) 
Observations 499 499 449 449 
Notes: Three (***), two (**), and one (*) stars indicate statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively. Standard errors, 
reported in parentheses, have been corrected for clustering at the group 
level. 
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Given the negative impact of Mixed(FT) contracts on agents’ effort choices, why do 
principals offer this type of contracts at all? Table 8 reports the results of a Probit regression 
analysis estimating the likelihood of a principal offering a Mixed(FT) contract.  
Table 8: Probit regression on principals offering Mixed (FT) 
 (1) 
Mixed (FT) 
(2) 
Mixed (FT) 
(3) 
Mixed (FT) 
(4) 
Mixed (FT) 
Effort t - 1 -0.28*** 
(0.04) 
-0.28*** 
(0.04) 
-0.27*** 
(0.04) 
 
Mixed (FT)*Initial 1.57*** 
(0.32) 
1.48*** 
(0.34) 
 
Trust 
 
-0.33 
(0.24) 
-0.53** 
(0.23) 
-0.41* 
(0.24) 
Risk -0.07 
(0.07) 
-0.04 
(0.09) 
0.08 
(0.09) 
SVO -0.00 
(0.01) 
-0.01 
(0.01) 
-0.01 
(0.01) 
Constant 0.02 
(0.36) 
0.45 
(0.57) 
1.15 
(0.71) 
-0.28 
(0.51) 
Periods 2-15 2-15 2-15 1 
N 658 658 658 47 
Notes: Three (***), two (**), and one (*) stars indicate statistical significance at the 
1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively. Standard errors, reported in parentheses, have 
been corrected for clustering at the group level. Models 1,2, and 3 estimate random 
effects probit and model 4 – a regular probit. 
 
Models 1-3 are random effects estimations for periods 2-15. Model 4 examines 
principals’ behavior in period 1. Model 1 shows that the lower effort the agent provided in 
the preceding period, the more likely the principal was to offer a Mixed(FT) contract in the 
current period. Furthermore, principals tend to stick to their initial choices. If a principal 
offered a Mixed(FT) contract in the first period of the experiment, it was also more likely 
that he offers a Mixed(FT) contract in the later periods. Models 2-4 look at principals’ 
characteristics which could predict the choice of a contract type. As described in the Design 
subsection, after the main part of the experiment participants were asked to make allocation 
choices to elicit their Social Value Orientation. Additionally, they answered questions on 
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self-reported trust and risk attitudes. These variables have no impact on the selection of a 
contract type in Model 2. However, Model 4 which predicts the choice of a contract type in 
the very first period of the experiment reveals that trust is related to the selection of contract. 
The less trustful the principal is, the more the Mixed(FT) contract is chosen. The coefficient 
of trust remains negative and statistically significant in Model 3 which includes all variables 
indicating principal characteristics as well as agent’s effort in the preceding period but drops 
the choice of contract in the first period.  
V. Survey results – kindness of a contract type 
As mentioned in section C the behavioral predictions were based on the assumption that a 
contract type is perceived differently concerning its kindness. Furthermore, according to the 
theory of reciprocity,288 the difference in kindness should be observed first when both 
contract types are available, as only then the choice of a contract type can reveal principal’s 
                                                 
288 Falk/Fischbacher, A theory of reciprocity 2006. 
Figure 8: Average kindness response by treatment and contract 
type 
Note: Mean responses to the kindness questionnaire. The first two 
columns represent kindness perception of a contract type when only 
one contract is presented. The last two columns represent perception of 
FixedTerm and OpenEnd contract types when they are presented 
simultaneously.   
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intentions. A survey was conducted to support the intuition on kindness perception of both 
contract types.289 Participants were randomly assigned to answer one of three questionnaires 
using a five-point Likert scale. Participants were asked about the kindness of contracts 
described in a short scenario. The first two scenarios described each of contract types 
reflecting the contracts in the FixedTerm and OpenEnd treatments. In these scenarios, 
participants were given information only on one contract type. The third scenario described 
both contract types as two options available to the principal as in the Mixed treatment. This 
way each scenario reflected the experimental environment implemented in the treatments. 
Participants were asked to assess the kindness of a contract type and to indicate whether they 
would work hard if hired under the respective contract type.  
Results from the survey are displayed in Figure 8 which shows the average responses 
to two questions about the kindness of a contract type.290 OpenEnd contract was found to be 
perceived as kinder than FixedTerm contract but only in the third scenario when both 
contract types were presented as two available options. OpenEnd and FixedTerm contracts 
are perceived as equally kind, when described separately.  The survey results are in line with 
the experimental findings. Each contract type does not alter agents’ behavior in a meaningful 
way, when it is imposed exogenously. However, when both contracts are available, agents 
react with higher effort levels to the open-ended than to the fixed-term contract. 
E. Discussion 
When entering into a principal-agent relation, the parties can specify the duration of 
their interaction in two ways. Either they can precisely define it and conclude a fixed-term 
contract or they can leave it unspecified and enter into an open-ended agreement. A fixed-
term contract does not preclude that once the defined term is over the parties can decide to 
renew the initial agreement. An open-ended contract, in turn, can be terminated any time. If 
the costs of renewing a fixed-term contract and terminating an open-ended contract are 
equal, then these two contract types are economically equivalent. Despite this apparent 
resemblance, each contract type can influence the behavior of contractual partners in a 
                                                 
289 The survey was conducted in experimental sessions in July and August 2015 after the subjects took 
part in an unrelated experiment.  
290 One question asked how kind the contract type is. The second question was reverted and asked how 
unkind the contract type is perceived. Figure 6 displays the measure combining responses to both questions. 
Splitting the two questions generates identical results. 
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different way. This impact can be particularly pronounced in relational contracts when 
enforcement of contractual obligations is based on informal mechanisms such as reciprocity 
or trust.  
This study reveals that the contract type has an impact on the contractual relation. 
Comparing behavior when only one type of contract is available, it was found that 
participants manage to form long-term beneficial relations under both types of contracts. 
However, open-ended contracts lead to longer interactions as compared to fixed-term 
contracts. Agents are also more reciprocating in long-term than in short relations. As a 
consequence, the less reciprocating behavior is observed when only fixed-term contracts are 
available than when open-ended contracts are the only option. Furthermore, when both 
contract types are available, fixed-term contracts turn out to be far less efficient than open-
ended contracts. They are barely used to form long-term beneficial relations. Importantly, 
agents who experienced both types of contracts provide less effort under the fixed-term than 
under the open-ended contract.  
The current results show that it is of particular importance to study not only the 
monetary incentives schemes (such as wages or bonuses) but also other elements of 
contractual terms such as contract duration in the context of relational (incomplete) 
contracts. Importantly, the impact of contractual terms on behavior in relational contracts 
should be investigated in the legal context that is given the contract types made available by 
law.  
Based on the current research it is still not clear why exactly an open-ended contract 
is found kinder and, as a consequence, leads to more efficient relations when contrasted with 
a fixed-term contract. It would be an interesting extension of this study to examine in details 
the underlying reasons for the kindness perception of both contract types.  
Furthermore, future research could consider bigger markets in which many firms and 
agents interact with each other. It is possible that the kindness of an open-ended contract 
would be reciprocated even stronger in such a setting, particularly with an excessive supply 
of labor. Also, the current simple experimental design did not allow for renegotiation before 
reentering the market. Extending the design to enable renegotiation could add to the 
conclusions on how the fixed-term contracts compared to open-ended contracts influence 
agents’ behavior.  
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F. Legal implications 
This experimental research project was inspired by a proposal of the Reflection 
Group on the Future of EU Company Law. The Reflection Group in its report from April 
2011 suggested that the Member States should be required “to grant the option to allow 
either one year or multiple year terms (e.g. not exceeding 4-6 years) and not to make 
directors and/or management of companies dismissible at will.”291 The proposed changes in 
appointment terms and dismissal protection have received relatively little attention from both 
– policymakers and corporate governance researchers.292 In contrast, compensation structure 
of corporate directors has increasingly been subject to legal interventions. For instance, the 
European Union issued the Commission Recommendation on April 30, 2009, 
complementing Recommendation 2004/913/EC and 2005/162/EC as regards the regime for 
the remuneration of directors of listed companies (2009/385/EC). The Commission 
recommended that remuneration should promote long-term sustainability of a company. To 
achieve it remuneration should be based on performance and its variable components linked 
to measurable performance criteria which can also be of non-financial nature. The German 
legislator followed the Commission’s Recommendations and issued the Gesetz zur 
Angemessenheit der Vorstandsvergütung [Appropriateness of Executive Directors 
Compensation Act] on July 31, 2009.293 The goal of this statute was to ensure that the 
remuneration structure provides appropriate incentives for executive directors to manage the 
company in a sustainable and long-term oriented way.294 The supervisory board is obliged to 
design remuneration schemes according to the new provisions, i.e. by setting a several years 
long basis for calculation of remuneration components (§87 (1) sentence 2 AktG).  
In chapter 2, I showed that regulation on appointment terms and dismissal procedures 
might also affect directors’ performance and decision making. Differently however from 
compensation structure which influences directors’ performance through its link to 
measurable performance criteria, appointment term and dismissal rules have an impact on 
informal mechanisms responsible for enforcement of relational aspects of directors’ 
                                                 
291 Antunes/Baums et al., Report of the reflection group on the future of eu company law 2011, p. 51. 
292 Generally on little attention paid to appointment and dismissal rules in the German corporate 
governance literature: Fleischer, Ag 2006, 429, p. 429. 
293 Gesetz zur Angemessenheit der Vorstandsvergütung from July 31, 2009, BGBl. I 2009 S. 2509 ff. 
294 Drucksache 16/12278 “Entwurf eines Gesetzes zur Angemessenheit der Vorstandsvergütung 
(VorstAG)” from March 17, 2009, available at: http://dip21.bundestag.de/dip21/btd/16/122/1612278.pdf. 
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behavior. These relational elements might include directors’ engagement in creation of 
corporate culture, development of good relationships with customers and suppliers or 
development of a management team. Experimental research has shown that agents are more 
willing to perform these kinds of tasks in a long-term principal-agent relationship. The 
longer the relationship is the better the agents’ performance. In contrast, absolute dismissal 
barriers have adverse effects on agents’ behavior, unless they are based on some pre-
specified criteria. According to empirical research investigating the impact of longer 
appointment term as introduced by a staggered board, the benefits of a staggered board are 
particularly pronounced for companies with high level of investment in R&D and intangible 
assets. My study contributed to the empirical evidence by demonstrating that seemingly 
equivalent (with respect to dismissal protection) regulations of the interaction length – fixed-
term renewable vs. indefinite at will appointments - might differently influence agents’ 
behavior. Importantly, this impact depends on whether only one or both options are 
available.  
The empirical evidence has two important implications for the policymaker. First, 
regulations of appointment term and dismissal rules might serve not only as a tool to define 
weak (short appointments, dismissal at will) or strong (long appointment, dismissal for good 
cause) position of a director in a company. The empirical research suggests that these 
provisions might play a major role in increasing the efficiency of the relationship between 
shareholders and directors. Specifically, an executive director who expects to manage a 
company for a longer tenure might perform better than the one who expects to stay only for a 
short period. At the same time, a director who is strongly protected from removal might not 
perform as good as a director who might be dismissed at-will or for a well-specified reason. 
Therefore, when considering improvement of incentives for corporate directors, the 
legislator should also take into account the potential and shortcomings of existing rules on 
appointment term and dismissal. In particular, it should be considered whether appointment 
term rules foster long-term relation between directors and a company but at the same time 
allow for exit from the relationship.  
Second, it is not only the specific limit on appointment term or removal but the menu 
of options made available by the legislator which matter for directors’ behavior. The 
Reflection Group suggested that the Member States should allow public companies to 
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choose between one-year and multiple year terms as well as to limit dismissal at will.295 
Offering to a director a one-year appointment with dismissal protection and an option for re-
election might seem very similar to multiple-year appointment with dismissal at-will. 
However, my experimental research suggests that the impact of these two options on 
directors’ performance might differ depending on whether both of them are available. A 
director might perform better if a company offers an appointment term and dismissal 
protection which is perceived kinder. A legal reform as suggested by the Reflection Group is 
likely to change the kindness perception of appointment term and removal provisions offered 
to a director. For instance, dismissal at-will might be viewed less attractive for a director if 
dismissal for good cause is another available option. The Reflection Group’s argumentation 
that there is no ‘one-size-fits-all’ solution and companies should be able to choose between 
various regulations of appointment term and dismissal rules296 seems plausible. 
Nevertheless, it should also be considered how certain rules might change their impact 
depending on which options will be introduced. On a more general level the results of my 
research and other empirical studies suggest that it is not only compensation schemes but 
also the length of appointment and dismissal rules which might potentially influence 
decision-making of executive directors.   
 
 
 
 
                                                 
295 Antunes/Baums et al., Report of the reflection group on the future of eu company law 2011, p. 51. 
296 Antunes/Baums et al., Report of the reflection group on the future of eu company law 2011, p. 51. 
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Appendix 1 
Besides the three main treatments – FixedTerm, OpenEnd and Mixed – an additional 
FixedTermDefault treatment was conducted as a control treatment. It included features of 
both – FixedTerm and OpenEnd treatment. The important elements of the experimental 
design were as described in section B. Contracts were concluded for only one period as in 
the FixedTerm treatment. However, differently from the FixedTerm treatment and similarly 
to the OpenEnd treatment, at the end of each period a principal and an agent could decide 
whether they want to continue to the next period or renew the current contract. If they both 
chose to renew, the next period started with the effort stage – wage and desired effort 
remained the same as in the contract concluded in the preceding period. If either a principal 
or an agent decided to continue to the next period, the next period started with the offers’ 
stage. Principals and agents were not bound by the contract from the preceding period. They 
could enter into a new contract with a different contractual partner. The  FixedTermDefault 
treatment similarly to the FixedTerm treatment set the duration of a contract as fixed. 
However, it allowed for renewing the contract before entering the offer stage. It was 
conducted to focus on a mere change of a default provision on contractual duration. Due to 
Figure 9: Mean effort and wage over time with FixedTermDefault treatment 
Note: The figure on the left-hand side displays group means of effort over all periods of the 
experiment in the FixedTerm, OpendEnd  and FixedTermDefault treatments. The figure on the 
right-hand side displays group means of wages over all periods of the experiment in the 
FixedTerm, OpenEnd and FixedTermDefault treatments.  
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the contractual duration similarities between FixedTerm and FixedTermDefault treatments, 
the behavioral predictions for the two treatments are identical.  
By design, the FixedTermDefault treatment is a mixture of both – FixedTerm and 
OpenEnd treatment. The results for means of wage (38.88), effort (6.05), and desired effort 
(7.68) as well as percentage of private (30%) and renewal (46%) contracts are fairly similar 
to the results from the FixedTerm treatment with a slight tendency to lean into direction of 
the OpenEnd treatment, particularly with respect to wage levels. Comparisons of wage, 
effort and desired effort between FixedTermDefault treatment and the two other treatments 
revealed no statistically significant differences (two-sided Wilcoxon rank sum test). Figure 9 
reports means of effort and wage over the course of the experiment for all three treatments. 
There are no clear differences between the treatments with respect to time trends in effort 
choices or wages. Figure 10 shows means of effort separately for initial and renewal 
contracts in all three treatments. The results from the FixedTermDefault seem to resemble 
closely the results from the FixedTerm treatment.  
Figure 10: Mean effort by contract type (Initial and Renewal contract) 
with FixedTermDefault treatment 
Note: Means of effort provided in all periods of the experiment 
separately for Renewal and Initial Contracts in FixedTerm, 
OpenEnd and FixedTermDefault conditions 
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Table 9: Tobit regression on effort by treatment with FixedTermDefault treatment 
 (1) 
Effort 
(2) 
Effort 
(3) 
Effort 
(4) 
Effort 
(5) 
Effort 
FixedTerm -0.36 
(0.54) 
-0.36 
(0.54) 
-0.61** 
(0.30) 
-0.62** 
(0.26) 
-0.30 
(0.24) 
FixedTermDefault -0.35 
(0.58) 
-0.35 
(0.58) 
-0.35 
(0.26) 
-0.45* 
(0.24) 
-0.21 
(0.22) 
Period 
 
0.17*** 
(0.03) 
0.11*** 
(0.02) 
0.09*** 
(0.02) 
0.05*** 
(0.02) 
Last Period -3.98*** 
(0.48) 
-3.23*** 
(0.43) 
-3.07*** 
(0.44) 
-2.91*** 
(0.44) 
Wage 
 
0.17*** 
(0.01) 
0.13*** 
(0.01) 
0.12*** 
(0.01) 
Desired effort 
 
0.38*** 
(0.07) 
0.36*** 
(0.06) 
Renewal contract 
 
1.13*** 
(0.16) 
Constant 6.50*** 
(0.36) 
5.44*** 
(0.38) 
-0.71* 
(0.37) 
-1.96*** 
(0.36) 
-1.99*** 
(0.32) 
N 2125 2125 2125 2125 2125 
Clusters 72 72 72 72 72 
Notes: Three (***), two (**), and one (*) stars indicate statistical significance at 
the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively. Standard errors, reported in 
parentheses, have been corrected for clustering at the group level 
 
Regression analyses were conducted to investigate possible more nuanced treatment 
differences. Table 9 reports the results of a Tobit regression on effort by treatments. As in 
previous regressions, the OpenEnd treatment is a control group. The coefficients values for 
the FixedTermDefault treatment are negative and look very similar to the FixedTerm 
treatment. Controlling for time trends (Period and Last Period) wage and desired effort, the 
coefficient for the FixedTermDefault treatment becomes weakly significant, indicating lower 
reciprocating behavior by agents in the FixedTermDefault treatment than in the OpenEnd 
treatment.  
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Table 10 reports results of a random effects regression analysis on wage by 
treatment. The key finding of both regression analyses is that the coefficients of FixedTerm 
and FixedTermDefault are never statistically different from each other.297 
Table 10: Regression on wages by treatment with FixedTermDefault treatment 
                                                 
297 Coefficients compared using a two-sided t-test.  
 (1) 
Wage 
(2) 
Wage 
(3) 
Wage 
FixedTerm 1.23 
(2.54) 
1.22 
(2.54) 
2.48 
(2.44) 
FixedTermDefault 0.07 
(2.65) 
0.07 
(2.65) 
1.07 
(2.50) 
Period 
 
0.25** 
(0.12) 
0.07 
(0.12) 
Last Period -2.56** 
(1.04) 
-1.83* 
(0.97) 
Renewal contract 
 
4.90*** 
(0.73) 
Constant 38.62*** 
(1.75) 
36.81*** 
(1.96) 
34.96*** 
(1.93) 
Observations 2125 2125 2125 
Clusters 72 72 72 
Notes: Three (***), two (**), and one (*) stars indicate 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels 
respectively. Standard errors, reported in parentheses, 
have been corrected for clustering at the group level 
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Appendix 2 
The instructions below are a translation from German for the Mixed treatment which 
combines elements of all the other treatments discussed in section A. 
General instructions for the participants 
You are about to take part in an economic experiment. In this experiment you can 
earn a significant amount of money depending on your decisions and the decisions of other 
participants, you will interact with. For this reason, it is essential to read the instructions 
carefully.  
The instructions you obtained are for your private use only. Please note that you are 
not allowed to communicate with other participants during this experiment. Should you have 
any questions, please ask us for assistance. If you do not comply with the rules, we will have 
to exclude you from the experiment and all payments. 
During the experiment, we do not speak of euros but points. Thus, your total income 
will be calculated first in points. All the points that you gain during the experiment will be 
converted into money and paid to you in cash at the end of the experiment.  
Today’s experiment includes 4 phases: 
1. Instructions: You have just received the instructions to the first part of the 
experiment (in this phase you are at the moment). 
2. The experiment: 
a) First part 
b) Second part: The instructions to the second part of the experiment will be 
presented to you on the screen as soon as the first part of the experiment is 
over. 
3. Questionnaire 
4. Payments 
Please note that decisions and payments in the first part of the experiment do not 
have any impact on decisions and payments in the second part of the experiment. 
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Instructions for the first part of the experiment: 
In the first part of the experiment the following conversion rate from points into 
euros applies: 
1 point = 4 Eurocents 
At the beginning of the first part of the experiment, you receive a lump sum of 6 
Euros (=150 points). 
In this part of the experiment all participants are divided into groups of five. Two 
different roles are randomly assigned to the participants in each group. There are two 
participants with a role “firm” and three participants with a role “worker” in each group. 
Each participant receives a randomly assigned identification number. To secure your 
anonymity the identification number you are assigned differs from the number of your 
cabin. Your role and your identification number will be displayed on the screen at the 
beginning of the experiment. The groups, roles as well as the identification numbers do not 
change during this whole part of the experiment. During the entire first part of the 
experiment, you will interact with the same participants in your group. 
The first part of the experiments lasts 15 rounds. Below you will find a detailed 
description of a round. 
Each round includes three stages: 
– Stage 1 “Recruitment” 
– Stage 2 “Effort choice” 
– Stage 3 “Income” 
All three stages are presented below. 
Stage 1 “Recruitment” 
In the recruitment stage, each firm may hire only one worker. There are two types 
of contracts, contract A and contract B. With contract type A an employment 
agreement is concluded for one period. In contract type B an employment agreement 
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lasts for the duration of the remaining periods. However, a contract B might be 
terminated in every period. An employment offer includes a wage, a desired effort level as 
well as the type of the contract, either A or B. The following restrictions apply: 
1. The wage offer may not be below 1 and higher than 100 points. 
1 ≤ wage offer ≤ 100 
2. The desired effort level may not be below 1 and higher than 10: 
1 ≤ desired effort level ≤ 100 
The wage offer is binding. It means that the worker receives the wage accepted, and 
the firm pays the wage at the end of each round. 
The desired effort level stated in the offer is not binding. The worker decides freely 
about the level of his effort choice in stage 2.  
In the recruitment stage, firms make wage offers and workers decide whether to 
accept an offer. The description of this process follows.  
 
1. The firm makes an offer. 
Two firms can make two types of offers to three workers in their group. 
a) Private offers:  Private offer is made only to one worker, who decides 
whether to accept it. The two other workers and the other firm are not 
informed about this offer. 
b) Public offers:  Public offer is made to all workers in a group, who can decide 
whether to accept it. The worker, who as first accepts it, concludes an 
employment agreement with the firm. The other firm is not informed about 
this offer. 
To make a private offer the firm indicates the following information: 
– wage 
– desired effort level 
– contract type (either A or B) 
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– identification number of the worker, the offer is addressed to 
Private offers will be displayed on the right side of the screen under the title “private offers”. 
To make a public offer the firm indicates the following information: 
– wage 
– desired effort level 
– contract type (either A or B) 
Public offers will be displayed on the left side of the screen under the title “public offers”. 
2. The worker accepts an offer  
Below is a description of how to accept private and public offers. 
1. Private offers: To accept a private offer the worker has to highlight the 
private offer displayed on the screen and click on “Accept” to confirm. 
2. Public offers: Each worker can accept public offers. To accept an offer one 
has to highlight the offer displayed on the screen and click on “Accept” to 
confirm. 
3. Further rules 
Each firm can submit an unlimited number of private and public offers. Firms and 
workers may enter only into one employment agreement in each period. That means that as 
soon as the firm hires the worker all other offers of this firm are deleted and the other 
workers cannot accept any further offers of this firm. 
Firms are not obliged to submit offers and workers are not required to accept offers. 
The recruitment stage lasts 150 seconds. No further offers may be sent and no further 
offers may be accepted after this time. The stage is also over as soon as all the firms in a 
group hire a worker. In this case, the recruitment stage may last less than 150 seconds. 
Stage 2 “Effort choice” 
Only workers who accepted an offer participate in this stage. 
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Each worker, who accepted an offer, makes an effort choice. An effort choice must 
fulfill the following criteria: 
An effort choice may not be below 1 and higher than 10: 
 
1 ≤ effort choice ≤ 100 
The worker pays with points for his effort choice. The relation between effort choice 
and effort cost will be presented in stage 3 “Income” 
Stage 3 “Income” 
Income of firms and workers, who concluded an employment agreement as well as 
firms and workers, who did not enter into an employment agreement, is presented below. 
1. Income of firms and workers who concluded an employment agreement 
Income of a worker depends on a wage accepted as well as on his effort choice. It is 
calculated in the following way: 
Worker’s income: Wage – costs of effort (dependent on the effort choice) 
The costs of effort increase with the effort choice. The costs are displayed in a table 
below: 
Effort choice 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Effort costs  
(in points) 
0 1 2 4 6 8 10 12 15 18 
 
Worker’s income is higher, 
– the higher is the wage accepted 
– the lower is the effort choice and effort costs thereof. 
Income of a firm depends on the wage accepted by the worker as well as on his 
effort choice. It is calculated in the following way: 
Firm’s income: 10 x effort choice - wage 
Firm’s income is higher, 
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– the higher is the worker’s effort choice, 
– the lower is the accepted wage. 
Income of all workers and firms, who entered into an employment agreement, is 
calculated according to the rules described above. Each firm can calculate the income of a 
hired worker, and each worker can calculate the income of a hiring firm. 
2. Income of firms and  workers who did not conclude any employment 
agreement 
Income of a worker is 5 points in a round without any agreement. Income of a firm is 
0 point in a round without any agreement. 
3. Further rules 
Please note that firms as well as workers can make losses. The losses will be paid 
from the initial lump sum (150 points) or income earned in previous rounds. 
As soon as the income in a current period is displayed on a screen, firms and 
workers, who concluded a contract B, can decide whether they want to continue the current 
agreement or terminate it.  
 If you want to continue the current agreement, please click on “Continue” 
 If you want to terminate the current agreement, please click on “Terminate”. 
Only if both parties, the worker and the firm, click on “Continue”, the agreement will 
be continued. In this case, the firm and the worker will skip the stage 1 “Recruitment” in the 
next period and start directly with stage 2 “Effort choice”. The contract and its conditions 
(wage and desired effort level) will remain the same in the next period.  
If at least one of the parties, the worker or the firm, clicks on “Terminate”, the next 
period starts with the stage 1 “Recruitment”. Firms and workers are not bound and can enter 
into a new agreement.  
As soon as the income in the current period is displayed on a screen, firms and 
workers, who concluded an agreement for the duration of one period, can click on 
“Continue” to start the next period. 
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Outline of a round 
 
 
 
 
 
      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Stage 1: 
Recruitment“ 
Stage 2: 
„Effort choice“ 
Stage 3: 
„Income” 
Firms send employment offers 
Workers decide whether to accept an offer 
Employment agreement 
concluded 
No employment 
agreement concluded 
The hired worker makes an 
effort choice 
--------------- 
Income dependent on 
wage and effort choice 
Firm’s income: 0 
Worker’s income: 5 
Continue 
Stage 1 
Renew 
Stage 2 
The next round starts with: 
Stage 1 
---------------- 
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Chapter 4 
Mandatory gender quotas and company 
performance 
A. Introduction 
Achieving gender equality in the workplace has been an important policy goal in the 
European countries for many years. Policymakers recognized that the gender inequalities in 
employment hinder full exploitation of the human resources available on the European labor 
market.298 The underuse of available workforce, in turn, might contribute to rendering the 
European Union incapable of establishing its status as the world leading economy.299 
Furthermore, promoting gender equality has been acknowledged as one of the main 
objectives of the EU.300 
As much as the need of establishing gender equality is approved and broadly 
recognized, the legislation implemented to achieve this goal is often controversial. 
Particularly, measures which actively support the underrepresented groups have been lively 
discussed. Such measures, called positive actions,301 might take a form of vocational 
training, improved child care or preferential treatment in selection procedures.302 From this 
broad range of actions, the particularly intrusive one is a mandatory quota rule which 
                                                 
298 Communication from the Commission ‘Europe 2020: A Strategy for Smart, Sustainable and 
Inclusive Growth’, COM(2010)2020. 
299 Communication from the Commission ‘Strategy for equality between women and men 2010-2015’, 
COM(2010) 491. 
300 Article 8 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU).  
301 For a definition of positive action see: Commission, International perspectives on positive action 
measures. A comparative analysis in the european union, canada, the united states and south africa 2009. 
302 Commission, Positive action measures to ensure full equality in practice between men and women, 
including company boards 2011. 
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imposes an obligation of achieving a fixed share of underrepresented group members in a 
target group within a specified period. 
Disappointed by a slow growth of female participation in economic decision-making, 
the European Commission in 2012 proposed a Directive that would establish mandatory 
quotas for women on corporate boards.303 The German legislator did not wait until the 
Directive goes through the legislative procedure. On March 6, 2015, the German Parliament 
(Bundestag) passed a law that introduced a minimum requirement of 30% female 
participation on boards of listed and co-determined companies.304 Both legal acts - the 
Directive and the Equal Participation Act - have evoked intense political and legal debate. 
In the following chapter, I will take a closer look at the Impact Assessment (IA)305 
issued by the European Commission as an accompanying document to the Directive as well 
as at the legislative reasons (Gesetzesbegründung) provided for the German statue. In 
particular, I will challenge the assumptions of the European Commission and the German 
government about the positive influence of mandatory quotas on company performance and 
corporate governance. The Commission states that increased gender diversity in a boardroom 
improves corporate governance and company performance - the more gender diverse the   
board is the better the board’s performance. Similar reasoning can be found in the 
government draft (Regierungsentwurf)306 of the Equal Participation Act. The German 
government makes a “business case” for mandatory quotas by claiming that more gender 
diverse boards will positively influence German companies and strengthen their 
competitiveness.307 Some scholars have already pointed out that the legislators 
                                                 
303 European Commission, Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on 
improving the gender balance among non-executive directors of companies listed on stock exchanges and 
related measures, Com (2012) 614 final, available at: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:52012PC0614 [hereinafter: the Directive]. 
304 Gesetz für die gleichberechtigte Teilhabe von Frauen und Männern an Führungspositionen in der 
Privatwirtschaft und im öffentlichen Dienst from April 24, 2015, BGBl. I S. 642 [hereinafter: the Equal 
Participation Act]. 
305 European Commission, Impact assessment on costs and benefits of improving the gender balance 
in the boards of companies listed on stock exchanges, SWD(2012) 348, available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/gender-equality/files/womenonboards/impact_assesment_quotas_en.pdf. 
[hereinafter: Impact Assessment or IA]. 
306 Drucksache 18/3784 “Gesetzentwurf der Bundesregierung. Entwurf eines Gesetzes für die 
gleichberechtigte Teilhabe von Frauen und Männer an Führungspositionen in der Privatwirtschaft und im 
öffentlichen Dienst” from January 20, 2015, available at: 
http://dipbt.bundestag.de/dip21/btd/18/037/1803784.pdf [hereinafter, Regierungsentwurf]. 
307 Regierungsentwurf, p.62. 
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misinterpreted the existing scientific evidence by assuming that an increase in the number of 
women on a corporate board will have a causal influence on company performance.308 
Rather than discussing the effect of gender diversity on company performance I will argue 
that it is important to consider the way in which gender diversity is achieved. In particular, it 
is crucial to evaluate how the undertaken measure itself influences company performance 
and corporate governance.309 This evaluation is essential for assessing the compliance of the 
Directive and the Equal Participation Act with the EU Law and the German Basic Law 
(Grundgesetz). I will discuss selected aspects of the legal debate for which the empirical 
research might provide particularly fruitful insights. Next, I will describe two types of 
studies investigating the impact of mandatory quotas on company and board performance. 
First, I will introduce the research on Norwegian companies in a period following the 
implementation of mandatory quotas. I will present experimental studies and discuss their 
relevance for assessing the impact of mandatory quota on board performance. In the next 
chapter,, I will discuss my experimental research and review implications of the empirical 
findings for the legal assessment of the Directive and the Equal Participation Act. 
B. Legislative Measures 
I.  The Directive: state-of-the-art 
On November 14, 2012, the European Commission proposed a Directive on 
improving the gender balance among non-executive directors of companies listed on stock 
exchanges. The Directive provides that all listed companies shall increase the proportion of 
the under-represented sex310 among non-executive directors to 40% by 2020 (Article 4(1)). 
Moreover, the appointment rules shall be made transparent and clear. In the selection 
procedure candidates of the under-represented sex shall be preferred unless they are not 
equally qualified as candidates of the opposite sex (Article 4(3)). In case the preferential rule 
is not followed an unsuccessful candidate may challenge the selection procedure. The 
company shall prove that a better-qualified candidate was chosen (Article 4 (5)). 
Furthermore, companies not able to reach the objective of 40% must provide an appropriate 
                                                 
308 Smith, Quota regulations of gender composition on boards of directors 2014, p.43; Szydło, Gender 
equality on the boards of EU companies: Between economic efficiency, fundamental rights and democratic 
legitimisation of economic governance 2015, p.103. 
309 Similar argument raised already in: Koch, ZHR 2011, 827, p.848. 
310 The Commission uses the term ‘sex’ in the text of the Directive and the term ‘gender’ in the Impact 
Assessment. 
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explanation for the noncompliance as well as demonstrate measures undertaken to achieve 
the objectives in the future (Article 5(3)). Otherwise, sanctions shall apply (Article 6). 
Almost a year after issuing the Directive, the European Parliament adopted a position 
at first reading and communicated it in a resolution from November 20, 2013.311 In the 
resolution, the Parliament expressed its general approval for the Directive with only minor 
amendments. The Parliament stressed the importance of assuring that the appointments are 
made from a gender-balanced selection pool.312 Moreover, it proposed additional forms of 
sanctions for noncomplying companies.313 
In December 2014 and in June 2015 the Directive was discussed by the Council of 
the European Union. The Council did not reach a conclusion whether to approve the 
Directive in the current form.314 To facilitate a compromise between representatives of all 
Member States, the Council suggested introducing a “flexibility clause” as well as extending 
implementation deadlines.315 The “flexibility clause” would allow the Member States to 
choose their measure in order to achieve the goals stated in the Directive.316 The Member 
States would need to ensure that those measures are equally effective and that sufficient 
progress is achieved.317 
II. The Equal Participation Act 
On March 6, 2015, the German Parliament adopted the law for the equal participation 
of men and women in the leadership positions in the private and public sector. The Equal 
Participation Act changed the content of §96 (2) and (3) German Stock Corporation Act 
(Aktiengesetz)318 on the appointment of the supervisory board (Article 3 Section 4b Equal 
                                                 
311 European Parliament legislative resolution of 20 November 2013 on the proposal for a directive of 
the European Parliament and of the Council on improving the gender balance among non-executive directors of 
companies listed on stock exchanges and related measures,  2012/0299(COD), available at: 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//NONSGML+REPORT+A7-2013-
0340+0+DOC+PDF+V0//EN. 
312 European Parliament legislative resolution of 20 November 2013, p.118. 
313 European Parliament legislative resolution of 20 November 2013, p.47. 
314 Press release; Outcome of the Council Meeting on December  11, 2014; 16803/1/14 REV1, 
available at: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/meetings/epsco/2014/12/11/; Press release: Outcome of the 
Council Meeting on June 18 and 19, 2015; 10088/15, available at: 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/meetings/epsco/2015/06/18 
315 Press release from December 11, 2014, p.9. 
316 Press release from December 11, 2014, p.9. 
317 Press release from December 11, 2014, p.9. 
318 Aktiengesetz from September 6, 1965, BGBl. I S. 1089. 
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Participation Act). As of 2016, the German companies listed on stock exchanges as well as 
companies subject to employees co-determination requirements will have to make sure that 
their supervisory board consists of at least 30 % men and 30% women. Any appointment of 
a board member which violates these conditions is void. In this case, the position remains 
vacant (leere Stühle). Article 3 Section 4b Equal Participation Act includes detailed 
procedural regulations for boards with employees’ representation. The Equal Participation 
Act does not specify any requirements regarding equal qualifications of male and female 
candidates as well as provisions allowing for exceptions given an individual case of a male 
candidate. It also does not allow any exemptions from the quota rule in the case of 
exceptional circumstances, i.e., lack of qualified available female candidates. 
III.  Impact Assessment, Regierungsentwurf and their critique 
The impact assessment procedure was introduced in the European legislature to 
promote good quality of the lawmaking process. The aim of an impact assessment is to 
enable the legislative decision makers to reach more informed judgments about the intended 
policy measures.319 An impact assessment shall include “evidence […] on the advantages 
and disadvantages of possible policy options”.320  
The IA on costs and benefits of improving the gender balance on the boards of 
companies listed on stock exchanges was issued in November 2012. It formulates two 
general objectives: (1) “gender equality in economic decision-making” and (2) full 
exploitation of “the existing talent pool”.321 Furthermore, the European Commission 
identified two specific objectives of the Directive: (3) reduction of “demand side” barriers 
women are confronted with when applying for leadership positions and (4) improvement of 
corporate governance and performance.322 
Having stated the objectives, the Commission proceeded with examining different 
policy options (i.e., no action, voluntary quotas, or mandatory quotas for executive and non-
executive directors) regarding their effectiveness in achieving the defined objectives. Here, I 
                                                 
319 See, for instance: Meuwese, Impact assessment in eu lawmaking 2008; Renda, Impact assessment 
in the eu: The state of the art and the art of the state 2006. 
320 European Commission, Impact Assessment Guidelines 2009, SEC(2009) 92, available at:  
http://ec.europa.eu/smart-regulation/impact/commission_guidelines/docs/iag_2009_en.pdf [hereinafter: Impact 
Assessment Guidelines 2009]. 
321 Impact Assessment, p.31. 
322 Impact Assessment, p.31. 
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will focus only on the very last objective, which is the improvement of corporate governance 
and company performance.323 First, the Commission assessed to which extent the presence 
of women on boards of directors would increase as a result of each policy option.324 Next, it 
defined which indicators should be taken into account when evaluating corporate governance 
and company performance improvement. Based on the studies investigating gender diversity 
and company performance, the Commission identified nine non-financial criteria of 
corporate governance, which have been shown to be influenced by the presence of women 
on corporate board. These criteria include accountability, risk and audit, monitoring and 
control, innovation and creativity, work environment and values, direction and leadership, 
pay policies, corporate reputation and corporate social responsibility, understanding of the 
market, and board dynamics. As an indicator of company financial performance, the 
Commission adopted return on equity which represents the ratio of a company’s net income 
to the book value of its equity.325 Finally, the Commission calculated the impact of each 
policy option assuming that the defined indicators and performance measures increase 
proportionally to the increase in female participation achieved by a given policy option.326 
Likewise, the German government claimed that the Equal Participation Act will lead 
to better corporate governance and will foster the national and international competitiveness 
of the German companies.327 More specifically, it argued that gender diversity on corporate 
boards would have a positive impact on the decision-making processes resulting in a better 
economic performance of a company.328 The government referred to a study conducted by 
the Karlsruhe Institute of Technology in 2011.329 The study revealed no general effects of 
the presence of female directors on the performance of German companies.330 However, it 
                                                 
323 There is a growing body of literature on  effects of mandatory quota rules on “demand side” 
barriers and “glass ceiling” women are confronted with in their corporate career, see, for 
instance.;Bertrand/Black et al., Breaking the glass ceiling? The effect of board quotas on female labor market 
outcomes in norway 2014. 
324 The details on the evaluation method described in this paragraph can be found in: European 
Commission, Annex 8. Impact assessment on costs and benefits of improving the gender balance in the boards 
of companies listed on stock exchanges, SWD(2012) 349, available at: 
http://www.parlament.gv.at/PAKT/EU/XXIV/EU/09/79/EU_97957/imfname_10383186.pdf, pp.73-112. 
325 Berk/DeMarzo, Corporate finance 2011, p.32. 
326 Impact Assessment, pp.41-42 
327 Regierungsentwurf, p.62. 
328 Regierungsentwurf, p.50. 
329 Summary of the results: Lindstädt/Wolff/Fehre, Frauen in Führungspositionen: Auswirkungen auf 
den Unternehmenserfolg 2011, pp. 4-5. 
330 Lindstädt/Wolff/Fehre, Frauen in Führungspositionen: Auswirkungen auf den Unternehmenserfolg 
2011, p.5.  
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showed a positive impact of women directors on corporate performance of two types of 
companies: (1) companies with a high share of female workers, (2) companies offering 
products and services directly to consumers.331 For the German government, this was 
sufficient evidence to conclude that increasing women's participation on corporate boards 
will result in a higher competitiveness of German companies.332 Similarly to the EU 
Commission the German government, instead of evaluating the direct impact of the 
introduced measure, focused on the influence of gender diversity on corporate performance.   
I claim that the Commission, as well as the German government, falsely assumed that 
gender diversity positively influences corporate governance and financial performance 
irrespective of the way it has been achieved. To properly evaluate the impact of a given 
policy measure, it is crucial to investigate how the policy itself will affect the company 
performance. In particular, a specific policy measure is likely to affect other than gender 
diversity aspects of board functioning relevant for firm performance. I will support my claim 
with empirical findings described in section D of this chapter as well as in chapter 5.  
C. Legal questions  
Both laws on mandatory quota rules – the Directive as well as the Equal Participation 
Act - are subject to a heated debate on their compatibility with the EU law and the German 
Basic Law (Grundgesetz).333 Proper evaluation of the impact of mandatory quotas on 
corporate governance and performance is relevant for some of the aspects touched upon in 
the legal discussion. The empirical findings on how the mandatory quotas affect corporate 
governance and company performance might be crucial for assessing both – the quality as 
well as conclusions of the evaluation conducted by the legislator. Here I will elaborate on 
these selected issues in light of the legal discourse.  
                                                 
331 Lindstädt/Wolff/Fehre, Frauen in Führungspositionen: Auswirkungen auf den Unternehmenserfolg 
2011, p.5. 
332 Regierungsentwurf, p. 50. 
333 Before the Equal Participation Act was passed, mandatory gender quotas had already been 
discussed by numerous German legal scholars: Papier/Heidebach, ZGR 2011, 305; Langenbucher, JZ 2011, 
1038; Bachmann, ZIP 2011, 1131; Habersack/Kersten, BB 2014, 2819; Grünberger, RW 2012, 1. 
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I. Challenges of the Directive 
1. Compliance with Impact Assessment Guidelines 2009 
The initial idea of impact assessments was to provide legislative decision-makers 
with high-quality advice. According to the Impact Assessment Guidelines 2009, the 
assessment should not be limited to the “direct effects” of a given policy option, but should 
also take into account the potential side or crowding out effects.334 The evidence included 
should be “transparent, comprehensive and balanced”.335 Such considerations are missing in 
the IA of mandatory quotas for women on boards. This view finds support in the opinion of 
the Impact Assessment Board. 
In 2005, the European Commission launched the Impact Assessment Board (IAB) to 
guarantee high standards of analyzes presented in impact assessments. The Impact 
Assessment at hand was substantially criticized by the Impact Assessment Board. In its first 
opinion to the draft version of the IA from June 20, 2012, the Impact Assessment Board 
raised, among other objections, that the relation between higher participation of women on 
corporate boards and company performance should be presented and treated more 
cautiously.336 In particular, the evidence on the potential positive impacts should be 
presented “more transparently and in a more balanced manner.”337 The second opinion of the 
IAB to the second draft version from August 10, 2012, although not as critical as the first 
one, still questioned the evidence presented.338 More specifically, it was pointed out that “the 
robustness of the income estimates [impacts on company performance] presented should be 
further reviewed and qualified and presented with the necessary degree of caution.”339 
It seems that the final version of the Impact Assessment did not improve much after 
the second critical opinion of the IAB. Indeed, the quality of the assessment regarding 
consequences of different policy options for corporate performance is still questionable. In 
                                                 
334 Impact Assessment Guidelines 2009, p.32. 
335 Impact Assessment Guidelines 2009, p.4. 
336 Impact Assessment Board ‘DG JUST-Impact Assessment on costs and benefits of improving the 
gender balance in the boards of companies and stock exchanges (draft version of 20 June 2012).’, available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/smart-regulation/impact/ia_carried_out/cia_2012_en.htm, p.1. 
337 Impact Assessment Board ‘DG JUST-Impact Assessment’ from 20 June 2012, p.2. 
338 Impact Assessment Board ‘DG JUST-Impact Assessment on costs and benefits of improving the 
gender balance in the boards of companies and stock exchanges (resubmitted draft version of 10 August 
2012).’,available at:  
http://ec.europa.eu/smart-regulation/impact/ia_carried_out/docs/ia_2012/sec_2012_0592_en.pdf. 
339 Impact Assessment Board ‘DG JUST-Impact Assessment’ from 10 August 2012, p.2. 
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particular, the evidence is presented in a selective manner and thus cannot be qualified as 
“transparent, comprehensive and balanced.” Furthermore, all evaluations of the impact on 
company performance and corporate governance are based on the assumption that gender 
diversity has positive influence irrespective of the policy measure. I claim that the 
evaluations should rather focus on empirical research investigating the impact of mandatory 
quotas (a measure finally suggested by the policymaker) rather than gender diversity on firm 
performance. 
2. Procedural challenge 
The drawbacks of the Impact Assessment might also call into question the legality of 
the Directive itself. One of the bases expressed in the article 263(2) of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) for questioning the legality of the EU acts is 
“infringement of an essential procedural requirement.” Potential procedural infringement 
rests on the assumption that the European Court of Justice (ECJ) would recognize binding 
effect of self-imposed rules such as Impact Assessment Guidelines. In this case, the 
Directive based on a poorly performed IA could be potentially deemed inconsistent with 
procedural requirements.340 It has to be mentioned however that, despite the EU 
Commission’s efforts to strengthen the meaning of the “Better Regulation” program, the ECJ 
has been so far rather reluctant to recognize a binding and judicially enforceable character of 
Impact Assessment Guidelines.341 
3. Substantive challenge  
Given that shareholders’ and companies’ interests are at stake when complying with 
mandatory quotas for corporate boards, the legality of the Directive might be questioned 
concerning its compliance with the proportionality principle. According to Article 263(2) 
TFEU, the legality of an EU act might be revised on the grounds of “infringement of the 
Treaties or of any rule of law relating to their application.” The principle of proportionality is 
one such rule and states that any policy measure needs to be suitable and necessary to 
                                                 
340 Alemanno, The better regulation initiative at the judicial gate: A trojan horse within the 
commission's walls or the way forward? 2009; Alemanno, A meeting of minds on impact assessment 2011. 
341 Rose-Ackerman/Egidy/Fowkes, Due process of lawmaking: The United States, South Africa, 
Germany, and the European Union 2015, p.220. 
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achieve its objectives.342 It is as yet unclear whether the proportionality principle applied in 
the EU law also entails the third element – proportionality stricto sensu.343 This component 
of the proportionality principle includes assessment of burdens imposed on individual 
interests and their proportionality to the objectives pursued by a policy measure.344 In 
principle, the European courts would examine the legal act in light of the proportionality 
stricto sensu given that this issue was explicitly raised by the challenging party.345   
The policymaker defines the improvement of corporate governance and company 
performance as one objective of the Directive. For assessing the proportionality of 
mandatory quotas, it is important to identify whether this measure is indeed suitable and 
necessary to achieve the defined goal. Furthermore, the introduction of mandatory quotas 
might potentially lead to adverse effects on the functioning of companies. In this case, the 
proportionality test would also include weighing the competing interests – of companies on 
the one hand and of achieving gender equality in practice on the other hand. The Directive 
could potentially be challenged for imposing an excessive burden disproportionate to the 
desired objectives. 
The ECJ has usually been reluctant to intervene into legislation within the EU 
competence in economic or social policy matters. It adopted the ‘manifestly inappropriate’ 
test for evaluating compliance of such measures with the proportionality principle. Instead of 
going into the substance of the case, the ECJ focuses only on the EU legislators’ assessment 
of the consequences of the challenged act.346 If the evaluation is not manifestly incorrect 
given the available information, the ECJ respects the broad discretion of the EU legislators 
and accepts the final conclusions of the assessment.347 Nevertheless, despite their extensive 
discretion, European institutions should be able to show before the Court that while 
exercising the discretion all “relevant factors and circumstances” 348 were taken into account. 
In a recent judgment in Vodafone case the ECJ recognized that “even though it has a broad 
                                                 
342 The scope of the principle was developed by the jurisdiction of the Union courts: C-11/70 
Internationale Handelsgesellschaft v Einfuhr- und Vorratsstelle Getreide [1970]; C-331/88 Fedesa and Others 
[1991]. In addition, it is entailed in the Article 5 of the Protocol (No 2) on the Application of the Principles of 
Subsidiarity and Proportionality. 
343 Craig, EU administrative law 2012, p.591-592. 
344 Craig, EU administrative law 2012, p.591-592. 
345 Craig, EU administrative law 2012, p.592. 
346 Tridimas, The general principles of EU law 2007, p.143-144. 
347  Ibid., p. 144. 
348  Case C-310/04  Spain v Council [2006] ECR I-7318. 
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discretion, the Community legislature must base its choice on objective criteria.”349 If the 
Community does not take into account all relevant information, the Court is not able to 
ascertain that the proportionality principle has not been violated.350 In such cases, the Court 
might conclude that the principle was infringed.351  
Finally, the Directive could be challenged based on infringement of the rights 
recognized in the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights: freedom to conduct business (Article 
16) and the right to property (Article 17). The EU courts had already acknowledged property 
right352 and freedom to conduct business353 as a fundamental EU right before the EU Charter 
of Fundamental Rights was incorporated into the European legal system. Nevertheless, the 
proportionality test regarding restrictions imposed by the EU policy measures on property 
rights and freedom to conduct business had been performed in a rather terse manner.354 An 
EU legal act will not be struck down unless it constitutes “a disproportionate and intolerable 
interference, impairing the very substance of the rights guaranteed”.355 However, since the 
EU Charter of Fundamental Rights became legally binding, the new developments have been 
observed in the EU case law.356 It is still too early to make any speculations on whether the 
EU Courts would be willing to engage in a more comprehensive review of the Directive 
regarding limitations imposed by mandatory quotas on the fundamental rights.  
II. Challenges of  the Equal Participation Act 
The Equal Participation Act could potentially be challenged on substantive and 
procedural grounds. The German Federal Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht) is 
willing to review procedural matters related to a legal act if it poses a potential threat to the 
constitutionally protected rights.357 Limitations imposed on the fundamental rights of 
shareholders and companies could constitute a basis for challenging the Equal Participation 
                                                 
349  Case C-58/08 Vodafone and Others [2010] ECR I-5026. 
350  C-310/04 - Spain v Council. 
351  C-310/04 - Spain v Council. 
352  Case C-491/01 British American Tobacco [2002] ECR I-11550. 
353  Case C-184/02 and C-223/02 Spain and Finland v. European Parliament and Council [2004] ECR 
I-7829. 
354 See: Case C-491/01 British American Tobacco; Case C-184/02 and C-223/02 Spain and Finland v. 
European Parliament and Council. 
355  Case C-491/01 British American Tobacco; Case C-184/02 and C-223/02 Spain and Finland v. 
European Parliament and Council. 
356 Case C-236/09 Test-Achats v Council of Ministers [2011] ECR I-801 
357  Rose-Ackerman/Egidy/Fowkes, Due process of lawmaking 2015, p.174. 
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Act. Specifically, the Equal Participation Act might violate Article 14 (1) Basic Law 
(property rights) of shareholders and a company (Article 19 (3) Basic Law),358 freedom of 
association (Article 9(1) Basic Law) as well as occupational freedom (Article 12(1) Basic 
Law).359 
1. The Co-determination Act 
In contrast to the ECJ, the Constitutional Court has been already confronted with a 
legislative intervention into the composition of corporate boards360 introduced with the Co-
determination Act (Mitbestimmungsgesetz – MitbestG).361 Although the Court finally 
deemed the Co-determination Act compliant with the Basic Law, the reasons stated in the 
judgment might be valuable for the assessment of the Equal Participation Act.  
The Co-determination Act was issued in 1976 and required companies of specific 
legal forms with more than 2000 employees to have half of the supervisory board composed 
of employees’ representatives. The goal of the Co-determination Act was different from the 
one of the Equal Participation Law. Its objective was to guarantee employees’ participation 
in a decision-making process of a company. Nevertheless, the actual implications of co-
determination rules for shareholders’ and companies’ rights were similar to mandatory 
quotas - they restricted shareholders’ impact on a composition of the supervisory board and 
interfered with an internal organization of a company.   
2.  Review of procedural issues  
In its judgment on the Co-determination Act, the Constitutional Court took a stand on 
the procedural requirements for generating legislators’ predictions regarding the impact of 
the introduced regulation on constitutionally protected rights.362 More precisely, the 
Constitutional Court defined the conditions for a plausible impact assessment given a high 
                                                 
358 According to Article 19(3) Basic Law fundamental rights are in principle (depending on the 
character of the fundamental right) granted also to juridical persons.  
359 For a discussion see: Papier/Heidebach, ZGR 2011, 305; Bachmann, ZIP 2011, 1131; 
Langenbucher, JZ 2011, 1038; Spindler/Brandt, NZG 2011, 401; Maunz/Dürig/Langenfeld, Grundgesetz-
Kommentar, Article 3 2015, sec.104-118.  
360 BVerfGE, 50, 290. 
361  Gesetz über die Mitbestimmung der Arbeitnehmer (MitbestG) from Mai 4, 1976 BGBl. I S. 1153. 
362 Besides the Co-determination Decision there have been numerous other cases in which the 
Constitutional Court imposed specific requirements on legislative procedures for evaluating consequences of 
the proposed legislation affecting constitutional rights, e.g.: BVerfGE 39, 210; BVerfGE 57, 139; BVerfGE 88, 
203; BVerfGE 94, 115. See also the discussion in: Rose-Ackerman/Egidy/Fowkes, Due process of lawmaking 
2015; Nolte, Der Staat 2013, 245. 
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uncertainty of possible consequences. According to the Court, the legislator should base the 
assessment on a proper evaluation of all existing evidence.363 The available sources of 
information should be carefully analyzed to enable the most accurate assessment of any 
potential effects of a regulation and its conformity with the Basic Law.364 The Constitutional 
Court suggested that the legislator could learn from the experience made with similar 
legislation in Germany or other countries.365 If the evaluation procedure fulfills the 
requirements defined by the Court, it is within legislator’s “margin of discretion” 
(Einschätzungsprärogative) to make a final decision on issuing a certain legal act.366 In such 
a case the Constitutional Court refrains from reviewing legislator’s conclusions reached in 
the evaluation process. Instead, the Constitutional Court, based on the legislator’s 
assessment, reviews the constitutionality of the legal act in question. 
Analogously to the Co-determination Act, there is a high uncertainty regarding the 
consequences of the Equal Participation Act for corporate governance and company 
performance. The corporate environment is very complex, and the tools to investigate 
internal decision-making processes of corporate boards are limited. Furthermore, the 
attitudes and reactions towards positive action measures depend on how they are 
implemented. Nevertheless, the uncertainty does not justify flaws in the procedure of 
establishing a factual basis for evaluating the consequences of the Act. As described in 
section B the German government defined the improvement of corporate performance and 
competitiveness of German companies as a goal of the introduced measure. This goal was 
defined based on the assumption that gender diversity on corporate boards will positively 
influence company performance. Below I present empirical studies which undermine this 
assumption.  
3. Review of substantive issues 
The Co-determination Decision provides equally useful guidelines for a substantive 
review of the Equal Participation Act. As mentioned above mandatory quotas for corporate 
boards might potentially violate Article 14(1), 9(1) and 12(1) Basic Law.  
                                                 
363 BVerfGE 50, 290, p.334. 
364 BVerfGE 50, 290, p.334. 
365 BVerfGE 50, 290, p.334. 
366 BverfGE 50, 290, p.333. 
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Whether mandatory quotas indeed impose an unconstitutional restriction on property 
rights of shareholders and companies (Article 14(1) and Article 19(1) Basic Law) depends 
on the content and legal boundaries of a property right as well as on proportionality of the 
inflicted limitations. Property rights of shareholders have two dimensions.367 On the one 
hand, share ownership entitles shareholders to exercise their rights as members of a company 
(mitgliedschaftsrechtliches Element).368 On the other hand, it gives them the right to 
participate in company profits (vermögensrechtliches Element).369 Mandatory quotas do 
restrict shareholders’ rights resulting from their membership in a company as they limit 
shareholders discretion regarding the appointment of supervisory board members. Moreover, 
the defined share of male and female directors in the corporate board has to be achieved even 
if there are not enough qualified candidates of the underrepresented gender available. 
According to some scholars limitations imposed by mandatory quotas should be evaluated 
together with limitations introduced by the Co-determination Act.370 The actual constraints 
of shareholders' appointment rights resulting jointly from both legal provisions could be 
assessed as too excessive371 despite the Court's lenient approach towards restrictions 
imposed on the rights of shareholders in public companies.372 Furthermore, an evaluation of 
how the challenged provision influences company profitability, dividend policy as well as 
the value of shares is required to conduct proportionality assessment of limitations imposed 
on shareholders' property rights within their financial dimension.373  
Property rights protect not only shareholders but also a company (a legal person) as 
an owner of the enterprise (Article 19 (3) Basic Law).374 The scope of protection includes 
                                                 
367 Maunz/Dürig/Papier, Grundgesetz-Kommentar, Article 14, 2015, sec.195. 
368 Maunz/Dürig/Papier, Grundgesetz-Kommentar, Article 14, 2015, sec.195. 
369 Maunz/Dürig/Papier, Grundgesetz-Kommentar, Article 14, 2015, sec.195. 
370 Deutscher Anwalt Verein, Stellungnahme des deutschen anwaltvereins zum referentenentwurf 
eines gesetzes für die gleichberechtigte teilhabe von frauen und männern an führungspositionen in der 
privatwirtschaft und im öffentlichen dienst 2014,p.31; Habersack, Staatliche und halbstaatliche eingriffe in die 
unternehmensführung : Gutachten e 2012,p.E37-E38, for a different view see: Grobe, AG 2015, 289, p.300; 
Wieland, NJW 2010, 2408, p.2409. 
371 The legal discussion is rather inconclusive with this respect. It has been argued that the Equal 
Participation Act impose less restrictive limitation on appointment rights than the Co-determination Act. 
Therefore, some scholars concluded that given the Co-determination Act was found constitutional so should the 
Equal Participation Act:  see i.e. Bachmann, ZIP  2011, 1131, Papier/Heidebach, AG 2011, 305. 
372 The Court justified its lenient approach by an impersonal character and broad social function of 
shareholders property rights, see also: Maunz/Dürig/Papier, 2015, sec. 195. 
373 BVerfGE 50, 290, 347. 
374 BVerfGE 50, 290, 351. 
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procedures for decision making and organization of the enterprise.375 Any legal intervention 
leading to organizational dysfunction of a company could be found unconstitutional.376 A 
dysfunction occurs if company organs are not capable of reaching a decision or if decision-
making process is disrupted by requiring more time and effort.377 Likewise, an infringement 
of Article 9(1) Basic Law and Article 12(1) Basic Law could be considered only as far as the 
challenged provisions lead to disruption in the functioning of the company and its organs.378 
The introduction of mandatory quotas in listed companies in Germany was 
accompanied by a lively legal discussion. Many corporate legal scholars criticized it heavily, 
naming it a “foreign body” in company law.379 They objected to legislators arguments trying 
to make a “business case” for mandatory quotas on corporate boards.380 A proper evaluation 
of the consequences mandatory quotas have on the functioning of a company is important for 
two reasons. If the legislator states that improving company performance is the goal of the 
Equal Participation Act, then it has to be shown that this objective can be indeed achieved 
with mandatory quotas. Second, in light of the Constitutional Court’s case law the 
assessment of mandatory quotas impact on company performance is crucial for 
constitutionality check on potential infringement of Articles 14(1), 9(1) and 12(1) Basic 
Law.  Below I discuss empirical research showing that there might be some negative side 
effects of gender quotas on company performance. These results should be taken into 
account when evaluating the constitutionality of the Equal Participation Act. 
D. Research on mandatory quotas 
Research suggests that quota rules might influence at least two other features of 
board functioning besides gender diversity. These are: 
- Board structure, i.e. quotas induce change in board size, in the number of new 
members as well as their characteristics and leadership styles; 
                                                 
375 Maunz/Dürig/Papier, Grundgesetz-Kommentar, Article 14, 2015, sec.196. 
376 Maunz/Dürig/Papier, Grundgesetz-Kommentar, Article 14, 2015, sec.196. 
377 BVerfGE 50, 290, p.352. 
378 BVerfGE 50, 290, pp.355-356. 
379 Habersack, Staatliche und halbstaatliche Eingriffe in die Unternehmensführung : Gutachten E 
2012, p.E36. 
380 Fleischer, ZGR 2012, , p.167, Koch, ZHR 2011, 827, p.844-845. 
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- Team dynamics and group decision-making processes, i.e. group cooperation 
changes due to fairness perceptions of the selection procedure. 
These features should be considered while evaluating whether corporate governance 
and companies’ financial performance will benefit from mandatory quotas. 
I. “Natural experiment” in Norway 
In 2002 the Norwegian Trade Minister warned the Norwegian companies that if they 
did not change their policy of appointing predominantly male directors, a quota rule would 
be introduced. One year later a law was passed implementing 40% quotas for women on 
boards of public companies. At first, the quota rule was voluntary. However, since the rate of 
compliance was low, in 2006 mandatory quotas entered into force. According to the binding 
quota rule, the level of 40% female participation was to be reached by 2008. The sanctions 
for non-compliance would be very severe – dissolution of a company. 
This event established a unique environment for research on the impact of quota rules 
on company performance as an exogenously imposed increase in the share of female 
directors (see Ahern and Dittmar,381 Matsa and Miller382 as examples). Both studies use 
different approaches to investigate the very same question regarding performance of 
Norwegian listed companies in the aftermath of the quota rule announcement. 
Ahern and Dittmar investigated shifts in stock prices after the announcement made 
by the Norwegian Trade Minister in 2002. Additionally, they analyzed changes in Tobin‘s 
Q383 as a measure of firm performance. As a control group, they used listed companies 
which already had one or more female directors on board before the introduction of the 
mandatory quota was announced. These companies had to make smaller adjustments to 
comply with the new law. Therefore, they were only slightly affected by the 2002 
announcement. As such, they constituted a control group for the companies which had no 
women on board in 2002 and had to make major changes to fulfill the new requirements. 
Ahern and Dittmar revealed a negative effect of the announcement of quota rules on stock 
prices. This negative effect is driven by the performance of companies with no women on 
                                                 
381 Ahern/Dittmar, The changing of the boards 2012. 
382 Matsa/Miller, A female style in corporate leadership 2013. 
383 Tobin’s Q represents a ratio of a market value of a company to the replacement costs of its total 
assets. 
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boards in 2002. Furthermore, Ahern and Dittmar observed smaller Tobin’s Q in the period 
2003-2009 in companies with no female director compared to the control group, which 
indicates a negative impact of quota rules on firm performance. Ahern and Dittmar 
concluded that it is the forced change in board composition which drives the adverse effect 
of quotas. They stressed that new female directors are younger and less experienced than the 
directors they replaced, although alternative explanations are possible. 
In contrast, Matsa and Miller focused on changes in accounting measures of affected 
public companies in 2006-2009. They also used a different approach to identifying a control 
group. They compared variation in profitability of listed companies with that of a matched 
sample of private companies which were not subject to the quota requirement. Overall, the 
profitability of listed companies in Norway decreases after the introduction of mandatory 
quotas in 2006. The decline is also observed when compared with changes in profitability of 
private companies. Matsa and Miller noticed that the decrease in profitability was mainly 
due to increased costs of employment and decrease in layoffs. They indicated that the 
leadership styles of new female directors might differ from that of previous board directors. 
Based on the studies regarding gender differences in preferences and attitudes of board 
directors384 as well as their analysis, they inferred that an increase in the share of female 
board directors influences corporate strategy. According to the authors, this effect is 
channeled by a specific corporate leadership style of women board directors. 
Although the studies on Norwegian experiences with mandatory quotas provide 
valuable insights into the understanding of potential impacts of gender quotas on corporate 
performance, the results need to be interpreted with an adequate caution. First of all, other 
studies have shown different effects of mandatory quota on firm performance. For instance, 
Nygaard reported that the impact of mandatory quota on stock prices depends on the 
information structure of the corporation.385 More specifically, the author revealed that firms 
with more outside directors on the board are negatively influenced by mandatory quotas in 
contrast to companies with insiders on the board showing a positive impact. Storvik 
conducted interviews with board members to assess the impact of the quota legislation on 
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perception and qualifications of new female directors.386 She concluded that the new female 
members are in general perceived as having the same formal qualifications as other directors 
and are not viewed as less competent. Furthermore, as Smith and Ferreira noticed, it is hard 
to draw unambiguous conclusions from the divergent effects observed. It is impossible to 
identify explicitly a driving force of the influence of mandatory quotas on company 
performance.387 The difficulty results from dissimilarities in approaches adopted in the 
studies on the Norwegian quota. The research described above focus on distinct time 
frameworks and performance indicators. Additionally, they adopt different selection criteria 
of control groups and identify different channels of quota impact. In addition to these issues, 
some concerns related to sample selection have been expressed.388 Bøhren and Staubo 
showed that many companies in Norway decided to change the organizational form to avoid 
the need of complying with quota rules.389 This evidence might be interpreted as an 
additional support for a claim that affected companies expected they might suffer costs 
resulting from compliance with mandatory quotas. To avoid these costs, companies were 
willing to change the organizational form. On the other hand, this suggests that the studies 
by Ahern and Dittmar as well as Matsa and Miller investigate a very specific sub-sample of 
all Norwegian companies as they refer only to the companies that decided to uphold the 
current organizational form. Furthermore, the data from Norway provides evidence only on 
short-term consequences. Therefore, it is as yet unknown what would be the long-term 
impact of the policy intervention introduced in Norway. 
Regardless of its shortcomings, the research presented cast doubts on the 
Commission’s and the German government’s claim that an increase in female participation 
on corporate boards achieved through mandatory quotas would directly lead to better 
corporate governance and company performance. 
II.  Experimental research on mandatory quotas 
One limitation of the field data gathered in Norway is that they do not allow 
investigating more basic mechanisms underlying the impact of quota rules on the functioning 
                                                 
386 Storvik, Women on boards 2011. 
387 Ferreira, Board diversity 2015; Smith, Quota regulations of gender composition 2014. 
388 Ferreira, Board diversity 2015. 
389 Bøhren/Staubo, Does mandatory gender balance work? Changing organizational form to avoid 
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of corporate boards. Thus, the insights from the field studies should be complemented with 
evidence from laboratory experiments. 
In this section, I describe laboratory research showing that positive action policies 
might have some negative impact on individual attitudes and values. One possible theoretical 
explanation of negative responses is that positive actions might be perceived as unfair, given 
common standards of fair procedures (importance of ‘voice’, procedural consistency, 
meritocracy rule). Furthermore, I relate to the theoretical literature on procedural fairness 
and group cooperation. This literature implies that the most unfair procedure is, the less 
group cooperation is observed. 
1. Effects of a positive action on individuals’ attitudes and values 
Social psychology research examining positive action policies have focused mainly on 
psychological consequences thereof. The impact of positive action policies on different 
aspects of evaluations and attitudes has been investigated in experimental and vignette 
studies. These studies looked at self-perception of beneficiaries,390 evaluation of 
beneficiaries’ ability by others391 or task choice following a preferential selection.392 The 
first study revealed that when selected to be a leader based on gender and provided with no 
information on their ability women rated their leadership abilities lower than when they are 
selected based on performance.393 In contrast, male participants had lower self-perception 
only if chosen based on gender and provided with negative information about own 
performance.394 In another study participants were asked to evaluate the competence of male 
or female co-workers. The results showed that if participants associated a colleague with a 
positive action policy, they perceived him or her as being less competent.395 One study also 
focused on the task choice following a selection procedure based either on performance or 
gender. In this experiment, female participants who were selected based on a preferential 
                                                 
390 Heilman/Lucas/Kaplow, Self-derogating consequences of sex-based preferential selection: The 
moderating role of initial self-confidence 1990. 
391 Heilman/Block/Lucas, Presumed incompetent 1992. 
392 Heilman/Rivero/Brett, Skirting the competence issue: Effects of sex-based preferential selection on 
task choices of women and men 1991. 
393 Heilman/Lucas/Kaplow, Self-derogating consequences 1990. 
394 Heilman/Lucas/Kaplow, Self-derogating consequences 1990. 
395 Heilman/Block/Lucas, Presumed incompetent 1992. 
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treatment subsequently chose a less demanding task than when chosen on the basis of 
performance. Selection method did not affect task choice of male participants.396 
Other studies implemented surveys to demonstrate that positive action policies do not 
necessarily result in negative responses. Taylor examined the data from the General Social 
Survey. According to the results, positive action policies did not have a negative influence 
on job attitudes and preferences of workers hired by employers applying such policy 
measures.397 Pious provided further evidence showing that people do not have negative 
attitudes towards positive action policies.398 Contrary to those findings, a survey conducted 
with female managers who believed to be hired because of their gender revealed a negative 
influence of such beliefs on their job satisfaction and commitment.399 
The more recent research investigated how the provision of additional information on 
the selection procedure might mitigate the negative impact of positive action policies on 
people’s attitudes and preferences. Experimental results demonstrated that participants 
informed that merit played a role in a preferential selection procedure tended to perceive the 
selected women as more competent. Furthermore, women’s self-perception did not suffer 
from preferential treatment if they knew that their performance was also considered in the 
selection for a leadership position.400 
Another study by Ritov and Zamir suggested that attitudes towards positive action 
policies depend on identifiability of individuals who are adversely affected by the policy 
measure.401 In the study participants were presented with different scenarios describing 
admission or selection procedures implementing positive action policies. Acceptance of 
positive action measure decreased when it was made clear in the scenario which individuals 
suffered from implementing such a procedure. 
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397 Taylor, Impact of affirmative action on beneficiary groups: Evidence from the 1990 general social 
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398 Pious, Ten myths about affirmative action 1996. 
399 Chacko, Women and equal employment opportunity: Some unintended effects 1982. 
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The findings presented above concentrated on the impact of positive action on how 
people perceive themselves as beneficiaries of that action, how others evaluate them and 
how they feel when selected based on positive action. They showed that positive action did 
influence evaluations, views, and attitudes. This impact varies depending on the information 
provided either on the procedure itself, candidates’ abilities or identifiability of individuals 
affected by a positive action policy. 
2.  Effects of a positive action on actual behavior 
a) Individual performance 
Given that people’s evaluations and preferences are affected by positive action 
policies, it is likely that they will not remain without impact on individual’s actual behavior. 
Research in social psychology has provided first insights on how people react when faced 
with a preferential procedure. In contrast to the studies presented above, this research 
measured performance or decisions in a task conducted in a laboratory environment instead 
of relying on results from questionnaires on self-reported evaluations or surveys. Nacoste 
and Hummels examined whether the behavior of decision makers in a hiring procedure is 
affected by a positive action policy.402 In this study participants made hiring and salary 
recommendations for male and female candidates. The experimenters varied the significance 
of positive action policy in a selection procedure. Whereas positive action did not have any 
effect on the hiring recommendation decisions, it did influence salary recommendations. 
Female candidates perceived as being advantaged by a positive action policy received lower 
salary recommendations than their male competitors. 
The findings on the influence of positive action policies on individual task 
performance are partially contradictory. Whereas Nacoste found no adverse impact of 
positive action on creative task performance,403 Turner and Pratkanis404 showed that female 
participants selected by gender performed worse in a creative task if they believed that it 
requires effort rather than capabilities. The opposite results were observed if women were 
selected based on their performance – they scored worse in a task if they believed that it 
rather requires capabilities than effort. The authors explained these somewhat counter-
                                                 
402 Nacoste/Hummels, Affirmative action and the behavior of decision makers 1994. 
403 Nacoste Affirmative action and self-evaluation in: Affirmative action in perspective 1989. 
404Turner/Pratkanis, Effects of preferential and meritorious selection on performance: An examination 
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intuitive results by a “self-handicapping” strategy implemented by women who were 
preferentially selected and believed that the task requires effort instead of capabilities. 
According to this strategy preferentially chosen individuals do not perform high in an effort-
requiring task because if they put in much effort and fail they cannot blame the lack of 
ability for that. In contrast, if they do not try hard and fail, they can always explain it by a 
lack of effort. Despite this vague explanation, the study delivers an important message – 
positive action policies do not have an exclusively negative impact on task performance, but 
rather depend on individual's conceptualization of the task character. A later study by Brown 
et al.405 showed that indeed positive action policies do not always decrease the performance 
of those preferentially treated. The authors conducted a laboratory experiment in which 
female participants performed a problem-solving task. The results revealed that if 
participants were informed to be selected solely by gender they solved fewer tasks than if 
they were informed to be selected randomly or by gender and performance. These results are 
in line with previous findings of Heilman et al.406 They confirm that the negative impact of 
positive action on the actual performance, similar to people’s beliefs and evaluations, can be 
attenuated by providing additional information on the importance of performance in the 
selection procedure. 
b) Individuals’ interactions and group performance 
Evidence on how the positive action policies influence interactions between individuals is as 
yet scarce. Recent economics experiments provided first insights on the impact of positive 
action on behavior in a group.407 Balafoutas and Sutter conducted a laboratory experiment to 
investigate how different positive policy measures affect competition, coordination and 
cooperation between individuals.408 In the experiment, participants formed groups of 6 
composed of three male and three female persons. Participants in those groups competed 
against each other by performing a real effort task consisting of adding as many two-digit 
                                                 
405 Brown/Charnsangavej et al., Putting the "affirm" into affirmative action: Preferential selection and 
academic performance 2000. 
406 Heilman/Battle et al., Type of affirmative action policy 1998. 
407 There is also a growing experimental literature on the effects of positive action on competitive 
behavior and results of selection procedure, i.e., Niederle/Segal/Vesterlund, How costly is diversity? 
Affirmative action in light of gender differences in competitiveness 2013. This literature focuses on the 
behavior in the selection procedure. As I am interested in behavior following the selection procedure, I refrain 
from reviewing this literature here. 
408 Balafoutas/Sutter, Affirmative action policies promote women and do not harm efficiency in the 
laboratory 2012,  An extended version of a paper including some additional results: Balafoutas/Sutter, Gender, 
competition and the efficiency of policy interventions 2010. 
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numbers as possible within three minutes. Depending on the experimental condition the 
experimenters changed the rules of choosing two winners of the competition. In the baseline 
treatment, two persons who performed the best in a task were selected to be winners. In other 
treatments the winners were chosen according to different preferential rules:  
(1) at least one woman was chosen to be a winner irrespective of her performance,  
(2) female participants were added one additional point,  
(3) female participants were added two additional points,  
(4) the competition was repeated if no female participant was among the winners.  
After the competition stage, participants in all treatments performed a cooperation and 
coordination task. In the cooperation task participants performed once again the same real 
effort task. This time, however, the number of correct calculations was relevant for the six-
person group outcome. Correct calculations conducted by six persons in a group were added 
up and divided among all group members. In the coordination task subjects played a two-
person coordination game with each member of a group. In the coordination game 
participants had to choose a number between 1 and 7.  
The payoffs are determined by a number simultaneously selected by the other player. 
The outcome of both players is the most efficient if they both choose 7. The lower the 
number chosen by one of the players is, the lower the outcome they both receive. An 
additional feature of this coordination game is that a player who picked a lower number than 
the other player receives a higher outcome. For instance, if player 1 chose number 3 and 
player 2 chose number 4, player 1 receives €4.50 and player 2 receives €4.00. This poses an 
additional hurdle for reaching an efficient coordination outcome of both players choosing 7. 
Payoffs from a coordination game implemented in Balafoutas and Sutter experiment are 
displayed in Table 11.409 
                                                 
409This game is also known as a ‘weak-link’ game introduced by Huyck/Battalio/Beil, Tacit 
coordination games, strategic uncertainty, and coordination failure 1990. For an overview see: Camerer, 
Behavioral game theory: Experiments in strategic interaction 2003. Camerer gives an intuition for a dilemma 
players of such a game are facing. He compares it to a situation in professional organizations where one project 
needs to be done within strict time limits and there are several people working on it. If one of them fails to 
deliver his/her part on time, the whole project fails. Such a game has multiple equilibria – either all workers 
perform well and deliver the project on time or all workers do nothing and the project fails. Delivering on time 
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Table 11: Payoffs in the coordination game 
 Other person’s number 
7 6 5 4 3 2 1 
Your number 
7 €6.50 €5.50 €4.50 €3.50 €2.50 €1.50 €0.50 
6 €6.00 €6.00 €5.00 €4.00 €3.00 €2.00 €1.00 
5 €5.50 €5.50 €5.50 €4.50 €3.50 €2.50 €1.50 
4 €5.00 €5.00 €5.00 €5.00 €4.00 €3.00 €2.00 
3 €4.50 €4.50 €4.50 €4.50 €4.50 €3.50 €2.50 
2 €4.00 €4.00 €4.00 €4.00 €4.00 €4.00 €3.00 
1 €3.50 €3.50 €3.50 €3.50 €3.50 €3.50 €3.50 
 
Results from both tasks – coordination and cooperation - revealed no negative 
influence of positive action policies (irrespective of their type) on the outcome of 
interactions between winners and loser of competition.   
In contrast, Mollerstrom showed that people cooperate less with each other when 
selection procedure favors members of one group.410 In a laboratory experiment participants 
were assigned to either orange or purple color. This manipulation is based on a minimal 
group paradigm developed by Tajfel.411 According to Tajfel, even seemingly irrelevant basis 
for assignment to different groups (i.e. scores received in a simple visual task) might create 
discrimination between members of own and the other group. This discrimination might 
demonstrate itself in different performance when interacting with a member of the own 
group compared to the performance when interacting with a member of the other group. In 
Mollerstrom’s study in each treatment, participants performed a math task which was a basis 
for promotion from a basic group (16 persons) to a high-stake group (8 persons). The 
promotion procedure varied depending on the treatment. In the quota treatment, there were 
12 orange and four purple participants in the basic group. Out of them, four orange and four 
purple participants could be promoted to the high-stake group. As there was only four purple 
participants present in the basic group, all of them were promoted irrespective of 
performance in the math task. Orange participants had to compete against each other for 
                                                                                                                                                      
is the most efficient option for all workers. It is however not straightforward which action will be chosen by the 
players – doing nothing or delivering on time. 
410 Mollerstrom, Quotas and cooperation 2012. 
411 Tajfel, Experiments in intergroup discrimination 1970. 
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being promoted to the high-stake group. In the control treatment, there were 8 participants 
assigned to orange and 8 assigned to the purple group. Four best orange and four best purple 
participants were selected to the high-stake group, which means that both – orange and 
purple participants had to compete for promotion. Two further treatments introduced 
different justifications of quota rule. They followed the same procedure as the basic quota 
treatment but were justified either with efficiency or with fairness arguments. In each 
treatment after the promotion procedure, participants selected to the high-stake group played 
two persons public good games with each member of the high-stake group. In a public goods 
game participants had to decide how much of his/her endowment to contribute to the 
common pool. Subsequently, contributions of both players were multiplied by 1.5 and 
divided equally between them. The study demonstrated that in the quota treatment 
participants contributed less than in the control treatment. Furthermore, contributions in both 
quota treatments with different justifications were also lower compared to the control 
treatment. 
The results from the two economics experiments on the impact of positive action 
policies on group cooperation are inconsistent. Whereas Balafoutas and Sutter observed no 
adverse effects of different positive action policies on coordination and cooperation,412 
Mollerstrom provided evidence on the negative impact of quota rules on group 
cooperation.413 It is as yet not possible to draw any firm conclusions regarding the 
mechanism which would explain the contradictory results as the studies differ on some 
details of the experimental design. One crucial difference between the studies is the 
categorization criterion. In the Balafoutas and Sutter study participants were categorized 
based on gender and women were favored by positive action procedures.414 In contrast, 
Mollerstrom implemented group membership based on a feature arbitrary assigned to the 
participants (colors) and members of one color group were benefited by a quota rule.415 It is 
possible that positive action favoring female participants does not result in negative reactions 
(as in the Balafoutas and Sutter study) because it applies to a historically disadvantaged 
group. To examine this potential explanation, in the study presented below reactions towards 
quotas favoring women are directly compared with reactions towards quotas favoring 
                                                 
412 Balafoutas/Sutter, Gender, competition 2010; Balafoutas/Sutter, Affirmative action policies 2012. 
413 Mollerstrom, Quotas and cooperation 2012. 
414 Balafoutas/Sutter, Gender, competition 2010; Balafoutas/Sutter, Affirmative action policies 2012. 
415 Mollerstrom, Quotas and cooperation 2012. 
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members of experimentally created group membership (i.e. green color group).  The design 
of the study is, however, distinct from previous experiments as it introduces initial 
discrimination concerning incentive schemes – underrepresented group members (females or 
participants assigned to a group with less frequent color) are selected to low-earnings groups.  
Furthermore, it focuses on the interaction of high-status group members formed as a result of 
a promotion procedure. In particular, it investigates how incumbent high-status group 
members interact with an incoming member promoted according to the quota- or 
performance-based procedure. 
E. Conclusions 
Superficially, the problem of group cooperation might seem unrelated to board 
processes. However, in the literature on corporate governance, the effort norms of board 
members are recognized as one of the main predictors of board task performance.416 Board 
dynamics, and in particular effort norms, were also mentioned in the IA as one of the 
relevant factors of corporate governance.417 The directors face a dilemma when preparing for 
and participating in board meetings. They can either actively contribute to tasks of a board or 
free ride and be passive, hoping that the other directors do the whole work. Furthermore, the 
group cooperation problem in corporate boards might demonstrate itself in putting personal 
over company best interest. Individuals face the same dilemma when deciding whether or 
not to cooperate with a group – they can either exert effort valuable for the group or do 
nothing, exploiting the effort of other group members. Therefore, to accurately estimate the 
impact of quotas on board performance it is necessary to know how mandatory quotas 
influence group cooperation. This is a subject of an experimental study I designed and 
conducted together with Angela Dorrough, Manuela Barreto, and Andreas Glöckner. The 
study is discussed in the chapter 5.  
 
 
                                                 
416 Wright/Siegel et al., The oxford handbook of corporate governance 2013; Minichilli/Zattoni et al., 
Board task performance: An exploration of micro- and macro-level determinants of board effectiveness 2012. 
417 Impact Assessment, p. 1. 
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Chapter 5 
Behavioral implications of gender quotas 
for group cooperation 
A. Introduction 
Policymakers who propose the introduction of a gender quota in public agencies and 
private organizations do so because this strategy guarantees the increase in women’s 
representation in a specific position or domain within a relatively short period. Besides this 
immediate benefit, legislators claim that introducing quotas for boards of directors in listed 
companies will bring additional advantages in the form of increased corporate performance. 
For example, a report from the European Commission points out that the “presence of 
women [on boards] contributes to improving corporate governance, team performance and 
the quality of decision-making”.418 A crucial—yet untested—aspect of this debate is whether 
or not these benefits of gender diversity can indeed be achieved through the implementation 
of quotas. In particular, it is as yet unclear whether or not a quota procedure positively 
affects an important feature of group performance, namely cooperation. 
Previous research on the effects of positive action419 has focused on individual task 
performance, job satisfaction, and task selection,420 but did not investigate group 
                                                 
418 European Commission, Impact assessment on costs and benefits of improving the gender balance 
in the boards of companies listed on stock exchanges, SWD(2012) 348, available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/gender-equality/files/womenonboards/impact_assesment_quotas_en.pdf. 
[hereinafter: Impact Assessment or IA], p.13. 
419 In the American system it is more common to use a term “affirmative action” to describe all 
policies which aim at reversing previous discrimination based on different characteristics such as gender or 
race. 
420 For overviews, see: Crosby/Iyer/Sincharoen, Understanding affirmative action 2006; 
Heilman/Alcott, What I think you think of me: Women's reactions to being viewed as beneficiaries of 
preferential selection 2001; Kravitz/Harrison et al., Affirmative action: A review of psychological and 
behavioral research 1997. 
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performance, or cooperation within teams. More recent research has provided relevant 
insights into this problem421 but has left important questions unanswered. Here, I present a 
laboratory experiment performed to answer some of these open issues. In particular, the 
study aims at answering the following research questions: 
1. Does group cooperation decrease when the promotion is based on quota rules 
as compared to performance? 
2. Is a quota-based promotion into a high-status group422 perceived as less fair 
than a performance-based procedure? 
3. If so, is this effect of promotion rule on performance explained by differences 
in fairness perceptions? 
4. Does quota-based promotion affect group cooperation differently when it is 
applied to gender as compared with an artificial and randomly assigned category? 
In contrast to the empirical studies on mandatory quota and company performance 
described in the previous chapter, a laboratory experiment allows me to investigate direct 
reactions of individuals affected by a policy measure. The features of the experimental 
method discussed in chapter 1 such as random assignment or controlled environment are 
crucial for the key advantage of this method which is a causal analysis of the effects of a 
legal institution.  
Furthermore, a laboratory experiment has an additional benefit compared to vignette 
studies also mentioned in the previous chapter (Storvik 2011). A laboratory experiment 
measures real choices of affected individuals instead of attitudes or hypothetical reactions. 
Additionally, participants in the experiment indeed interact with each other in a group 
reflecting the decision-making procedure of a collective body such as a corporate board.   
                                                 
421 Balafoutas/Sutter, Affirmative action policies 2012; Mollerstrom, Quotas and cooperation 2012. 
422 A “high-status group” is understood as a group, members of which distinguished themselves from 
members of other groups by, i.e., higher earnings or higher career level. 
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B. Materials and methods 
I.  Design and participants  
Participants were randomly assigned to the four conditions of a 2(categorization 
criterion: gender vs. artificial category) x 2(promotion rule: performance vs. quota rule) 
between-participants design. One hundred eighty-eight participants, mostly students at the 
University of Bonn (age: M = 24.74, SD = 6.5; 50% female) with heterogeneous fields of 
study, were recruited from the MPI Decision Lab subject pool via the online recruitment tool 
ORSEE.423 Participants interacted with each other in groups of four, and usually, 12 
individuals took part in each of the 19 experimental sessions. Due to occasional no-shows, 
only eight persons (two groups) participated in some sessions, resulting in valid data from 11 
to 13 groups per condition. Each session lasted about 70 minutes. In all four conditions, 
participants performed an incentivized slider task. Participants’ total payments ranged from 
3.70 to 22.50 Euros (approx. USD 4.03 to 24.53).424 The experiment was programmed in z-
Tree.425 
II. Materials and procedure 
Upon arriving at the laboratory, participants were randomly assigned to separate 
cubicles. They were instructed that communication between participants was forbidden 
throughout the experiment and that the experiment consisted of several parts. First, 
instructions describing only the rules of the first part were distributed (on paper). After 
participants had answered three control questions, their answers were checked by the 
experimenters. In the case of at least one incorrect answer, participants were asked to reread 
the instructions and to try again. Afterward, participants filled out a demographic 
questionnaire. Next, they were assigned to groups of four. In the gender conditions (gender 
performance and gender quota) each group consisted of one randomly drawn female and 
three randomly drawn male participants. In the color conditions (color performance and 
color quota), participants were first assigned a color (orange or green) and next randomly 
                                                 
423 Greiner, The online recruitment system orsee 2.0-a guide for the organization of experiments in 
economics 2004. 
424 In addition to the performance contingent reward (M = 10.90 €, approx. USD 11.88), participants 
received 1 € (approx. USD 1.39) fixed payment for an online Social Dominance Orientation questionnaire they 
filled out at least 12 hours before coming to the laboratory. 
425 Fischbacher, Z-tree: Zurich toolbox for ready-made economic experiments 2007. 
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divided into groups of four (three orange and one green participant in each group). 
Afterward, each group of four was split into two-person subgroups (high-status and low-
status subgroups), in which participants performed the first part of the experiment. Thus, half 
of the participants started in a privileged high-status group. The remaining half - in a low-
status group. The differences in status were introduced through an exchange rate of points 
earned in the experimental task. Each point obtained by a member of a high-status group was 
worth 16 cents, whereas members of a low-status group received 8 cents for each point. 
Thus, members of low-status groups were discriminated against with regard to wage for 
doing the same task as members of the high-status groups.   
The high-status group consisted of two male (two orange) participants and the low-
status group consisted of one male (one orange) and one female (one green) participant. The 
male (orange) participants had a chance of 2/3 of being assigned to the high-status group, 
whereas the female (green) participants were always assigned to the low-status group. Thus, 
female (green) participants had no chance to be initially assigned to a high-status group.  
This way in the gender condition females were discriminated against (all were placed in the 
low-status group) while two-thirds of the males were assigned to a high-status group (one-
third were placed in the low-status group). In the artificial category conditions, two color 
groups were created (green and orange) and participants randomly categorized as ‘green’ 
were discriminated against (all were placed in the low status). Participants were provided 
with information on the color they were assigned to and on the color (in the color conditions) 
gender (in the gender conditions) of the other subgroup member.  
In the experiment, participants completed a slider task.426 Participants were presented 
with 48 sliders on the screen. Each slider ranged from 0 to 100. Participants were instructed 
that their task was to adjust sliders from the initial position at 0 to the value of 50. They had 
120 seconds for this task and could move the slider bar by clicking on the sides of the bar or 
by dragging the slider along the bar, which moved the slider by increments of 1. Since 
previous research has found systematic differences between hypothetical and real social 
interactions,427 we fully incentivized the slider task to enhance external validity: For each 
                                                 
426 Gill/Prowse, A structural analysis of disappointment aversion in a real effort competition 2012; 
Gill/Prowse, A novel computerized real effort task based on sliders 2013. 
427 Vlaev, How different are real and hypothetical decisions? Overestimation, contrast and assimilation 
in social interaction 2012. 
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correctly solved slider (that is, for each slider that was placed exactly at the value of 50) 
participants earned one point. The slider task has one additional advantage that is crucial to 
our research: it has been proven to be gender neutral428 in that previous research did not 
observe gender differences in individual performance. 
The first part of the experiment included three phases in which the slider task was 
completed, i.e., a practice trial, and two phases that were relevant for payment: one with the 
individual and one with the group payment scheme (in randomized order). After each phase, 
participants received feedback concerning the number of sliders solved and the payments. In 
the individual scheme, payment depended solely on individual performance. Thus, it served 
as a benchmark for individual skills and learning. In the group scheme, the number of sliders 
solved by the two members of a subgroup was summed up, multiplied by 1.2, and divided 
evenly between the subgroup members. We implemented this multiplier to reflect additional 
benefits obtained through group work. Hence, both members of each subgroup (i.e., high-
status or low-status group) could additionally profit from their contribution.  
As soon as the first part was over, the instructions for the second part were 
distributed. Participants read that one of the low-status subgroup participants would now 
switch to the high-status subgroup to replace a randomly chosen high-status subgroup 
participant, who in turn would switch to the low-status subgroup, in order to keep the group 
size constant. This way a possibility of being promoted from the low-status to the high-status 
group was introduced. The promotion rule varied depending on the experimental condition. 
In the performance-based condition, the low-status subgroup member switching to the high-
status subgroup was chosen on the basis of the average number of sliders solved in the 
preceding individual and group payment phases. The participant with more sliders solved 
was promoted to the high-status subgroup (a random draw was conducted in the case of a 
tie), irrespective of his/her color or gender. In the quota conditions, a female (green) 
participant was chosen to be promoted to the high-status subgroup. In this case, performance 
in the first part of the experiment was irrelevant for the promotion. After reading the second 
                                                 
428 Gill/Prowse, A novel computerized real effort task based on sliders 2013; Gerhards/Siemer, Private 
versus public feedback-the incentive effects of symbolic awards 2014; Lindner, Decision time and steps of 
reasoning in a competitive market entry game 2014. 
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part of the instructions and answering a control question429 regarding the promotion 
procedure, participants were informed (on the screen) about whether they would switch to 
the other subgroup or remain in their initial subgroup. They were also reminded of what 
constituted the basis for promotion (performance, gender, or color). Although participants 
who stayed in the high-status subgroup were well aware of what promotion rule had been 
used to recruit the new member (for the exact wording, see the experimental instructions 
provided in the appendix), they were not informed about the exact performance of their new 
subgroup member. The new subgroup members were not informed either about the exact 
performance of the incumbent subgroup member. Next, as in the first part of the experiment, 
participants solved the slider task once with the individual and once with the group payment 
scheme (again, the order was randomly determined). The payment for each point obtained in 
the slider tasks followed the same rule as in the first part—high-status group members 
received 16 cents per point while low-status group members received 8 cents per point. After 
completing the second part, participants filled out a questionnaire in which they were 
explicitly asked about the extent to which they perceived the promotion procedure as fair. To 
assess perceived fairness of the promotion procedure, we included a questionnaire based on 
Tyler and Blader.430 The questionnaire included such items as “The rules and procedures 
were equally fair to everyone”, “The participants were treated with dignity”, “How fair was 
the outcome of the promotion procedure?” Questions were answered on seven-point Likert-
type scales, with higher scores representing perceptions of the procedure as fairer.431 The 
resulting questionnaire consisted of a scale measuring the formal quality of decision-making 
(four items; Cronbach’s alpha = 0.76) and another scale measuring the formal quality of 
treatment (three items; Cronbach’s alpha = 0.84). Furthermore, a scale on distributive 
fairness to control for potential differences in distributive justice perceptions was included 
(two items; Cronbach’s alpha = 0.81).432  
                                                 
429 The control question was a multiple choice question. Irrespective of the treatment, there was 
always one option describing the quota-based promotion procedure and one option describing the performance-
based promotion procedure. In this way, participants were made aware of other possible promotion procedures. 
430 Tyler/Blader, Cooperation in groups: Procedural justice, social identity, and behavioral engagement 
2000. 
431 In the experiment, participants answered the fairness questionnaire with an inverted scale where 1 
indicated the fairest and 7 the most unfair judgment. For the sake of a more intuitive understanding of the 
results, I inverted the scale in all analyses. 
432 I additionally examined whether responses to quota systems based on gender or on artificially 
created groups are affected by chronic tendencies to endorse, desire, and support social hierarchies, that is, 
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Finally, participants were informed about their total payments in both parts of the 
experiment and asked to enter individually a separate room, where they received their 
payments in private.  
C. Theoretical background and hypotheses 
I.  Procedural and distributive justice 
Positive action policies might be judged within two dimensions of justice: 
distributive and procedural. Whereas the first one is concerned with rules according to which 
distribution of resources is made (i.e., equity rule), the second one relates to procedures by 
which the decisions on distribution are met (i.e., all affected individuals can present their 
view before a decision is made).433   
Nacoste434 suggested that attitudes, as well as reactions towards positive action 
policies, might be driven by people’s evaluations of procedural justice. The social 
psychology research on procedural justice focused on psychological consequences of 
different procedural features.435 Nacoste suggested that people’s evaluations of procedural 
fairness depend on how much ‘voice’ they are granted in a procedure. Nacoste argued that 
selection procedures subject to positive action measures might be perceived as less fair than 
procedures based on performance because the first one assign more weight to group 
membership (such as gender, race) than the latter one. As a result, individuals cannot 
influence the outcome of a selection procedure subject to positive action policy by, i.e., 
stressing their good performance in a relevant task. Lind and Tyler in turn pointed out that 
positive action policies might be perceived as unfair because they violate procedural 
consistency across people.436 The authors referred to findings of Barret-Howard and Tyler 
suggesting that procedural consistency across people and time is a crucial feature for fairness 
perception of procedure.437 
                                                                                                                                                      
social dominance orientation (Sidanius & Pratto, 2001). The results revealed no significant effects of this 
measure.  
433 Bobocel/Son Hing et al., Justice-based opposition to social policies: Is it genuine? 1998. 
434 Nacoste, Sources of stigma: Analyzing the psychology of affirmative action 1990. 
435 Lind/Tyler, The social psychology of procedural justice 1988, p.7. 
436 Lind/Tyler, The social psychology of procedural justice 1988, p.165. 
437 Barrett-Howard/Tyler, Procedural justice as a criterion in allocation decisions 1986. 
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Meritocracy might be yet another factor relevant for fairness evaluations of positive 
action policies.438 Meritocracy is an ideology - widespread in Western societies - which 
supports an allocation principle according to individual performance and input.439 Its 
relevance for attitudes towards positive action policies is however not clear. On the one 
hand, it has been found that people who endorse merit principle oppose strongly positive 
action policies.440 However, the objection towards positive action diminishes if supporters of 
meritocracy recognize the currently existing high work discrimination.441   
Summing up, there are different reasons why selection procedures subject to positive 
action policies might be perceived as less fair than performance-based procedures. Although 
theoretical research suggested that positive action policies might affect both - procedural 
(lack of consistency, lack of “voice”) as well as distributive justice evaluations (violation of 
meritocracy principle) of selection procedures and their outcomes, it has been empirically 
shown that people relate positive action policies to procedural fairness evaluations.442 Based 
on the theoretical and empirical research on positive action policies, the following 
hypothesis is proposed regarding fairness perception: 
H1: Members of a high-status group are expected to perceive promotion based purely 
on quota as less fair than promotion based purely on previous performance. 
II.  Group engagement model 
Further research on procedural justice demonstrated that fairness evaluations of a 
procedure do influence people’s attitudes and values as well as their behavior. Blader and 
Tyler developed a group engagement model explaining how procedural fairness perception 
influences cooperation in a group.443 The model assumes that people shape their social 
identity using group membership. According to the model this identity is crucial for 
cooperation in a group – the more people identify with a group, the more they are willing to 
cooperate with other group members. Additionally, the fairness of procedures implemented 
                                                 
438 Bobocel/Son Hing et al., Justice-based opposition 1998 
439 Son Hing/Bobocel/Zanna, Meritocracy and opposition to affirmative action: Making concessions in 
the face of discrimination 2002. 
440 Bobocel/Son Hing et al., Justice-based opposition 1998. 
441 Son Hing/Bobocel/Zanna, Meritocracy and opposition 2002. 
442Cohen-Charash/Spector, The role of justice in organizations: A meta-analysis 2001. 
443 Tyler/Blader, Cooperation in groups 2000; Tyler/Blader, The group engagement model: Procedural 
justice, social identity, and cooperative behavior 2003. 
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in a group influences people’s group identification. The fairer the procedures are, the more 
people identify with a group.444 Given that positive action measures negatively affect 
procedural fairness evaluations, their implementation to group selection procedures might 
lead to a decrease in cooperation. 
Based on the group engagement model two following hypotheses are proposed 
regarding behavioral reactions towards quota rules and their underlying mechanisms: 
H2a: The members of the high-status group are expected to show reduced group 
cooperation after a promotion which is based purely on quota, as compared to a promotion 
based purely on performance. 
H2b: This reduction of group cooperation is expected to be mediated by fairness 
perceptions of the promotion procedure. 
III.  Gender versus artificially created category 
Given the universality of procedural fairness standards such as voice or procedural 
consistency as well as widespread beliefs in a meritocracy, negative fairness perception, and 
behavioral reactions should be observed irrespective of whether the quota is applied to 
gender or an artificially created feature. If beliefs in meritocracy and procedural fairness 
standards are the main force underlying the reactions towards quota rules, no difference 
should be expected depending on whether quota refers to gender or any other group 
membership. 
H3a: Quota rules are expected to be perceived as less fair and lead to less cooperation 
than performance-based promotion, irrespective of whether quotas are based on gender or 
artificially created categories. 
H3b: No difference is expected between reactions towards quota rules based on 
gender compared to artificially created categories. 
D. Results 
Since the hypotheses refer to the behavior of the members from the high-status 
group, the analyzes focused on the responses of a subgroup of participants consisting of an 
                                                 
444 Tyler/Blader, Cooperation in groups 2000; Tyler/Blader, The group engagement model 2003. 
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incumbent member of a high-status subgroup and a new member originally stemming from a 
low-status subgroup. The total number of participants whose responses are relevant to the 
hypotheses is half (N = 94) of the total number of participants who took part in the study (N 
= 188). Only these participants enter the following analyzes. 
I.  Perceived fairness 
In order to investigate the perceived procedural fairness of the promotion procedure 
introduced between the first and second part of the experiment, the mean responses to 
questions 1-7 of the fairness questionnaire were calculated for each participant. The 
distributive fairness was investigated by calculating the average responses to questions 8 and 
9 of the fairness questionnaire. The individual averages of procedural fairness perception are 
displayed in Figure 11. 
 
Figure 11: Perceived fairness by treatment condition 
Note: Means of individual responses to the questionnaire on perceived 
fairness of the promotion rule by experimental condition (categorization 
criterion: color vs. gender, promotion rule: performance vs. quota). Bars 
indicate 95% confidence intervals. 
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Figure 11 reveals that the participants perceived the quota procedure implemented in 
the gender treatment as the most unfair, whereas the quota procedure in color treatments was 
evaluated as the fairest. In order to test hypotheses 1, 3a and 3b, an ordinary least squares 
(OLS) regression was conducted predicting perceived procedural fairness from promotion 
rule, categorization criterion, and their interaction (variables centered). The results are 
displayed in Table 12, Model 1. They reveal a significant influence of categorization 
criterion on perceived procedural fairness. Promotion rules were perceived as more fair 
when categorization was based on an artificially created group than when it was based on 
gender. The main effect of a quota rule, as compared to a performance rule, was not 
statistically significant. A significant interaction between promotion rule and 
categorization/discrimination criterion was observed. Simple effects revealed that quota rules 
were perceived as less fair than performance-based promotion in the gender conditions, F(1, 
90) = 4.69, p = .03. This effect was not observed in the color conditions, F(1, 90) = 1.25, p = 
.26.  
Table 12: OLS Regression on procedural fairness, distributive fairness, and change in 
cooperation score of a subgroup 
 (1) 
Procedural 
Fairness 
(2) 
Distributive 
Fairness 
(3) 
Change in 
cooperation 
score 
Quota (1=quota, 0=performance; 
centered) 
-0.175 
(0.263) 
-0.545 
(0.351) 
-1.683+ 
(0.901) 
Color (1=color, 0=gender; 
centered) 
0.920*** 
(0.263) 
0.755* 
(0.352) 
0.610 
(0.889) 
Quota*Color 1.234* 
(0.527) 
0.472 
(0.704) 
2.183 
(1.795) 
Task order   1.476* 
(0.672) 
Constant 4.667*** 
(0.131) 
3.853*** 
(0.176) 
-1.330 
(0.823) 
Observations 94 94 91 
Adjusted R2 0.141 0.047 0.079 
Clusters   47 
Note: Results from an OLS regression with standard errors provided in parentheses. “Task order” 
indicates the number of slider tasks separating both group payment schemes. In Model 3, standard 
errors were clustered at the group level. Participants who solved no slider task were omitted in Model 
3. + p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
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Further analysis focused on evaluations of distributive justice (Table 12, Model 2). 
An OLS regression predicting perceived distributive fairness from promotion rule, 
categorization criterion, and their interaction (variables centered) revealed no main effect of 
quota versus performance based promotion rule. Similarly to procedural fairness perception, 
the outcomes of promotion procedures were perceived as more fair when participants were 
categorized according to color as compared to gender. However, the interaction between 
promotion rule and categorization criterion was not statistically significant. Furthermore, no 
simple effects of quota rule on distributive fairness perception were observed both in the 
gender, F(1, 90) = 2.40, p = .12, and in the color conditions, F(1, 90) = 0.45, p = .50.  
The quota-based promotion procedure implemented in the study did not comply with 
procedural fairness standards as identified in previous empirical and theoretical research 
(sections C in chapter 5 and section D in chapter 4). Yet, the results revealed that the quota-
based procedure was seen as less fair than performance-based promotion only when the 
categorization was based on gender rather than on an artificially created category. Thus, the 
evidence provides only partial support for the hypotheses 1, 3a and 3b. Additional analysis 
of distributive fairness perception revealed no impact of promotion procedures on fairness 
perception of its outcomes.  
II.   Performance and cooperation 
Two participants solved no slider during the entire experiment and one participant 
solved no slider only in the first part of the experiment, which most probably is a result of 
the persons misunderstanding the task. These participants were excluded from the following 
analyses. Thus, the total number of participants entering the analysis is 91.445 Averaged 
across all parts and conditions of the Experiment 1, participants solved a total of 85.3 (SD = 
23.9) sliders (excluding practice trial), which amounts to the average of 21.3 (SD=5.9) 
sliders per phase. In the color conditions, the difference between the average number of 
sliders solved by male and female participants was not statistically significant (men: M = 
22.9, SD = 5.4; women: M = 21.5, SD = 4.0; Mann-Whitney test: z = 1.31, p = .18), 
confirming the gender neutrality of the task. In the gender conditions, however, female 
participants solved on average fewer sliders than male participants (men: M = 23.1, SD = 
                                                 
445 Including these participants does not change the pattern of the results. 
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5.0; women: M = 19.6, SD = 5.5; Mann-Whitney test: z = 2.13, p =.03).446 In line with 
research on the effects of disadvantage on performance (e.g., Barreto, 2014 for a review), 
this difference is likely to reflect the negative motivational effects of the gender 
disadvantage induced at the start of the study. 
The second set of hypotheses concerns the effects of quota on cooperation in the 
second part of the experiment (i.e., after promotion). The participants’ willingness to 
cooperate was operationalized as the difference in number of sliders solved in the group 
payment scheme and the number of sliders solved according to the individual payment 
scheme. This difference is referred to as the ‘cooperation score’.447 A negative cooperation 
score indicates free-riding, whereas a positive cooperation score implies cooperation. The 
cooperation score was calculated in order to control for any heterogeneity in skills and 
learning, since performance in the individual payment scheme is included in its calculation. 
Additionally, inclusion of performance in individual payment scheme into the cooperation 
score was crucial for excluding any potential effects of stereotype threat. The promotion 
procedure (performance-based vs. quota-based) was introduced between the two parts of the 
experiment. To test the hypotheses, the analysis focused on a change in cooperation scores 
between the first and second part of the experiment. This way one can examine whether the 
introduction of a measure (i.e., promotion procedure) leads to a change in cooperative 
behavior. Therefore, the cooperation score in the first part of the experiment was subtracted 
from the cooperation score in the second part. Positive values indicate either an increase in 
cooperation or a decrease in free-riding, whereas negative numbers indicate a decrease in 
cooperation or an increase in free-riding. Individual means of changes in cooperation scores 
for all experimental conditions are given in Table 13. Figure 12 displays the group means of 
changes in cooperation score by treatment.  
 
                                                 
446 The gender difference holds comparing number of sliders solved only by the participants in the 
low-stake group in the first part of the experiment: Female participants solved significantly less slider than 
male participants in the gender (p = .049) but not in color conditions (p=.43).  
447 Cooperation score of each participant i in each part of the experiment, t ∈ {1,2} was computed 
according to the following formula: 
𝐶𝑖𝑡  = 𝐺𝐸𝑖𝑡 − 𝐼𝐸𝑖𝑡  
where 𝐺𝐸𝑖𝑡  is the number of sliders solved by an individual i on behalf of the group in part t and 𝐼𝐸𝑖𝑡  is the 
number of sliders solved for individual profit in part t.  
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Table 13: Descriptive statistics of change in cooperation scores by condition. 
 Merit Quota Total 
Gender 1.14 (4.23, n=21) -2.00 (4.22, n=20) -0.39 (4.47) 
Color 1.04 (5.01, n=26) 0.71 (4.33, n=24) 0.88 (4.65) 
Total 1.09(4.63) -0.52 (4.44) 0.31 (4.59) 
Note: Individual means and standard deviations in parentheses. Negative scores indicate an increase 
in free-riding or decrease in cooperation. Participants who solved no slider were excluded. 
An OLS regression analysis was conducted, predicting this change in the cooperation 
score by promotion rule (coded as 0 = performance, 1 = quota), categorization criterion 
(coded as 0 = gender, 1 = color), and their interaction (variables centered). A cluster 
correction for standard errors at the group level was used to control for interdependencies 
between participants. Additionally, a phase indicator was included as a control variable to 
Figure 12: Change in cooperation score by experimental condition 
Note: Group means of change in cooperation scores between the first and 
second part of the experiment (before and after promotion) by experimental 
condition (categorization criterion: color vs. gender; promotion rule: 
performance vs. quota). Bars indicate 95% confidence intervals. 
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account for general learning effects over time. The results of the analysis are presented in 
Table 12.  
In line with hypothesis 2a, a marginally significant decrease in the cooperation score 
for quota-based promotion was found as compared to performance-based promotion, b = -
1.68, t(46) = -1.87, p = .06. Neither the main effect of categorization criterion, b = 0.61, t(46) 
= 0.69, p = .49, nor the interaction reached conventional significance levels, b = 2.18, t(46) = 
1.22, p = .23. Although the interaction was not significant, simple effects were examined to 
address the goal of understanding whether treatment based on artificial categories would 
differ from treatment based on gender. A significant simple effect of quota-based promotion 
was observed for gender, F(1, 46) = 6.94, p = .01, but not for the artificially created 
category, F(1, 46) = 0.22, p = .64. 
In sum, quota rules led to less cooperation than performance rules. Simple effects 
revealed that this was only the case when the quota was imposed on the basis of gender and 
not when it was imposed on the basis of an artificially created category, although the 
interaction was not significant. 
According to hypothesis 2b, I expected the effect of the promotion rule on 
cooperation to be mediated by fairness perceptions. However, the distinct patterns of 
findings for these two measures suggest that this is not the case. Indeed, an OLS regression 
predicting a change in the cooperation score with procedural fairness perceptions as an 
independent variable did not reveal a significant effect, b = 0.171, t(46) = 0.67, p = .50. 
Thus, the necessary conditions for mediation analysis were not met.448 Hence, hypothesis 2b 
was not supported by our data. The observed effect of promotion rules on group cooperation 
was not mediated by procedural fairness perceptions. 
E. Discussion 
The current study systematically investigated the effects of one of the measures 
aimed at reducing gender inequality in the workplace—gender quotas—on perceived 
fairness and team cooperation. One of the positive effects argued by proposers of gender 
quotas is their potential to improve team performance. The current results show that this idea 
                                                 
448 Baron/Kenny, The moderator–mediator variable distinction in social psychological research: 
Conceptual, strategic, and statistical considerations 1986. 
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is misguided in contexts where team performance is reliant on cooperation. An incentivized, 
real-effort task was implemented to examine the effects on cooperation. Unlike previous 
research in this area449, the current study investigated behavior in groups, the composition of 
which changed either due to a quota or to performance-based rule. Furthermore, to gain more 
insight into the mechanism underlying possible reactions to quota rules, in this study a 
gender-based promotion procedure was contrasted with a system that applied to an 
experimentally created category with no meaning or existence outside of the laboratory (i.e., 
group color). 
The results revealed a negative influence of gender-based quota rule on procedural 
fairness perception. More specifically, gender based quota rule was perceived as more unfair 
than performance based rule. Interestingly, this negative effect was not observed when quota 
was based on artificially created category (i.e. color). In these conditions the promotion 
procedure based on quota and performance were perceived equally fair. 
The pattern of results on fairness perception of outcomes was slightly different than 
with respect to procedural fairness evaluations. The outcomes of quota procedure and 
performance-based promotions were perceived equally fair, irrespective of whether 
categorization is based on gender or on an artificial category. This is in line with previous 
results which revealed relevance of positive action policies for procedural but not for 
distributive justice evaluations. Similarly to procedural fairness, distributive aspect of the 
promotion procedure was evaluated as more fair in color compared to gender conditions. 
Contrary to the initial hypothesis, people evaluated procedures as well as their outcomes 
differently when they were categorized on the basis of gender than on the basis of artificial 
category. The result is consistent with research stressing the greater impact of the categorical 
treatment when it refers to social categories with broader social meaning and existence 
beyond the experimental context. 
Distinct results were observed regarding actual behavior of participants. They were 
more willing to exert effort on behalf of a group when promotion was based on performance. 
At the same time they did not alter their behavior when an incoming member was promoted 
on a basis of an artificially assigned category.  Furthermore, the willingness to work for a 
                                                 
449 Balafoutas/Sutter, Affirmative action policies 2012. 
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group tended to drop when promotion was based on gender. Contrary to hypothesized 
mediation through procedural fairness perception, no impact of fairness evaluations on 
changes in group cooperation was observed. Therefore, it could not be concluded that 
influence of promotion procedure on group cooperation was channeled by fairness 
evaluations of procedures. 
One possible explanation of these surprising results is that people might 
conceptualize the promotion procedure differently when it refers to socially meaningful 
categories, i.e. gender than when it implemented abstract categories, i.e. colors. Previous 
research has shown that random procedures are generally perceived as fair.450 As colors were 
assigned randomly at the beginning of the experiment, the later promotion procedure based 
on color might have been perceived random and therefore fair. Another potential explanation 
might be provided by research on categorization threat which has shown that in some 
situations people dislike being categorized as a member of a given social group.451 Negative 
emotions related to an inappropriate categorization might result in weaker group 
identification452 and subsequently lead to lower group cooperation. Negative reactions are 
more likely if the category is particularly irrelevant in a given context or if in a specific 
situation individuals prefer to be evaluated on the basis of personal characteristics or 
merit.453 Thus, being perceived as a member of an artificially created group with no meaning 
in the real world is less likely to be perceived as a threat than being categorized based on a 
socially meaningful category, i.e. gender. 
The findings presented here show a potential side effect of positive action on 
procedural fairness perception and an important aspect of team performance in form of 
cooperation. Despite initial discrimination of female participants, promotion procedure based 
purely on gender was perceived as less fair than performance based promotion. Yet, based 
on current results it is still not possible to distinguish the underlying mechanism of 
                                                 
450 I.e. Oberholzer-Gee/Bohnet/Frey, Fairness and competence in democratic decisions 1997. But see 
other studies showing that fairness perception of a random procedure might depend on a context or a type of a 
decision: Savage/Torgler, Perceptions of fairness and allocation systems 2010; Bolton/Brandts/Ockenfels, Fair 
procedures: Evidence from games involving lotteries 2005 
451 Barreto/Ellemers et al., To be or not to be: The impact of implicit versus explicit inappropriate 
social categorizations on the self 2010. 
452 For a review: Barreto/Ellemers, The effects of being categorised: The interplay between internal 
and external social identities 2003. 
453 Branscombe/Ellemers et al. The context and content of social identity threat in: Ellemers et al., 
Social identity: Context, commitment, content 1999. 
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behavioral reactions towards quota based promotion procedures. Nevertheless, the 
experimental results indicate that these reactions might be specific to socially meaningful 
categories such as gender. 
Implementing quota rules as a policy introducing gender equality in a workforce 
might be tempting for policymakers as it enables achieving high participation of women in 
different working groups and positions within a relatively short period of time. However, 
one should also consider potential negative side effects of the proposed reforms, such as an 
impact on group cooperation. The practical implications of the presented study should be as 
yet handled with great caution. In particular, since it was inconclusive with respect to the 
procedural fairness as a channel of behavioral reactions towards gender-based quota rules, it 
is necessary to identify an underlying mechanism first before any firm conclusions about 
behavior in the real world could be made. This is particularly important in light of the 
previous research which showed that procedural fairness plays a bigger role for individuals 
who attach great importance to group membership.454 As membership in the experimental 
high-stake group might have been of relatively small significance for the participants, it 
might be a potential reason why, despite observed differences in fairness evaluations, 
procedural justice could not be identified as a driving factor of participants' behavior. 
Despite relatively high activity of policy makers towards introducing full gender 
equality in many spheres of daily live, gender inequalities still exists and call for even more 
intervention. However, these interventions besides achieving its legitimate objectives might 
also produce unintended negative side effects. Identifying the underlying mechanisms of 
these reactions will help choosing positive action measures which both achieve their goals 
and avoid negative consequences.    
F. Legal implications 
In 2012 the European Commission proposed a Directive requiring a 40% women 
share on board of directors in all publicly listed European companies to be achieved by 2020. 
Besides increasing female participation in economic decision making, the European 
Commission declared an intention to pursue improvement of corporate governance and 
                                                 
454 Gonzalez/Tyler Why do people care about procedural fairness? The importance of membership 
monitoring in: Vermunt/Törnblom, Distributive and procedural justice: Research and social applications 2013. 
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company performance with a proposed measure. The Commission claimed that mandatory 
quotas will be most effective in increasing gender diversity in corporate boardrooms within 
relatively short period of time. The increased gender diversity, in turn, will contribute to 
better corporate governance. The German legislator went ahead the European initiative and 
in 2015 issued the Equal Participation Act requiring 30% share of male and 30% share of 
female directors in corporate boards of all listed and co-determined public companies. 
Similarly, to the European Commission it was argued that gender diversity will lead to better 
corporate performance and higher competitiveness of German companies.  
The experimental research presented above together with other empirical research 
discussed in the previous chapter revealed shortcomings of the assumptions underlying the 
Commission’s evaluation of different policy options with respect to their influence on 
corporate governance and company performance. First, the evidence suggests that in its 
impact assessment the EU Commission neglected a very important aspect – a mandatory 
quota itself might affect functioning of the board for other than gender diversity reasons. 
Second, the results on the impact of mandatory quotas on board functioning cast doubts on 
the Commission’s conclusions about positive effects of the proposed policy measure on 
corporate governance and company performance. This puts into question the quality of the 
Impact Assessment as well as the legality of the Directive.  
Given the empirical results there are at least three possible grounds for questioning 
these documents. First of all, it is doubtful whether the Impact Assessment conforms to the 
Impact Assessment Guidelines 2009. As described in chapter § 4 an impact assessment 
should be “transparent, comprehensive and balanced”. The evaluations presented in the 
Impact Assessment at hand are based on the assumption that gender diversity will positively 
influence firm performance irrespective of the implemented measure. The results of 
empirical research discussed in chapter 4 suggest that this assumption is implausible. 
Second, badly performed IA does not fulfill procedural requirements which might constitute 
a basis for challenging the Directive on procedural grounds (see chapter 4). Finally, it is 
questionable whether the Directive complies with the proportionality principle that is 
recognized as a general principle of EU law. Given the ECJ judgments discussed in chapter 
4, it is questionable whether the Commission indeed took into account “all relevant factors” 
and choose mandatory quota on the basis of “objective criteria” given that it considered only 
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the impact of gender diversity and not the legislative measure itself (mandatory quota) on 
company performance. In my opinion the Commission missed an important factor in its 
evaluations. The lack of information on how the given policy measure affects other than 
gender diversity aspects of corporate governance would not allow the Court to properly 
evaluate whether the goal of improved company performance can indeed be achieved with 
mandatory quota. The results of empirical research discussed in chapter 4 and chapter 5 
show that the type of a policy measure might indeed influence firm performance and group 
cooperation. In particular, mandatory quotas might negatively affect corporate performance. 
This effect would be crucial for evaluating the scope of limitations imposed by the Directive 
on property rights and freedom to conduct business protected by the EU Charter of 
Fundamental Rights. 
Similar to the EU Commission, the German legislator did not really evaluate the 
impact of mandatory quotas on company performance, but rather focused on the effects of 
gender diversity in corporate board on performance and competitiveness of German 
companies. Empirical findings discussed in chapter 4 and 5 provide arguments undermining 
the accuracy of the factual basis adopted by the German government for assessing the impact 
of the proposed policy measure. The legislator neglected studies analyzing experiences of 
countries which implemented mandatory quotas for corporate boards as well as other 
empirical research on the impact of mandatory quotas on peoples’ reactions and attitudes.455 
Therefore, it is doubtful that the German legislator fulfilled the Constitutional Court’s 
requirements for a proper evaluation of a factual basis as specified in the judgment on Co-
Determination Act when assessing the consequences of the Equal Participation Act for 
corporate governance and company performance. 
Furthermore, the government’s conclusion about a positive impact of the introduced 
legislation on company performance might be challenged given some negative effects shown 
in the studies. This might be crucial for evaluation whether the Equal Participation Act 
violates the constitutional rights, i.e., Articles 14 (1), 9(1) and 12(1) Basic Law. The 
influence of mandatory quotas revealed in the empirical research would be helpful in 
analyzing the impact of the Equal Participation Act on company profitability, dividend 
                                                 
455 The empirical findings on mandatory quotas were presented to the Parliamentary Committee 
working on the legislation draft in: Hirte, Stellungnahme zur Frage einer Geschlechterquote im Aufsichtsrat, 
2011, p.2-7. 
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policy, and the value of shares as well as organizational functioning of a company. These 
aspects are important for assessing the extent of limitations imposed on the constitutional 
rights. 
Despite the necessity to increase the number of females among board directors, the 
current measure in form of mandatory quotas is not optimal. Evaluating the extent of 
potential disadvantages imposed by the mandatory quotas requires detailed and 
comprehensive analysis of the existing scientific evidence on consequences of the proposed 
measures. Yet, the Commission as well as the German legislator neglected the evidence on 
several important and potentially detrimental consequences some of which I reviewed in 
chapters 4 and 5. Any future policy making initiatives or revisions of the existing once 
would greatly benefit from more careful and exhaustive review of the scientific work and 
better understanding of the processes influenced by the measures introduced. In particular, it 
is of a great importance to consider also the impact of a measure itself instead of focusing 
exclusively on the effects of an increased gender diversity a given measure would achieve. 
In addition, the research presented here indicates it is necessary to reconsider the 
economic rationale of mandatory quota.456 An alternative could be putting more emphasis on 
the equality rationale.457 If there are serious doubts about positive effects of mandatory 
quotas on company performance, it is rather unlikely that stressing economic rationale in a 
gender diversity debate will convince the involved actors to increase female participation in 
economic decision making. Additionally, further empirical research on alternative measures 
might help selecting most efficient ways of introducing more women on boards of directors. 
                                                 
456  Koch, ZHR 2011, 827, p.848. 
457 Choudhury, New rationales for women on boards 2014. 
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Appendix 1 
Sample instructions for the first part of the experiment are provided below. In cases 
where the gender conditions differ from the color conditions the respective wording is given 
in between 2 forward slashes: // “color condition” // 
Sample instructions for part 1 of the experiment 
You are about to take part in an economic experiment. In this experiment you can 
earn a significant amount of money depending on the choices you make. For this reason, it is 
essential to read the instructions carefully. 
The instructions you obtained are for your private use only. Please note that you are 
not allowed to communicate with other participants during this experiment. Should you have 
any questions, please ask us for assistance. If you do not comply with the rules, we will have 
to exclude you from the experiment and from all payments. 
During the experiment we do not speak of euros but of points. Your income will be 
calculated first in points. The total number of points collected during the experiment will be 
converted to euros at the end of the experiment. 
The total profit made during the experiment as well as the payment for filling in the 
online questionnaire will be paid out in cash at the end of the experiment. 
Today’s experiment consists of several parts. In the first part the participants are 
assigned to groups of 4. Each group of 4 consists of 3 male //”orange”// and 1 female 
//”green” // member. The 4-persons group will be divided into two-member groups, of 
which one is a high-stake and the other is a low-stake group. In this two-member group you 
are interacting from now on. //The information on which color you are assigned is provided 
in form of a colored point in the bottom left corner of your screen and is visible during the 
whole experiment.// 
The following conversion rate applies to the high-stake group: 
1 point = 16 cents 
And to the low-stake group: 
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1 point = 8 cents 
In our study the assignment to the low-stake or high-stake group is done according to 
gender //colors//. The high-stake group consists of only male //“orange”// participants, 
whereas the low-stake group consists of one male //“orange”// and one female //“green”// 
participant. Should you be male //the “orange” person//, there is a 2/3 probability you are 
assigned to the high-stake group. Female // “green” // participants are always assigned to the 
low-stake group. 
This part of the experiment consists of two stages. In both of the stages you receive 
the same task. There is only one difference between the both stages. In one stage (individual 
task) the points gained in the task are ascribed to your individual account, whereas in the 
other stage (group task) the points are ascribed to the two-member group account.  
The task in stage 1 and stage 2 
In both stages you have 120 seconds to solve the task. The task is to move a slider 
exactly at the position of 50. For each slider solved, depending on the stage you are in at the 
moment, one point is ascribed either to your group account (group task) or to your individual 
account (individual task). You are informed on the screen which stage you are entering and 
in which stage you are at the moment. The task looks in the following way: 
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Your profit in this part of the experiment consists of two parts: 
 The points, gathered in the individual task (“Profit from the individual 
task”) 
and 
 The “Profit from the group task”. The profit from the group task is a 0.6 
share of the sum of slider solved by you and the other member of your two-
member group. 
Your profit in points from the both stages is calculated in the following way: 
 
The profits in points are calculated according to the same formula for each of the 
players from your group. 
If, for example, the sum of all contributions of the group members is 60 points, you 
and the other player from your group receive the profit from the group task of 0.6*60 = 36 
points. 
If the players solve altogether 9 sliders in the group task, you and the other player 
from your group receive 0.6*9=5.4 points from the group task. 
Control Questionnaire 
In order to make sure that you understood the instructions and you can take 
part in the experiment, please answer the following comprehension questions. Should 
be anything unclear, please ask us for assistance. 
Please mark the correct answers. There might be more than one correct answer to 
each question. 
Profit in points from the both stages: 
= 1*(slider solved in the individual task) + 0.6*(the sum of all sliders solved in 
the group task) 
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1. How likely it is, that you will be assigned to the high-stake group in this part of the 
experiment //if you are a “green” person//? 
● 0% 
● 100% 
● 66,7% 
● 50% 
2. //How likely it is, that you will be assigned to the high-stake group in this part of the 
experiment if you are an “orange” person? 
● 0% 
● 100% 
● 66,7% 
● 50%// 
3. How is your profit in the group task calculated? 
● According to the number of sliders solved by myself. 
● According to the number of sliders solved by myself and the other 
member of my group: The player, who solved more sliders, gets the bigger 
share of the group account. 
● According to the number of sliders solved by myself and the other 
member of my group: The number of sliders solved by each of the players is 
summed up and each player received the equal share of the group account. 
 
4. How does the high-stake group differ from the low-stake group? 
● To receive the payment of 4 € a member of the low-stake group needs 
to solve more sliders than a member of the high-stake group. 
● The high-stake group receives more points pro slider in the group task 
than in the individual task. 
● Both groups receives are paid equally in the group task; however the 
high-stake group receives more in the individual task. 
● For each slider solved a member of the high-stake group receives more 
points than a member of the low-stake group, irrespective of whether it is a 
group or an individual task. 
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Sample instructions for part 2 of the experiment – performance rule 
Now, the second part of today’s experiment is about to begin. 
At the beginning of the second part you are in the same two-member group as in the 
previous part of the experiment. //The assignment to the specific color does not change.// 
This part of the experiment consists of two stages – an individual task and a group task, that 
you take part in within the two-member group (either the high-stake or the low-stake group). 
The type of a task is identical as in the first part of the experiment. After those two stages 
you are asked to fill out a short questionnaire. Then the experiment is over and you receive 
your payment. 
Before you proceed with a task, there is a group change within the 4-member group 
formed at the very beginning of the experiment. A member of the low-stake group with the 
highest average number of sliders solved (average from the group task and individual task in 
the first part of the experiment), switches to the high-stake group. In case of an equal number 
of slider, it is decided randomly which of the two low-stake group players switches the 
groups. In exchange, one member of the original high-stake group is randomly chosen to 
switch to the low-stake group. 
This part of the experiment consists of two stages. In both stages you are asked to 
solve an identical task. There is only one difference between the both stages. In one stage 
(individual task) the points gained in the task are ascribed to your individual account, 
whereas in the other stage (group task) the points are ascribed to the two-member group 
account. 
Your profit in points from the both stages is calculated in the following way: 
Control Questionnaire 
In order to make sure that you understood the instructions and you can take part in 
the experiment, please answer the following comprehension questions. Should be anything 
unclear, please ask us for assistance. 
Please mark the correct answers. There might be more than one correct answer to 
each question. 
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1. What criterion is applied in order to choose a member of the low-stake group who 
switches to the high-stake group? 
● Who switches to the high-stake group depends on the performance in 
the group task in the first part of today’s experiment: A person, who solved 
the highest number of sliders in the group task switches to the high-stake 
group. 
● Who switches to the high-stake group depends on gender //the color//. 
The female //“green”// person switches to the high-stake group. 
● Who switches to the high-stake group depends on the performance in 
the individual task in the first part of today’s experiment: A person, who 
solved the highest number of sliders in the individual task, switches to the 
high-stake group. 
● Who switches to the high-stake group depends on the average 
performance in the slider task: A person, who on average solved more sliders, 
switches to the high-stake group. 
Sample instructions for part 2 of the experiment – quota rule 
Now, the second part of today’s experiment is about to begin. 
At the beginning of the second part you are in the same two-member group as in the 
previous part of the experiment. //The assignment to the specific color does not change.// 
This part of the experiment consists of two stages – an individual task and a group task, that 
you take part in within the two-member group (either the high-stake or the low-stake group). 
The type of a task is identical as in the first part of the experiment. After those two stages 
you are asked to fill out a short questionnaire. Then the experiment is over and you receive 
your payment. 
Before you proceed with a task, there is a group change within the 4-member group 
formed at the very beginning of the experiment. The female //green// member of the low-
stake group switches to the high-stake group. In exchange, a male //orange// member of the 
original high-stake group is randomly chosen to switch to the low-stake group. 
This part of the experiment consists of two stages. In both stages you are asked to 
solve an identical task. There is only one difference between the both stages. In one stage 
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(individual task) the points gained in the task are ascribed to your individual account, 
whereas in the other stage (group task) the points are ascribed to the two-member group 
account. 
Your profit in points from the both stages is calculated in the following way: 
 
Control Questionnaire 
In order to make sure that you understood the instructions and you can take part in 
the experiment, please answer the following comprehension questions. Should be anything 
unclear, please ask us for assistance. 
Please mark the correct answers. There might be more than one correct answer to 
each question. 
1. What criterion is applied in order to choose a member of the low-stake group who 
switches to the high-stake group? 
● Who switches to the high-stake group depends on the performance in 
the group task in the first part of today’s experiment: A person, who solved 
the highest number of sliders in the group task switches to the high-stake 
group. 
● Who switches to the high-stake group depends on the gender //color//. 
The female //green// person switches to the high-stake group. 
● Who switches to the high-stake group depends on the performance in 
the individual task in the first part of today’s experiment: A person, who 
solved the highest number of sliders in the individual task, switches to the 
high-stake group. 
Profit in points from the both stages: 
= 1*(slider solved in the individual task) + 0.6*(the sum of all sliders solved in 
the group task) 
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● Who switches to the high-stake group depends on the average 
performance in the slider task: A person, who on average solved more sliders, 
switches to the high-stake group. 
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